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Abstract
A Telling Silence: Nietzsche on the Downfall of the Dialectic presents a rereading of Nietzsche's 
work in the German original with a view to the conspicuous silence in which Nietzsche 
shrouds his relationship to the dialectic. The study shows how this silence is betrayed in the 
intricacies of Nietzsche's writing, and in turn betrays the nature of his relationship to the 
dialectic as integral to his thinking and inherent in his historical position as a philosopher. 
Nietzsche's distinct use of the terms Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft indicates that he thinks his 
fundamental thought specifically as Wiederkunft and, correspondingly, determines being as 
bringing-forth, as giving-birth, as Niederkunft. Since Niederkunft, in metaphysical terms, 
describes the tragic act per se, this definition of being coincides with the definition of being as 
tragedy, which had preoccupied Nietzsche since his youth. An inquiry into the fact that 
Nietzsche hardly speaks of work at all shows, accordingly, that he renounces the notion of 
the human that has characterized Western philosophy since Plato. As the first thinker of the 
West, he defines the human not in work, but in labour and in this sense not as man, but as 
woman -  signalling, thus, a solution to the dead end of the master-slave-dialectic. Finally, the 
I study questions the tradition of reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion, which prevails in 
Nietzsche scholarship to date, and presents Nietzsche's thinking as the antidote to the 
explosive age of dialectics. As it ascribes to Nietzsche's thinking the implosion of the 
dialectical age as well as the emergence of a new era of human life on earth, it depicts his 
thinking in essence as the Niederkunft of the Western system of thought, and subsequently 
examines its implications today.
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Conclusions on Method: A Preface
An aphorism, properly stamped and moulded, has not been 
'deciphered' just because it has been read out; on the contrary, 
this is just the beginning of its proper interpretation, and for this, 
an art of interpretation is needed.1
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality
The aphoristic writing of Friedrich Nietzsche requires by his own reckoning an art of 
interpretation -  and not a methodology -  in order to reveal its full magnitude. An art of 
interpretation suggests above all that the interpretation entails an element of creation: it 
suggests that something is made of the original text. In this sense, an art of interpretation is 
the very opposite of a method, which, wittingly or not, always forestalls the results it is 
willing to accept as such. A method, in other words, closes down an interpretation even 
before it has begun, whereas Nietzsche's understanding of art in general would suggest that 
an art of interpretation opens up an interpretation such that it, in turn, gives rise to ever new 
interpretations. If Nietzsche recommends that his thinking should be approached thus, he 
implies that there is never a complete, a definitive or even a finished interpretation of his 
thinking: there is always more to be made of his thought. An interpretation of Nietzsche can 
only ever be one among many; in this sense, I do not intend my reading of Nietzsche to lay 
claim to the truth. And conversely, it is precisely because for Nietzsche himself, 'it is clear
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 9.
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that interpretation is always unfinished72 and there is always more to be made of his thinking 
that I ventured to write on Nietzsche at all, even in an age that has already seen a wealth of 
Nietzsche scholarship.
I approached the study of Nietzsche7 s work with no more methodical an intention than 
to listen to him as best I could. In contradistinction to much of the contemporary scholarship 
on Nietzsche, I therefore always proceeded from reading his work in the German original, 
and consequently, I have at times used material which is not yet readily available in 
translation; in these instances, the translations given in the text are my own. As my argument 
rests on the intricacies of Nietzsche7s writing, which point to and indeed beyond the 
conspicuous silence that surrounds his relationship with the dialectic, the secondary 
literature on Nietzsche's work has not in itself been a focal point of my research. I chose the 
secondary texts that I have consulted according to what I discovered in Nietzsche's own 
writing, without prescribing a format and a method for their use at the outset.
Like so many a reader of Nietzsche, I have been seduced by his style and hence I 
grounded my analysis of his thinking in the subtleties of his language; contrary to many of 
the seminal commentaries on his work, however, I have confined myself solely to the 
metaphysical aspect of his thought. I do not examine Nietzsche as a lyricist, a dramatist or a 
polemicist, siding rather with Martin Heidegger's view that Nietzsche is not a 'poet- 
philosopher' or a 'philosopher of life',3 but always and everywhere a thinker of metaphysics 
in the strictest sense. Correspondingly, I follow Heidegger's argument that Nietzsche's
2 Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', translated by Alan D. Schrift, in: Gayle L. Ormiston /
Alan D. Schrift (eds), Transforming the Hermeneutic Context (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1990), pp. 59-67 (p. 64).
3 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes I  and I I , translated by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1991), I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 5.
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thought, whilst it marks no doubt a turning point in the history of the West, is ultimately still 
deeply engrained in the tradition of Western philosophy.4 It is in this context that my 
approach led me to address Nietzsche's relationship to Hegel, which, it seems, has always 
fascinated as well as perturbed those who engage with both of these thinkers. In 
contemporary scholarship, Elliot L. Jurist detects a growing 'uneasiness with the conception 
of Hegel and Nietzsche as philosophical opposites',5 which I certainly share, if only to the 
extent that I do not take their positions to be mutually exclusive. I am not, however, looking 
to reconcile their thinking; I am not looking for the 'compromise' between Hegel and 
Nietzsche, which Gilles Deleuze already suspected to be impossible,6 and I am not even 
trying 'to place Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with one another',7 as Jurist and Will 
Dudley,8 among the most prominent contemporary scholars, profess to do. And yet, if I am 
uncomfortable with aiming for a reconciliation or a 'consensus'9 between Nietzsche and 
Hegel and even with engaging them in conversation, I am equally uncomfortable with 
reading their relationship as a 'hand-to-hand combat',10 as Jacques Derrida has suggested, or 
reducing Nietzsche's thought to an 'attack' on Hegel's system.11 It is, indeed, on the very 
same grounds that these positions arouse my suspicion, for a relationship of combat and 
attack of the other, no less than one of reconciliation and dialogue, remains in essence a 
dialectical one. By contrast, I suggest a reading of the relationship between Hegel and
4 Cf. Heidegger, 'Nietzsche as the Thinker of the Consummation of Metaphysics', in: Nietzsche: 
Volumes I I I  and I V ,  edited by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), III: The Will to 
Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, translated by Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell and Frank A. 
Capuzzi, pp. 3-9.
5 Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency (Cambridge,
Massachussets: MIT Press, 2000), p. 1.
6 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983), p. 
195.
7 Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche, p. 2.
8 Will Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. i.
9 Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche, p. 2.
10 Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otiobiography, Transference, Translation, edited by Christie 
McDonald, translated by Peggy Kamuf from the French edition by Claude Levesque and Christie 
McDonald (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), p. 23.
11 Cf. Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy, p. 237.
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Nietzsche which makes the two thinkers part of the same tradition, and yet opposites in their 
respective take on it, which grants a complimentary quality of their thoughts12 without the 
possibility of reconciliation and which, in short, depicts their relationship as forever 
confrontational in the most immediate sense. In contradistinction to those who, following 
Karl Lowith, view Hegel and Nietzsche as the two opposing ends which delineate the 
nineteenth century in the history of German thought,13 I detect in their respective thinking 
not just parallels of a more or less contingent nature, but a point of convergence, as both 
thinkers approach, albeit from different angles, the last thought that is possible in Western 
metaphysics. In this sense, I presume much closer a relationship between Hegel's and 
Nietzsche's thought than most commentators do, certainly those who, with Lowith, perceive 
a clear break between Hegel's completion and Nietzsche's new beginnings,14 or indeed those 
who, with Heidegger, view Nietzsche as the last metaphysician and thus cast Hegel in the 
role of his precursor. And yet, at the very point of their convergence, I detect an 
irreconcilable element in the thoughts of Hegel and Nietzsche: an element of confrontation, 
which, I contend, is in essence anti-dialectical. This take on Nietzsche's position vis-a-vis 
Hegel is crucial to my interpretation of his thought on the whole; in principle, my reading 
expands, indeed, on Max Horkheimer's and Theodor Adorno's view that Nietzsche was one 
of the few after Hegel who recognized the dialectic of enlightenment.15
In examining the convergence of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thinking at the end of the 
philosophical system of the West, I focus in particular on its implications on our definition of
12 I would not, however, want to follow Will Dudley in his call for 'Hegelians and Nietzscheans to 
engage in a harmonious collaboration'. Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy, p. 238.
13 Karl Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionare Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts 
(Stuttgart: Fischer, 1969), p. 7.
14 Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionare Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, p. 8.
15 Max Horkheimer /  Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, edited by Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, translated by Edmund Jephcott ( Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 36.
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the human, and it is in this context that I discuss the dialectic of master and slave and the 
role it assigns to work in the constitution of the human. Today, it may seem that work is no 
longer a philosophical question but has become a topic for economics or sociology, as Lowith 
suggests, but I contest his view that Karl Marx was the last thinker who actually grounded 
the social and economic issues of work in philosophy,16 suggesting rather that Nietzsche's 
thinking engages, indeed, no less than Marx's or Hegel's with the role of work in our 
conception of the human. In this context, I discuss the absence of woman in the master-slave 
dialectic and explore her existence -  in contradistinction to man's -  in terms of the human 
consciousness it evokes. Inasmuch as it engages, thus, with Nietzsche's thinking of woman, 
my reading of his thought delves into what has always been one of the most controversial 
aspects of his thinking. As opposed to most of the early Nietzsche scholars, who 'followed 
one of Nietzsche's most famous commentators, Walter Kaufmann, in dismissing his 
comments on women as unfortunate products of his time and irrelevant to his philosophy',17 
I side with the majority of more recent interpretations which, particularly from a feminist 
perspective, emphasize that his remarks cannot be ignored. In fact, I detect in Nietzsche's 
thinking of woman the central theme of his thought, and precisely in this respect, I also 
diverge from much of what has become the canonical scholarship on Nietzsche and the 
feminine. It seems, indeed, that much of the controversy that still surrounds Nietzsche's 
thinking of woman is rooted in the very fact that work is today no longer examined in a 
philosophical way at all, or at best only, as in Lowith's own analysis, in terms of its societal 
and cultural implications in the history of the bourgeois-Christian world18 but not in its 
theoretical origins in the dialectic of master and slave. Accordingly, Nietzsche's thinking of
16 Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionare Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, p. 307.
17 Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall, 'Introduction: Why Feminists Read Nietzsche', in: Oliver /  
Pearsall (eds), Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche (University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), pp. 1-17 (p. 1).
18 Cf. Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionare Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 
pp. 287-314.
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woman has largely been treated as a more or less problematic appendage to his thought, to 
be investigated in societal, political or psychoanalytic terms; it has not, however, been 
explored as his central metaphysical thought. Such an interpretation, I suggest, has the 
potential to qualify many a criticism that has been levelled against Nietzsche in relation to 
his remarks on women. If Nietzsche thinks "woman7 purely in metaphysical terms, his views 
are not a question of his personal experience, which certainly reflects on Malwida von 
Meysenbug's criticism, who, as one of the earliest commentators on his views on women 
"renounced his generalizing judgments" on the grounds that "he hardly knew any women".19 
Similarly, Keith Ansell-Pearson"s point that to "overlook, or to disregard ... Nietzsche's sexist 
remarks is ... politically dangerous"20 is no doubt a valid one regardless of whether or not 
Nietzsche's comments were actually intended in a political way; and nonetheless, the view 
that Nietzsche thinks woman precisely not in political terms, as I suggest, sheds no doubt a 
different light on any criticism of his remarks on political grounds. It is certainly not my 
intention to defend Nietzsche against his critics or be in any way apologetic about his views 
but, by the same token, the thinker that emerges in my reading is neither a hopeless 
misogynist nor, indeed, a dysfunctional neurotic, whose questionable views on women can 
be traced, to his family situation.21 If I do not expand on Nietzsche's thinking of woman in 
social, political and psychoanalytic terms, it is not, however, because I dismiss the validity of 
such arguments. The relationship between man and woman is of course always a social and 
political question, but I would contend that in the philosophical tradition of the West, it is
19 Bianca Theisen, 'Rhythms of Oblivion" in: Peter J. Burgard, Nietzsche and the Feminine 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), pp. 82-103 (p. 82).
20 Keith Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche, Woman and Political Theory" in: Paul Patton (ed.), Nietzsche, 
Feminism and Political Theory (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 35.
21 Kelly Oliver, for instance, traces 'Nietzsche's troubled relation to "the feminine'" to his family 
circumstances of 'The Abject Mother' and 'The Dead Father" and concludes that he ultimately 
'fetishizes the abjection itself. He fetishizes the womb of being where there are no borders between 
truth and falsity, good and evil, creation and destruction, mother and son, masculine and feminine'. 
Oliver, 'Nietzsche's Abjection' in: Burgard, Nietzsche and the Feminine, pp. 53-67 (pp. 53,57,63,65).
*
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always also -  and indeed primarily -  a metaphysical one. In discussing Nietzsche's thinking 
of woman as a category of human consciousness, I intend, thus, not so much to depart from 
previous scholarship on Nietzsche's thinking on woman, as in fact to engage with its 
underlying issues. To a certain extent, my reading follows, thus, in the footsteps of those 
who, after Alison Ainley, examined how '[b]y taking up the metaphoric potentials of 
pregnancy and femininity ... Nietzsche is able to effect a strategic parody of sexual 
difference',22 and those who, after Eric Blondel, read woman in Nietzsche's writing as 'the 
privileged metaphor of life'.23 I do not, however, interpret Nietzsche's remarks on woman 
only in metaphorical terms; hence, I could not agree with Alexander Nehamas' view that 
Nietzsche 'looks at the world as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, ... a literary text',24 
or with any other metaphorical interpretation which detects in Nietzsche's thinking 'not a 
theory of the world but a view of the ideal life'.25 If Nietzsche's views on woman constitute 
the centre of his philosophical system, as I suggest, his thought defines being as a whole as 
gynaecomorphism and, indeed, in such a way that this definition of being is grounded not in 
an ideal but in this world -  and in this world only.
In the course of my research, I have also encountered secondary texts that could not 
add to my reading of Nietzsche, nor contradict it in any way but prima facie -  most notably, 
Luce Irigaray's Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Blanchot's The Writing of the 
Disaster. Irigaray's female address of the male philosopher in Marine Lover of Friedrich
22 Alison Ainley, '"Ideal Selfishness": Nietzsche's Metaphor of Maternity' in: David Farrell Krell /  
David Wood (eds), Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-lnterpretation (London: 
Routledge, 1988), pp. 116-130 (p. 126).
23 Eric Blondel, 'Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor' in: David B. Allison, The New Nietzsche: Contemporary 
Styles of Interpretation (Cambridge, Massachussets: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 150-175 (p. 156).
24 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 3.
25 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 7.
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Nietzsche laments, and thus also reinforces, the female position as that of the other;26 hence, 
the possibility that Nietzsche thinks being as gynaecomorphism, as I suggest, undermines 
her reading in its very premises. In the case of Blanchot's The Writing of the Disaster, the 
discrepancy stems from his approach to the task of interpretation. Criticizing that Nietzsche, 
'without reflecting', sometimes 'borrows his language from the Christian commonplaces of 
the time',27 Blanchot suggests that there is, at times, an accidental quality about Nietzsche's 
writing. As he forecloses, thus, the possibility that every word in Nietzsche's texts carries 
meaning, Blanchot excludes the implicit meanings that I discern in Nietzsche's words from 
the very outset of his interpretation.
My prioritisation of Nietzsche's own writing over the secondary literature is mirrored 
in the structure of my argument. Each chapter opens with a reading of Nietzsche's writing in 
the original and proceeds to explore its broader meanings on the grounds thus laid out. And 
just as each chapter describes a trajectory from Nietzsche's own words to their wider 
implications, the study as a whole describes a trajectory from the very intricate analysis of 
Nietzsche's language in the opening chapter to an overview of the implications of his 
thought for our age in the closing one.
Examining Nietzsche's communication of his thought of eternal return in Chapter One, 
I suggest that his distinct use of the terms Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft proves that he thinks 
his fundamental thought precisely and specifically as Wiederkunft and, correspondingly, 
determines being as bringing-forth, as giving-birth, as Niederkunft. I expand upon this 
reading of Nietzsche's fundamental thought in regard to his position in the history of
26 Cf. Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991).
27 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 123.
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philosophy in general and his standing vis-a-vis Hegel and Hegel's re-incamation as 
Zarathustra in particular.
In a close reading of The Birth of Tragedy in Chapter Two, I argue that what is often 
regarded as an insignificant work of Nietzsche's youth shows, in fact, that Nietzsche thought 
his fundamental thought as Niederkunft long before he thought it as the eternal return of the 
same and as will to power. I explore the metaphysics of Niederkunft as the tragic act per se in 
relation to Nietzsche's notion of art as the truly metaphysical activity of man. In the tragic 
fate of the dialecticians Socrates, Faust and Bartleby, I show the intricate relationship 
between the tragic and the dialectic and their critical juncture in Nietzsche's thinking.
In Chapter Three, I look at the implications of Nietzsche's thinking for the definition of 
the human. Noting that Nietzsche does not speak of work in a philosophical sense, I examine 
his silence against the Western tradition, which, from Plato's Republic and the Bible onwards 
seeks in work the defining quality of man. I examine this definition in comparison with the 
essence of woman in Western thought and, discussing the distinction between work and 
labour, suggest a definition of woman as the human consciousness that arises in labour, as 
opposed to work. Reading Nietzsche as the first thinker of the West to define the human not 
in work but in labour and, thus, not as man but as woman, I explain how his thinking paves 
a way around the dead end of the master-slave-dialectic and implies a future for mankind on 
earth.
Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine the history of Nietzsche scholarship and question 
the tradition, prevalent to date, of reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion. Examining the 
self-consciousness of Nietzsche's thinking as a symptom of his historical position, I suggest
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that his thinking describes not so much an explosion as the implosion -  the giving-in and the 
Niederkunft -  of the Western system of thought. In looking at the singular role that 
Heidegger's reading has played in Nietzsche scholarship, I elucidate the grounds for my 
own allegiance to the commentator who has to date most definitively described Nietzsche's 
thinking as implosion. I conclude by examining the role of Nietzsche's thinking for the 
contemporary age and its implications for reading Nietzsche today.
In this sense, the question of a method, the question of how it is possible and what it 
means to read Nietzsche today, has in fact been the object and the outcome of my research 
much more than a consideration which preceded it. At the end of my study, I realize how 
much it is still a beginning -  and I hope that it will be a beginning in the way that reading 
Nietzsche should, by his own admission, always be a beginning: a preface.28
28 Cf. Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996).
1From Wiederkunft to Niederkunft: 
Towards a Rereading of the Eternal Return
I again plant myself in the soil out of which I draw all that I will 
and can -  I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos -  I, the 
teacher of the eternal recurrence.. .*
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
The thought of eternal return emerged as Nietzsche's fundamental thought only relatively 
late. It was not until several decades after Nietzsche's lifetime that Martin Heidegger's 
hugely influential lecture series on Nietzsche revealed its position at the very core of 
Nietzsche's thinking. Reading the whole of Nietzsche's thinking as a thinking of the eternal 
return, Heidegger recognized this thought as a strangely opaque epitome of Nietzsche's 
work and pointed to its singular and controversial position within the whole of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. 'No wonder', he grants, that previous 'commentators have felt it to be an 
obstacle and have tried all sorts of maneuvers to get round it, only grudgingly making their 
peace with it'.2 Today, it is not necessarily any easier to get to grips with Nietzsche's thought 
or to make one's peace with it; and as it has been established as the epitome of Nietzsche's 
thinking, it would be practically impossible to 'manoeuvre around' it. If the thought of 
eternal return is Nietzsche's fundamental thought, any serious reading of Nietzsche engages 
and ought to engage with it in one way or another. As Nietzsche himself, however, never
1 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), pp. 29-122 (p. 121).
2 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 5.
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discussed and hardly ever even mentioned the thought of eternal return explicitly, a reading 
of it will often rest on what is merely implicit in his famously metaphorical writing. In this 
sense, a reading of the eternal return promises to be most instructive in Nietzsche's German 
original. This is not to say that Nietzsche's work has not sparked some of its most important 
repercussions in translation or that it is any more untranslatable than other texts. But even if, 
as Nietzsche himself professed, it is 'neither the best nor the worst of a work which is 
untranslatable',3 it is nonetheless precisely this, the untranslatable, which shows a thought in 
all its manifestations and implications, in its richness, abundance and entirety.
Wiederkunft and Wiederkehr, The Two Modes of the Return
In German, Nietzsche refers to his thought of eternal recurrence as die ewige Wiederkunft -  
and in the work he intended for publication, he always refers to it thus. His specific usage of 
the term Wiederkunft in contradistinction to the synonyms or near-synonyms that the German 
language offers cannot be replicated in a translation, far less his juxtaposition of the terms 
Wiederkunft and Wiederkehr. In English, the consistent use of the words 'return' and 
'recurrence' can only indicate the fact of a distinction, but not its nature. Whilst it can, thus, 
serve to direct the reader to the German original, it will not in its own right provide much of 
an insight into Nietzsche's thinking of the eternal return. Even in the German, however, 
Nietzsche's usage of the terms is hardly conspicuous at first and has therefore rarely been 
commented on. A remarkable exception is an article by Peter Murray, who ventures:
3 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, translated by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 119.
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Nietzsche uses two words to refer to his teaching of the eternal return, namely, 
Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft. I would like to examine their differing origins and to 
suggest that it is unlikely that Nietzsche found the two to be interchangeable.4
Nietzsche does, indeed, use both terms throughout his work and he does not use them 
interchangeably, but this is precisely because he does not, as Murray suggests, use both terms 
to refer to his thought of eternal return. In fact, Nietzsche employs the term Wiederkehr to 
denote a recurrence in any sense other than that of his thought of eternal return -  which, by 
contrast, he consistently refers to as Wiederkunft. In Ecce Homo, for instance, Nietzsche says 
Wiederkehr and not Wiederkunft when he speaks of 'a real return of German seriousness and 
German passion in spiritual things',5 or when he speaks of the 'return of milder, more 
philanthropic thoughts',6 thoughts which he believes were indicative of the proximity of a 
herd of cows, that is, of the simple ruminating herd animals so often the symbolic target of 
his scorn. Elsewhere, of course, the distinction may not be quite so obvious. In the Twilight of 
the Idols, as Nietzsche writes
What did the Hellene guarantee to himself with these mysteries? Eternal life, the 
eternal recurrence of life; the future promised and consecrated in the past ...,7
he does indeed use the phrase 'die ewige Wiederkehr',8 seemingly contrary to his otherwise 
consistent usage. In this particular instance, however, he refers not so much to his own key 
thought as to the ideas of recurrence as they prevailed in ancient Greek thinking. And in this
4 Peter Murray, 'Nietzsche's New Wiederkunft, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 17 (1999), 70-72 (p. 70).
5 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin, 2004), p. 56, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Georgio Colli /  Mazzino Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke. 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter), Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner /  Gotzen-Dammerung /  Nachgelassene 
Schriften (August 1888 -Anfang Januar 1889): Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysos-Dithyramben, Nietzsche 
contra Wagner (1969), pp. 253-372 (p. 316).
6 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 75, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 340).
7 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (p. 120).
8 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (p. 120), and 
'Gotzen-Dammerung' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen- 
Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 49-157 (p. 153).
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sense, the passage does not constitute an exception to his usage of the terms; on the contrary: 
it is a particularly striking illustration of his juxtaposition of the terms in that it shows that he 
does not render the phrase of the eternal recurrence as Wiederkunft where it does not in 
essence relate to his own fundamental thought. In his choice of the terms, Nietzsche indicates 
thus that despite his usual emphasis on their kinship he does, in fact, perceive a substantial 
difference between Greek ideas of recurrence and his own thinking of the eternal return. It is 
this difference which establishes his thinking as a development and as a completion of 
metaphysics, as opposed to a simple regression to the thought of the ancients. As Heidegger 
explains,
Nietzsche's philosophy is the end of metaphysics, inasmuch as it reverts to the 
very commencement of Greek thought, taking up such thought in a way that is 
peculiar to Nietzsche's philosophy alone. [...] Nietzsche by no means recovers 
the philosophy of the commencement in its pristine form. Rather, here it is purely 
a matter of the reemergence of the essential fundamental positions of the 
commencement in a transformed configuration.9
Here as elsewhere, Heidegger is much more emphatic than Nietzsche himself about the fact 
that Nietzsche thinks the eternal recurrence precisely not in the way of the Greeks or as a 
return to Greek philosophy but as 'a matter of overcoming the doctrine of the eternal flux of 
things and its essentially destructive character'.10 Nietzsche himself is seldom as explicit 
about his relationship vis-a-vis early Greek philosophy as he is in an unpublished note of the 
early 1880s, which reads, 'I teach you redemption from the eternal flux'11 -  redemption, that 
is, from this most famous Greek notion of eternal return in die philosophy of Heraclitus. 
Much more frequently, his writing reveals only implicitly that he acknowledges a difference 
between Greek philosophy and his own in thinking the eternal return. And yet, subtle
9 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 199-200.
10 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 146.
11 Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vll/1: 
Nachgelassene Fragmente Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84 (1977), p. 209; translation as quoted in: Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 146.
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though it may be, his specific usage of the terms Wiederkunft and Wiederkehr shows that he 
perceives these two notions to pertain to categorically different modes of return.
In this light, it seems no doubt peculiar that he suggests in Ecce Homo that the
doctrine of Eternal recurrence7, that is to say of the unconditional and endlessly 
repeated circular course of all things -  this doctrine of Zarathustra could possibly 
already have been taught by Heraclitus.12
On the face of it, Nietzsche professes here a real kinship between Heraclitus' thinking and 
his own, and to be sure, he always felt that it was the Greeks and Heraclitus in particular 
whose thinking came closest to his own -  closest, that is, but not necessarily close. In fact, in 
the way it is phrased, his statement already conveys a good deal of doubt, and rather than 
testifying to the correspondence of their thinking, threatens to betray the distance between 
them. Nietzsche, inasmuch as he refers here to Wiederkunft,13 seems to argue that Heraclitus, 
too, could have been thinking the thought of eternal recurrence beyond a simple Wiederkehr 
and in line with his own thought of eternal return. But does it not seem that Nietzsche's 
phrasing of the argument says precisely the opposite; does it not seem that it suggests that 
Heraclitus could at best have thought Nietzsche's thought of eternal return, die ewige 
Wiederkunft, in inverted commas? Similarly, Nietzsche appears to use the term Wiederkunft in 
reference to a Greek way of thinking as he explains in Ecce Homo t hat he had already 
prophesied 'the return of the Greek spirit'14 in his first published work, The Birth of Tragedy. 
But again, the phrasing of his statement could also indicate precisely the opposite. After all, 
Nietzsche's choice of the term Wiederkunft might imply that he is in fact referring to his own
12 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 51.
13 Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen- 
Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 311).
14 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 52, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/ Gotzen-Dammerung/ Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 312).
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thinking here. Read thus, his statement would indicate that, in retrospect at least, Nietzsche 
saw The Birth of Tragedy not so much as an exploration of a Greek way of thinking as an 
anticipation of his own fundamental thought. And in this sense, Nietzsche's statement not 
only places The Birth of Tragedy much closer to the core of his thinking than is usually 
presumed; it also reveals much more of his intricate relationship with Greek philosophy and 
grants us, thus, much more of an insight into his thinking, than if it merely testified to a slip­
up in his usage of the terms.
The one instance where Nietzsche employs the term Wiederkunft such that it clearly 
does not refer to the thought of eternal recurrence is in The Anti-Christ, as he traces the 
origins of Christianity and speaks about the point at which
there is introduced into the type of the redeemer ...: the doctrine of a Judgement
and a Second Coming15 [die Lehre vom Gericht und von der Wiederkunft].16
In this case, the break with Nietzsche's specific use of the terms is evident even in the 
translation, which renders Wiederkunft in this context not as return or as recurrence but as 
'Second Coming'. The term denotes here indeed not just a return but a resurrection and, 
more specifically, the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In what can only be described as a 
vehement criticism of Christianity Nietzsche refers, thus, to Christ, no less, by the very term 
he elsewhere uses to point to his own fundamental thought and to the overcoming of 
Christianity in his thinking. The contradiction, however, is merely apparent; for Nietzsche 
read in the figure of Christ also die very opposite of Christians and of Christianity. In The 
Anti-Christ and indeed in the passage above, he expands on precisely this discrepancy 
between Christ himself and die image presented of him in Christianity, arguing that
15 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 123-199 (p. 166).
16 Nietzsche, 'Der Antichrist' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  
Gotzen-Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 162- 252 (p. 213).
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Jesus had done away with the concept of 'guilt7 itself -  he had denied any chasm 
between God and man, he lived this unity of God and man as his 'glad tidings' ...
And not as a special prerogative!17
In this light, the term Wiederkunft sits no doubt much more easily in a reference to Christ. If 
Nietzsche points out that the doctrine of Christ's Second Coming is something that was later 
introduced into the Christian ideal of the 'redeemer', he is nonetheless aware that it is only 
there that Christ reveals himself to be god as well as man. Only in his Second Coming, 
imposed on him by his following though it may be, does Christ actually live the unity of man 
and god; and only thus does he begin to resemble Nietzsche's Overman, who also lives as 
man and god. In this sense, the term Wiederkunft points here once again towards Nietzsche's 
own fundamental thought; it reveals that Nietzsche saw in the figure of Christ someone who 
might well have anticipated the Overman.
It seems, thus, that even where it is not immediately obvious or entirely 
straightforward, Nietzsche does not use Wiederkunft and Wiederkehr synonymously but is in 
fact very consistent in his specific usage of these terms. He is certainly and very obviously 
consistent in that he renders his thought of eternal recurrence as Wiederkunft wherever he 
refers to it explicitly -  in a first note of August 1881, as well as in the plans for the work he 
did not finish, in Zarathustra's Seven Seals,1* as well as in declaring himself, in the Twilight of 
the Idols, the 'teacher of the eternal recurrence'.19 It is Nietzsche's first communication of this 
thought, however, which paints the most vivid image of it. What if, Nietzsche ventures in 
The Gay Science, a demon were to suggest that
17 Nietzsche, 'The Anti-Christ' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 123-199 (p. 166).
18 Nietzsche, 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' in Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/1: Also Sprach 
Zarathustra (1883-1885) (1968), pp. 283-287.
19 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (p. 121), and 
'Gotzen-Dammerung' in Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen- 
Dammerung / Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 49-157 (p. 154)
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[t]his life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great 
in your life will have to return to you [wiederkommen20], all in the same succession 
and sequence.21
Nietzsche does not even name the eternal recurrence as such here -  and yet, speaking for the 
first time of this very thought, he renders the verb "to return7 not as wiederkehren or any other 
near-synonym, but as wiederkommen -  in the verb form, that is, of Wiederkunft. In his first 
account of his fundamental thought, Nietzsche announces it not as Riickkehr or as Riickkunft 
or as Wiederkehr; in this first account, the teacher of the eternal recurrence already reveals 
himself as the teacher, precisely and specifically, of Wiederkunft.
♦ ♦ ♦
It is no coincidence that Nietzsche chose the term Wiederkunft over the feasible alternatives to 
describe his thought of eternal recurrence. Today, it may sound like the more formal term in 
comparison to Wiederkehr, but this is a relatively recent distinction which would probably not 
have been relevant in a nineteenth-century work. There are, however, other slight 
divergences in meaning between the two words, although they can nearly always be used 
synonymously; and it is these differences which shed light on Nietzsche7 s choice of the 
terms. Amongst the meanings and former meanings of Wiederkehr, the Grimms7 German 
dictionary cites return or recurrence in the general sense, a return in the particular sense of a 
return to god or a return to virtue, and historically in some instances also a compensation or
20 Nietzsche, 7Die frtihliche Wissenschaft' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, v/2: Idyllen aus 
Messina/Die frohliche Wissenschaft/ Nachgelassene Fragmente: Friihjahr 1881 bis Sommer 1882 (1973), pp. 
11-335 (p. 250).
21 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 273.
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compensatory damages.22 The verb wiederkehren, correspondingly, means to return or to 
recur, historically also in the more specific senses of to return or to repay a favour, to return 
to the straight and narrow, to return to faith, or to return something to its previous state; 
wiederkehren could, moreover, in some instances mean to repeat itself, to compensate, to 
recompense, to rectify, to regret, to repent or to do penance.23 As for Wiederkunft, the 
Grimms7 dictionary mentions that, aside from its meaning of return or recurrence in a 
general sense, the term could refer more specifically to the return of someone from a journey, 
from foreign parts or from banishment, and it could imply joy and happiness at the return of 
someone who has been away for a long time or has returned from great danger. Historically, 
Wiederkunft could in some instances also be used to mean future, Zukunft.24 Similarly, the 
verb wiederkommen which nowadays means simply to return or to recur, includes amongst its 
historic meanings to encounter, to recover, to heal and to regain strength, to come to from a 
state of unconsciousness, to rise from the dead and to return to life.25 On the whole, it seems 
that of the two terms Wiederkehr implies the greater focus on the past; its connotations, in that 
they draw largely on the re-gret, the re-tum, the re-action, emphasize the negative, the sense 
of passing and highlight, thus, the transience inherent in repetition. Wiederkunft, on the other 
hand, seems to point more to the future; its connotations, insofar as they draw not so much 
on the passing but on the arrival, on the coming again, on the active and the positive, 
highlight, thus, the being anew that is also inherent in repetition and in the eternal return of 
the same. It is on these connotations that Nietzsche's use of the terms draws. He refers to his 
fundamental thought as Wiederkunft because he thinks it, precisely, as Wiederkunft. And 
thinking the recurrence as Wiederkunft and not as Wiederkehr is what makes it the redemption
22 Jakob Grimm /  Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch (Leipzig: Hirzel), XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. 
Teil: Wenig-Wiking (1960), pp. 1068-1072.
23 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, xiv. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig-Wiking, pp. 1072-1079.
24 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, xiv. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig-Wiking, pp. 1093-1095.
25 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig-Wiking, pp. 1086-1091.
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from the eternal flux, the "liberation7, in Heidegger's words, "from the irreducible, ceaseless 
""forever the same""".26 In everyday use, to be sure, the difference between Wiederkunft and 
Wiederkehr appears so small that it is usually considered to be negligible. But small though it 
may be, this difference is categorical for Nietzsche's purposes. Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft 
denote two different modes of the return, and the difference changes everything. It reflects 
the difference between the thought of eternal flux and the thought of eternal return: between 
the Greek notion of recurrence and Nietzsche's own thinking of it. At a first glance, no doubt, 
even Nietzsche's formulation of the thought of return 'introduces an immense, paralyzing 
indifference into all beings and into human behavior".27 Nietzsche, however, thinks the 
eternal return precisely not so that it results in indifference, as Greek notions of recurrence 
did, but so that it "grants supreme lucidity and decisiveness to beings at every moment'.28 
Ultimately, Greek notions of recurrence allowed the philosophy and the entire "history of 
antiquity ... to get bogged down in fatalism'.29 But thinking the same thought slightly 
differently, as Nietzsche does, has radically different implications. It is this small but all- 
important difference between the modes of return that he marks in his choice of the terms 
Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft.
Mostly, the difference between the two modes of return is merely implicit in 
Nietzsche's writing. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, however, he provides a more explicit 
description in the powerful image "Of the Vision and the Riddle". Zarathustra and the dwarf 
both know the solution to this riddle to be a circle -  and yet, the way they think the circle, the 
eternal return, is radically different:
26 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 147.
27 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 147.
28 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 147.
29 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 132.
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The gap opens between two things that in one way are alike, so that they appear 
to be the same. On the one side stands the following: 'Everything is nought, 
indifferent, so that nothing is worthwhile -  it is all alike’. And on the other side: 
'Everything recurs, it depends on each moment, everything matters -  it is all 
alike’.
The smallest gap, the rainbow bridge of the phrase it is all alike, conceals two 
things that are quite distinct: 'everything is indifferent' and 'nothing is 
indifferent'.30
This is, indeed, the 'smallest gap' which separates Nietzsche's thinking from Greek notions 
of eternal recurrence. In his specific use of the term Wiederkunft for his own thought of 
return, Nietzsche acknowledges this distinction -  and thus, in turn, opens up the gap that 
separates Wiederkunft from Wiederkehr and illustrates that the terms, in some ways so similar, 
can also be radically distinct. It is in this sense that Nietzsche's thinking pervades into his 
language, and vice versa, in a way that a translation could hardly replicate. A good 
translation, however, is never simply a replication, Wiedergabe’, it is itself a kind of 
Wiederkunft: a coming again, a re-emergence, a rebirth of meaning -  and in this sense true to 
Nietzsche's metaphorical style.31 Words, to Nietzsche, are 'themselves ... nothing other than 
interpretations',32 and the way in which he uses the word Wiederkunft certainly makes the 
term metaphorical. The word Wiederkunft, in that it denotes the intricacies of a particular 
mode of the return, in and of itself already describes how Nietzsche thinks his fundamental
30 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 182.
31 Cf. Walter Benjamin, 'The Task of the Translator', translated by Harry Zohn, in: Marcus Bullock /  
Michael Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, I: 1913-1926 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 253-263; Benjamin, 'Die Aufgabe des 
IJbersetzers' in: Gesammelte Schriften, i v / l  (Werkausgabe 10): Kleine Prosa /  Baudelaire-Ubertragungen, 
edited by Tillman Rexroth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 9-21; and Jacques Derrida, 
'Letter to a Japanese Friend', translated by David Wood and Andrew Benjamin, in: Peggy Kamuf, A 
Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 269-276.
32 Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', in: Ormiston /  Schrift (eds), Transforming the Hermeneutic 
Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, pp. 59-67 (p. 65).
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thought. And inasmuch as it is reminiscent of Niederkunft,33 it already hints at another 
formulation of this thought in Nietzsche's writing.
Wiederkunft and Niederkunft as Manifestations of Nietzsche's Central
Thought
If Nietzsche's term for his principal thought, die ewige Wiederkunft, resounds with Niederkunft, 
it points first of all to the fact that thoughts of pregnancy, of creation and of bringing forth 
prevail everywhere in his work. Nietzsche, no doubt, felt himself to be 'a thinker big with 
thought'.34 In an unpublished note of the early 1880s, he muses:
What keeps me alive? Pregnancy: and every time a work was bom, my life hung 
by a thin little thread.35
It is not only in relation to the circumstances of his thinking, however, that Nietzsche uses 
the language of pregnancy and of giving birth; he also describes the object and the essence of 
his thoughts in these terms. He is, as Derrida observes, 'the thinker of pregnancy which, for 
him, is no less praiseworthy in a man than it is in a woman'.36 Indeed, the fact that he 
describes in the thought of Niederkunft not only the modality of his thinking but the essence 
of being as a whole reveals that he thinks being as Niederkunft, even if he does not discuss or
33 Niederkunft: delivery, childbirth, lying-in, confinement; in: Karl Wildhagen /  Will Heraucourt, 
English-German, German-English Dictionary in Two Volumes (Wiesbaden: Brandstetter; London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1964), II: German-English, p. 833.
34 Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's S ty les/ tperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, translated by Barbara Harlow 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 65.
35 ‘Was erhdlt mich am Leben ? Die Schwangerschaft: und jedes Mai wenn das Werk geboren war, king das 
Leben an einem diinnen Fadchen'. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, Vll/1: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84, p. 121.
36 Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles/  Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, p. 65 (my italics).
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even mention this thought explicitly.37 It is only the implicit prevalence of the thought of 
Niederkunft in Nietzsche's work which reveals its central importance for his thinking. In the 
Twilight of the Idols, for example, Nietzsche writes:
the 'pains of childbirth' sanctify pain in general -  all becoming and growing, all 
that guarantees the future, postulates pain ... For the eternal joy in creating to 
exist, for the will to life eternally to affirm itself, the 'torment of childbirth' must 
also exist eternally .. .M
In this instance, the connection between Nietzsche's thoughts of Wiederkunft and Niederkunft 
emerges much more explicitly than elsewhere in his work. For if Nietzsche argues that life, in 
order to affirm itself, implies the 'torment of childbirth', he effectively states that the eternal 
recurrence of the same, die ewige Wiederkunft, implies as its modus operandi the existence of 
childbirth -  die Niederkunft. In this sense, the two thoughts are essentially connected, to the 
extent that they describe the same phenomenon. Just as the thought of Niederkunft implies 
affirmation despite the pain and the danger of childbirth, the thought of Wiederkunft, as 
Nietzsche thinks it, stipulates affirmation despite the terror it evokes -  for, as Deleuze points 
out, only that which is affirmed returns.39
Elsewhere, the connection between Nietzsche's thoughts of Wiederkunft and Niederkunft 
may not be quite so obvious, but it is always palpable in his writing. Ultimately, if being and 
hence everything that is is thought in terms of the eternal recurrence of the same, as
37 A rare exception is a letter to Franz Overbeck, where Nietzsche refers to his thinking explicitly as 
Niederkunft as he writes: 'Die unausgesetzte schmerzliche Entbehrung an allem Nothdiirftigen, Trostlichen, 
Stdrkenden, lange zusammengeprefit durch meinen iiblichen Gedulds-Stoicismus, bricht von Zeit zu Zeit 
heraus, und zwar wie mir scheint, immer am stdrksten nach einer neuen "Schwangerschaft" und 
“Niederkunft"'. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (13/14 November 1884) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausga.be (Berlin: de Gruyter), m/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 
1880-Dezember 1884 (1981), p. 555.
38 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (p. 120).
39 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 189.
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Nietzsche proposes, it follows that 'there will be nothing new in it'40 ever -  and everything 
that is yet to occur must already be implicit in the present. The future can only be brought 
forth by what already is; equally, what exists at present can in essence only bring forth and 
give birth to itself. Bom of the past, so to speak, the present is pregnant with the future. This 
is not to say that for Nietzsche the future is determined as such. The world, thought with 
Nietzsche as 'perpetual Becoming' and 'as a totality of force [which] is nonetheless 
inherently finite,... produces "infinite" effects'.41 There is, in other words, a limited number 
of states that the world can attain, but this does not mean that the future is strictly 
determined or in any way predictable. The future occurs, rather, as the chance emergence of 
one of the world's potential constellations over all its other possible states. In this sense, it 
comprises chance and necessity in such a way that they are no longer opposites. Each 
constellation of the world emerges by chance, and yet, since their number is ultimately finite, 
emerges necessarily and will necessarily recur in all eternity. The 'total character of the 
world', Nietzsche concludes, 'is in all eternity chaos -  in the sense not of a lack of necessity 
but of a lack of order'.42 Thus it is that Nietzsche's thinking of the eternal return pertains in 
essence to the structure of Niederkunft. The modality of the future as Nietzsche thinks it is the 
modality of giving birth, of Niederkunft: the bringing forth of that which is both necessity and 
chance. Indeed, the structure of time more generally corresponds in Nietzsche's thinking to 
the structure of Niederkunft. To think the eternal return thus that it does not become the 
crushing 'forever the same' which leads to indifference and fatality, it has to be thought as 
incessant Niederkunft of the world, as the world's eternal bringing forth and creating itself 
anew. Every moment is different from the preceding one on account of what has been 
brought forth and is now actual, and what will be brought forth from this moment and is in
40 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 273.
41 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 89.
42 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 168.
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this sense implicit in it. As each moment is bom from the preceding one and in turn gives 
birth to the next, it seems almost as if Nietzsche's thinking of the 'Ring of Recurrence'43 
entails something of a linear progression of time. And indeed -  is not a circle in a sense a 
line? For even if, in other words, the 'path of eternity is crooked',44 as Zarathustra's animals 
observe, it is still a path.
Nonetheless, Nietzsche's thought of eternal return eventually emerges as a radical 
break with the notion of linear progression as it prevails in the dialectical age. Initially, no 
doubt, the discrepancies seem to be small. The circle described in the eternal return entails a 
linear aspect which, though it simply accounts for its inherent necessity, appears to be 
reminiscent of the dialectical notion of linear progression. In fact, however, the progression 
of the dialectic cannot, despite appearances, be reduced to a linear movement anyway. The 
dialectic may lay claim to a linear progression, but in the sense that it comprises the back- 
and-forth between the opposites and the upwards movement of Auftiebung, it would be more 
accurate to describe it as having a helix structure -  a structure, that is, which implies a 
circular movement. Hegel himself compared the dialectic to a circle, illustrating thus that it is 
'not only an advancing process but a retrograde one at the same tim e'45 When Adorno, 
however, later concludes that '[t]o this extent, the picture of the circle describes it correctly',46 
he also implies that it is only this far that the analogy holds true. The image of the circle 
describes only one aspect of the dialectic; it describes the dialectic from one point of view - 
and there is indeed a point from which a helix structure looks like a circle. Ultimately,
43 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zamthustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, translated by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp. 244-247.
44 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 234.
45 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 
157.
46 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 157.
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however, the dialectic is always more than a circle and more than the return to the father7.47 
There is always -  and inherent in the operation of Aufhebung -  a sense of the dialectic going 
beyond itself, of going on and going up. In this sense, it emerges that in the thought of 
eternal return, which resists the upward urge of Aufhebung, Nietzsche thinks in fact the anti- 
dialectical. The circle of the eternal return is essentially an anti-dialectical figure, although it 
is certainly not undialectical. The undialectical in Nietzsche's dunking is, rather, that which is 
not affirmed and which therefore does not return. As Deleuze pointed out, the thought of 
eternal return implies that '[ojnly that which affirms or is affirmed returns7;48 what is not 
affirmed, on the other hand, disappears into nothingness -  never to be recuperated, never to 
be appropriated and in all eternity meaningless. The undialectical, in other words, is that 
which is not brought into the world again through affirmation. And in the light of what is at 
stake, it is evident that this act of affirmation cannot be taken lightly; it is always painstaking, 
all-important and all-deciding. In this respect, too, the thought of eternal return corresponds 
to the creative affirmation of Niederkunft. As a bringing-to-life, Niederkunft constitutes first 
and foremost a simple affirmation of life; ultimately, however, it is also an affirmation of life 
over and beyond one existence, and in this sense even at the expense of life, for it stipulates 
the death of one for the other to live. All giving birth and all 'reproduction demands the 
death of the parents who produced their young only to give fuller rein to the forces of 
annihilation7.49 In this sense, the act of Niederkunft implies the affirmation not so much of one 
individual life as of life itself. It is, essentially, the affirmation that brings life to life. In a letter
47 Cf. Derrida, Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone, 1993), pp. 75-94, and 
Glas, translated by John P. Leavey jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 
pp. 75a-79a.
48 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 189.
49 Georges Bataille, Eroticism, translated by Mary Dalwood (London: Marion Boyars, 1987), p. 61.
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of December 1882, Nietzsche suggests as much as he writes: 'It appears to me that only the 
state of pregnancy ties us, time and again, to life'.50
As the process of life bringing forth life in Niederkunft and thus perpetuating life itself, 
the circle of the eternal return touches upon the question of god. In Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche even asks himself whether his thought of return 'would ... not be -  circulus vitiosus 
deus'?51 This consideration is certainly remarkable, if only because he speaks of god here, 
although he had already proclaimed his death in The Gay Science of 1882. Little wonder, then, 
that Heidegger, too, opens his analysis of the passage in astonishment and with a series of 
questions:
We cannot believe our eyes and ears: 'circulus vitiosus deus?' Circulus means the 
circle and the ring, hence eternal recurrence, indeed as vitiosus; vitium means 
defect, malady, something destructive; circulus vitiosus is the ring that also 
necessarily brings recurrently this vitium. Is it deus? Is it the god himself, the one 
whom Nietzsche at the end of his way still calls -  is it Dionysos? And in the 
sphere of this god -  the world?52
The malady, the vitium, that the circulus vitiosus brings back -  could this, Heidegger asks, be 
deus, god? Does the circle of the eternal return reproduce everything as it was and is -  and 
with everything, god? 'At all events, here we have a question,' Heidegger concludes: 'So, 
then, God is not dead? Yes and no!'53 The moral god, no doubt, met his death in Nietzsche's 
thought. Nietzsche's dictum of the death of god, however, refers not only to the moral god, 
for if the character of the world and of being as a whole is thought as eternal return of the 
same, god as the creator is redundant, devoid of power and meaning -  dead. And in this
50 'Es scheint mir, dafl allein der Zustand der S c h w a n g e r s c h a f t  uns immer wieder an’s Leben anbindet'. 
Nietzsche to Hans von Bulow (early December 1882) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, 
ill/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 290.
51 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translated by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 82.
52 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 65.
53 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p p .  65-66.
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sense, the eternal return of the same is the end -  and in fact also the goal -  of the dialectic. In 
the incessant striving for the other, the dialectical man never aimed for anything but god, 
who, in Derrida's words, is the 'wholly other'.54 But as soon as man has attained god, he has 
also killed him, for a god who is on a par with man has expired as god. After this death of the 
altogether other, the dialectic does not have a direction or an aim any longer and collapses 
within itself. With the death of god, the dialectical helix falls back upon itself and forms the 
circle of the eternal return. As well as god himself, the location or the dimension of god is 
now missing from the world. For Karl Jaspers, indeed, the thought of the eternal recurrence 
cannot be thought in the presence of a god. 'If there were gods', Jaspers argues, 'there would 
be nothing to create'.55 And yet, it is precisely in Nietzsche's thought of eternal return that 
man himself finally becomes a creator and thus, if only in this sense, a god. As the eternal 
return is revealed as the ultimate goal of the dialectical man, it emerges on the other hand 
that it also reproduces, in a sense, the man who believes that he could be god and who 
finally believes himself to be god. There is, in other words, in Nietzsche's thinking of the 
return always the potential for a return of the dialectical man. Correspondingly, there is in 
Nietzsche's thinking always the potential for a god. In fact, Heidegger suggests that the 
existence of a god is not so much an obstacle as indeed the prerequisite for man to become a 
creator. For, Heidegger asks,
[w]hat would remain for human beings to create ... if gods were always available 
and merely at hand? [...] Is it not the case that the god must first of all be created?
Do we not require supreme force to be able to create something out beyond 
ourselves? And prior to that, must not man himself, the last man, the 
contemptible man, be re-created to that end?56
54 Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 
78 and passim.
55 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, translated by 
Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 432.
56 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 67.
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If Heidegger suggests, thus, that man requires a god in order to create something beyond 
himself, this does not necessarily contradict Jaspers' observations that the existence of a god 
is detrimental to human creation. The discrepancy, rather, points to the fact that Nietzsche's 
thinking marks the transformation of man's relationship to his god. It is certainly true that 
man cannot be a creator, properly speaking, as long as god alone reigns over the only 'true', 
that is, the transcendent world. And it is, on the other hand, no less true that man, having 
after all first created this god and then killed him, could create another god. This, indeed, is 
what is at stake in Nietzsche's thinking. In his controversial prophesy of the 'birth of the 
Overmen',57 he anticipates a human society which defines its relationship to god in very 
different terms to the way we see ourselves vis-a-vis the sacrificial Christian god. The birth of 
the Overmen -  and it is not a coincidence that Nietzsche speaks of 'birth' here -  denotes 
simply the beginning of a new relationship between man and god: a relationship of mutual 
enjoyment and of love, reminiscent, as Deleuze explains, of Ariadne and Dionysos.58 It is in 
this sense that man, as Heidegger suggested, requires god in order to truly overcome himself 
and create himself anew in the Overman, who is bom of man and god and, to be precise, of 
the dialectical man and his god.
Once the dialectic has killed the god that was its goal, it collapses within itself; it comes 
down onto itself and with itself: this is the Niederkunft of the dialectic in both senses of the 
term. It describes the dialectic bringing forth the Overman and creating the possibility of a 
new human existence on earth. In the more literal but rarer usage of the term, Niederkunft 
also denotes a simple coming-down from above; in this sense, it describes the same process 
in terms of the dialectic moving backwards. The two meanings of Niederkunft not only
57'Die Geburt der l i b e r me n s c h e n ' .  Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, Vll/1: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84, p. 117.
58 Cf. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 186-198.
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describe two aspects of Nietzsche's thinking; in their discrepancy they also highlight the 
inherent problem of the dialectic, which could produce something truly other and truly 
beyond itself only if it were to go backwards and against itself to the extent that it expires. 
Creation is against the very nature of the dialectic. Everything in the dialectic is synthetic but 
strictly speaking nothing is created or even produced, because the dialectic can never bring 
forth; it only ever preserves. It is only in its end, in its death, that it is truly creative; and it 
expires precisely because it ultimately only works against itself. In the Negative Dialectics, 
Adorno notes that
[w]hat tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the reconcilement for which 
it mistakes itself. The violence of equality-mongering reproduces the 
contradiction it eliminates.59
Indeed, Adorno highlights here not only the inherent contradiction of the dialectical 
principle, he also illustrates how the anti-dialectical principle emerges, as he explains 
elsewhere, at the very core of the dialectic.60 In the sense that the dialectic reproduces the 
contradiction it eliminates, it reveals in this act of producing alone the anti-dialectical 
principle operating at its heart. For once the dialectic not only preserves but produces, the 
principle at its core is no longer dialectical; it is no longer one of Aufhebung but one of 
Niederkunft. This, precisely, is the inherent problem of the dialectic: ultimately, its only goal is 
its own annihilation. Since its inception in ancient Greece, however, dialectical thinking has 
been very careful in its denial of its apocalyptic nature. In thinking the thought of eternal 
return, Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West to recognize the imminent crisis in thought. 
The thought of eternal return, as Nietzsche was well aware, describes tire ultimate 
catastrophe of the dialectic. In April 1887, he writes to Franz Overbeck:
59 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 142-143.
60 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
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This winter I have perused enough of the European literature to be able to say 
now that my philosophical position is by far the most independent, much as I feel 
myself to be the heir to several millennia. Contemporary Europe has no idea of 
the terrible decisions around which my whole nature revolves and of the wheel of 
problems to which I am tied -  and that in me a catastrophe is preparing, the name 
of which I know but will not pronounce.61
Describing himself as the 'heir' to the tradition of Western thinking, Nietzsche acknowledges 
his place within it, despite the fact that his thought also constitutes a marked break with this 
tradition. And as he announces a catastrophe the name of which he will not utter, it is almost 
as if the term 'catastrophe' speaks for itself. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term 
'from Latin catastropha, from Greek Catastrophe 'overturning, sudden turn', from kata- 'down' 
+ strophe 'turning' (from strephein 'to turn')'.62 And what is Nietzsche's thought, if not a 
sudden overturning of the dialectic, an implosion of the dialectic, a shift from Aufhebung to 
Niederkunft -  and in this sense precisely a sudden down-turning?
♦ ♦ ♦
With Nietzsche's thought, thinking in the West changes fundamentally. The thought of 
eternal return determines being as a whole as becoming -  as creation, as bringing forth. In 
this sense, Niederkunft comes to describe the configuration of the world as a whole. 
According to Nietzsche, the world is 'a permanent becoming',63 and yet, 'what becomes is
61 ‘Diesen Winter habe ich mich reichlich in der europaischen Literatur umgesehen, um j e t z t  sagen zu konnen, 
dafi meine philosophische Stellung bei w e i t e m  die unabhdngigste ist, so sehr ich mich auch als Erbe von 
mehreren Jahrtausenden ftihle: das gegenwdrtige Europa hat noch keine Ahnung davon, um welche Jurchtbaren 
Entscheidungen mein ganzes Wesen sich dreht, und an welches R ad von Problemen ich gebunden bin -  und 
dafi mit mir eine K a t a s t r o p h e  sich vorbereitet, deren Namen ich weifi, aber nicht aussprechen werde'. 
Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (14 April 1887) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, I I I /5: 
Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889 (1984), p. 57.
62 Judy Pearsall (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 
287.
63 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 109.
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inasmuch as in creation it becomes being and is becoming'.M The world is thus in a perpetual 
state of becoming being and being becoming and in this sense in a perpetual state of 
pregnancy and of giving birth: in a state of Niederkunft. And conversely, it is this state of 
Niederkunft which, for Nietzsche, determines the constitution of the world. It is what 
characterizes the world as such, that is, as the world, as Zarathustra suggests when he 
recounts:
When the moon rose yesterday I thought it was about to give birth to a sun, it lay 
on the horizon so broad and pregnant.
But it was a liar with its pregnancy; and I will sooner believe in the man in the 
moon than in the woman.65
Zarathustra does not believe in the woman in the moon; he does not believe that the moon is 
capable of giving birth. If the world is determined by its state of Niederkunft, he indicates, 
thus, that the moon does not pertain to this world. The moon is here an image of the 
transcendental, of the place which, according to Western metaphysics, would grant the real, 
the truthful, the 'immaculate'66 perception of the world. But this place, Zarathustra observes, 
has no real bearing upon the world and its claim to this end is a lie. In this sense, his tale 
shows how Nietzsche thinks the end of the transcendent world. If Nietzsche, as Karl Jaspers 
explains, thinks 'the world as pure immanence',67 this is not to say that he stipulates that 
there can be nothing other than this world. Nietzsche, Jasper argues,
does not reject the possibility of countless worlds in addition to this one in which 
and as which we are. But these worlds would in no way concern us, while the 
assertion that the other world is the only true one affects our entire Existenz.68
64 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 200.
65 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 144.
66 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 144-145.
67 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, p. 319.
68 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, p. 319.
22
From MHeder^ unft to y/iederfainft: Towards a %§reading o f the ‘EtemaCGtgtum
It is not that Nietzsche's thinking altogether abolishes the transcendent world but it abolishes 
it as such, as over and above the world. The transcendent loses its essence, that is to say, its 
transcendental place; it either becomes meaningless or it comes into the world. In this sense, 
too, that is, in that it effects the transcendent to become part of the world, Nietzsche's 
thinking determines the world as Niederkunft: in the more literal sense of the word. And this 
constitutes an essential change of the world as a whole; for with the transcendental world, 
what has hitherto been die 'immanent' world has also been changed fundamentally, as 
Nietzsche acknowledges when he writes:
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world 
perhaps? ... But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!69
With the transcendent world, the immanent world has equally been abolished as such, that is, 
in its essence as the merely-temporal and the merely-worldly, as the 'apparent' which has no 
stake in the truth. Now the 'immanent', the stuff of this world, has the potential to acquire 
meaning above the merely particular. Nietzsche, as Jaspers points out,
... transcends life to a more-than-life, from the standpoint of which life can be 
judged, affirmed, and denied, but he does this in such a way that this innermost 
essence of man -  his more-than-life -  is itself still thought of as life, as pure 
immanence, and not as Existenz confronting transcendence.70
What has changed with Nietzsche's thinking is the relationship between life and the more- 
than-life. In the world after Nietzsche, even that which transcends life in one way or another 
remains part of life. The world does no longer offer the unaffected and 'immaculate' 
perspective of the moon, but it does offer elevated perspectives such as that of the eagle, who
69 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols', in: Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (p. 51).
70 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, p. 324.
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is one of Zarathustra" s animals.71 These are, however, always tied to the world much more 
than the "transcendental world" of old and they only ever afford temporary glimpses. In 
Nietzsche's thinking, the more-than-life is always characterized by its imminent coming- 
down into the thick of life again. Thus it is that the thought of eternal return determines the 
world as eternal Niederkunft not only in the sense of an eternal giving birth and bringing 
forth but in the sense also of a constant coming-into-the-world of that which, however long 
or briefly, transcended it. The theme of Niederkunft is, thus, not simply a thought that 
preoccupied Nietzsche incidentally; it seems, rather, that it touches upon the essence of his 
thinking. In an unpublished note of the mid-1880s, Nietzsche describes "[t]he world as a 
work of art that gives birth to itself -  ",72 that is, not in terms of the eternal return of the same 
but in terms of Niederkunft. In this instance, it certainly seems that the thought of Niederkunft 
constitutes no less a definition of the world than the thought of eternal return and indeed 
defines the world in very much the same way. It seems, in other words, that the thought of 
Niederkunft is another configuration of Nietzsche's fundamental thought of eternal return, die 
ewige Wiederkunft.
♦ ♦ ♦
If the thought of Niederkunft is to be understood as another expression or manifestation of 
Nietzsche's fundamental thought, it raises, first of all, a series of questions. For how are these 
manifestations different and how are they related? Why are there even different 
manifestations of this one thought? And why is it that Nietzsche himself never actually 
speaks of his fundamental thought as Niederkunft? In the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger, for
71 Cf. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 52-53, and Heidegger, 'Zarathustra's Animals" in:
Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 45-48.
72 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage, 1968), p. 419.
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one, discerns two manifestations of what he calls Nietzsche's 'fundamental' thought: the will 
to power and the eternal recurrence of the same. He argues that these are essentially two 
expressions of one thought; the difference is that
[t]he determination 'will to power' replies to the question of being with respect to 
the latter's constitution; the determination 'eternal recurrence of the same' replies 
to the question of being with respect to its way to be.73
Both of these phrases express thus the same thought, but they each describe it in a particular 
manner or mode. The fact that there are, indeed, two manifestations of Nietzsche's 
fundamental thought, Heidegger argues, lies in the nature of the question of being itself, 
which can be interpreted and answered in two different senses: it can either refer to the 
constitution of being or to what Heidegger calls its 'way to be'. In this respect, it seems that 
the thought of Niederkunft expresses Nietzsche's fundamental thought in the same way as the 
eternal return, that is to say, it describes the world with a view to ‘the way in which being as a 
whole is'.74 It says that the world, according to Nietzsche, is eternally propagating, creating 
and giving birth to itself. It is, thus, not a matter of how the question of being is addressed 
that distinguishes Wiederkunft and Niederkunft as configurations of Nietzsche's central 
thought; it is, rather, a matter of perspective. The expressions of Wiederkunft and Niederkunft 
both designate the character of being, but they differ in the respective position from which 
they describe the way being is. Being manifests itself as the eternal return of the same when 
the question of being is posed from the position of the philosopher, that is, from outside of the 
world it is to describe. From within the world, the eternal return would not appear as such. 
The determination of being as eternal return implies a perspective of eternity and of 
transcendence: it describes being from a point of view over and above the world. In fact, it 
implies the perspective of the recently-deceased god, whose place has been taken by the
73 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 199.
74 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 109.
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dialectical man who has since Socrates aspired upwards, to ever greater heights away from 
the world. This is the position that Nietzsche inherits in the history of Western thought; in 
this respect, his thinking remains within the Western tradition and in fact constitutes its 
culmination, as Heidegger argues.75 And it is precisely because Nietzsche is a philosopher in 
the traditional sense that the nature of being appears to him as eternal return of the same. 
His traditional position notwithstanding, however, Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West 
to look for the essence of the world in the world itself; he is the first of the philosophers to 
look down. In this sense, he certainly breaks with the Western tradition, albeit from a position 
bequeathed to him by this very tradition. Once again, Zarathustra's words best explain the 
situation, as he declares:
You look up when you desire to be exalted. And I look down, because I am 
exalted.76
In this respect, and notwithstanding their other differences, Zarathustra speaks also for 
Nietzsche, whose perspective on the world is equally that of one who looks down because, 
having completed die quest of the dialectic, he knows himself to be exalted. Indeed, the mere 
fact that Nietzsche looks down into die world for its essence reveals that he is speaking from 
a perspective over and above the world. And from this point of view, the nature of being 
appears as eternal return of the same. To one who is actually immersed in the world, on the 
other hand, and who is in this sense not exalted but looks at being from within, the nature of 
being, that is to say, the way being is, would appear not as eternal return but as Niederkunft. 
In the world, the nature of being shows itself as creation and as incessant giving-birth and, 
after Nietzsche, as the coming-down, the descent, the Niederkunft of the transcendent. A 
position within the grand circle of the eternal return does not afford a view of this circle
75 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 205 and passim.
76 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 68.
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itself. In the world that is determined by the eternal return, everything that is is in essence as 
Niederkunft in one sense or the other. It is in this sense that the thought of eternal return 
determines being as a whole as Niederkunft.
♦ ♦ ♦
As the thought of being as Niederkunft is so clearly related to Nietzsche's thought of eternal 
return, the question as to why Nietzsche himself never phrases his fundamental thought as 
Niederkunft is all the more pressing. The very first time he thought this thought, in the 
summer of 1881, he thought it as eternal return of the same, and he clearly described it as 
eternal return on several occasions later on in this writing, although it is remarkable how 
seldom he actually mentions it explicitly. Indeed, Nietzsche 'spoke of his fundamental 
thought either in very brief straightforward references or only circuitously, in cryptic 
passwords and parables'.77 In this later writing, he also refers to the other configuration of 
his principal thought, the will to power, and he does so rather more frequently than he 
mentions the eternal return. Nowhere in his writing, however, does he speak of Niederkunft 
in a way that would reveal it as a manifestation of his fundamental thought. He speaks of 
pregnancy, of creation and of giving birth, he speaks of women and of woman, and these 
images and allusions betray the fact that the thought of pregnancy preoccupies his thinking. 
And yet, although he evidently engages with the thought of Niederkunft all throughout his 
work, he never refers the term to being as a whole; he never describes the nature of the 
world explicitly as Niederkunft. Nor, indeed, would Heidegger's reading suggest that 
Nietzsche's thought could also manifest itself as Niederkunft, although it was Heidegger who 
recognized in the eternal return and in the will to power two manifestations of what he calls
77 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 14-15.
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Nietzsche's fundamental thought. Heidegger argues that the 'thought of eternal recurrence 
of the same is the inner -  but not the retrospective -  completion of the thought of will to 
power',78 and explains that
[pjrecisely for this reason Nietzsche thought eternal recurrence of the same at an 
earlier time than he did will to power. For when he thinks it for the first time, 
each thinker thinks his sole thought in its completion, though not yet in its full 
unfolding.79
That these two manifestations of Nietzsche's thought come to him at different times is, thus, 
to be explained by the fact that they each refer to a different mode of the question of being. 
The thought of Niederkunft, however, refers to the question of being in the same way as the 
thought of eternal return; as has been suggested above, they differ in terms of the perspective 
they stipulate respectively. Hence, if Nietzsche does not think of his principal thought as 
Niederkunft, this simply confirms that his point of view is not the one from which being 
appears as Niederkunft. Nietzsche, in other words, does not describe the world as Niederkunft 
because he does not see it as Niederkunft. He is -  and he always remains -  in a position from 
which he sees the nature of the world as eternal return. In this sense, he is merely anticipating 
a world in which the nature of being reveals itself as Niederkunft. And thus it is that he feels 
himself to be pregnant: for what is pregnancy, if not forthcoming, imminent Niederkunft? 
Now, Heidegger does not explicitly describe Nietzsche's thinking as Niederkunft, either, but 
he indicates that the thought of eternal return results in creation becoming the defining 
characteristic of being. He suggests that
[t]he thought of eternal return thinks being in such a way that being as a whole 
summons us without cease. It asks us whether we merely want to drift with the 
tide of things or whether we would be creators. Prior to that, it asks us whether
78 Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 10.
79 Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 10.
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we desire the means and the conditions by which we might again become 
creators.80
The thought of eternal return calls us into question because it entails the prospect of a 
radically different definition of man. By thinking being as eternal return or, what amounts to 
the same, by thinking being as creation and Niederkunft, man defines himself anew. It is in 
the nature of being, Heidegger explains, that it is in this sense determined by the question of 
being itself. The way the question of being is developed determines the innermost essence of 
being.81 Once we begin to think being as Niederkunft and thus incorporate the thought of 
Niederkunft, we determine the world such that it is in essence Niederkunft. And since man 
pertains to being as a whole, he too will now be defined anew; he too will now be defined as 
creator. The thought of Niederkunft reveals, thus, more readily than the thought of eternal 
return the extent to which Nietzsche's thinking draws man into question, with a view to 
woman as well as with a view to the end of man, to the overcoming of man. Ultimately, 
however, it is only in drawing himself into question that man can finally become himself. 
Only in coming down from the position above the world where he had searched for the 
truth, and for his own truth, has man become capable of defining himself. In this act of 
Niederkunft, he determines the world and himself as Niederkunft; he determines himself as 
creator and as the creator of himself. In this respect, it seems, Zarathustra is not only an 
advocate, a Fiirsprecher,82 someone who merely predicts and prophesies. He does not simply
80 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 174.
81 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same; cf. especially '25. The Essence of a 
Fundamental Metaphysical Position; The Possibility of Such Positions in the History of Western 
Philosophy7, pp. 184-197.
82 Cf. Heidegger, 7Who is Nietzsche7s Zarathustra?7 in: Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Return of the Same, pp. 
209-233. Heidegger discerns in the term Fiirsprecher a sense not only of 7speaking on behalf of7 but also 
of 7speaking forth7 and 7speaking before7.
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announce the thought of eternal return; he thinks it in such a way as to incorporate and to 
live it in all its implications -  for "Zarathustra begins by going under/ . 8 3
Zarathustra's Down-going: Decline, Demise and Destiny in the Dialectic
Zarathustra" s is no doubt a strange beginning, a strange prologue, which announces before 
all else his own demise, his down-going, his Untergang.84 "I must go down -  as men, to whom 
I want to descend, call it',85 he declares: 'Ich muss ... un tergehen '.86 The emphasis on the 
word untergehen refers not only to the fact of the down-going but also to its mode, in the 
sense that Zarathustra's down-going, thought in its entirety, comprises the different 
meanings of this term. Untergehen, the translator R. J. Hollingdale points out, "has three 
meanings: to descend or go down; to set (as of the sun); and to be destroyed or to go under"; 
he grants that there "is much play upon this triple meaning throughout the book' and that 
the "noun Untergang is treated in a similar way".87 The fact that Nietzsche describes 
Zarathustra's down-going as Untergang -  and not as Niedergang or as Niederkunft -  indicates 
that he thinks it in the interplay of these different connotations of the word. He certainly 
does not think it as Niederkunft; and he could not have, for Zarathustra's down-going would 
appear as Niederkunft only from within the world, which is not the position from which 
Nietzsche speaks as a Western philosopher. The word Niedergang, on the other hand, is 
almost synonymous with Untergang, and it seems that from Zarathustra's point of view, at 
least, his down-going could also be described as Niedergang. As Nietzsche only refers to it as
83 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 67.
84 Nietzsche, "Also Sprach Zarathustra' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/1: Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, p. 22.
85 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 39.
86 Nietzsche, "Also Sprach Zarathustra" in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/1: Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, p. 6.
87 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 339.
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Untergang, however, it seems that his perspective is not the same as Zarathustra's; in fact, it 
seems that Nietzsche's choice of the word Untergang implies that Zarathustra disappears out 
of his sight and leaves Nietzsche, and man in general, behind. If Nietzsche thinks of 
Zarathustra's journey not as a coming-down but as a going-down, this not a contradiction of 
the fact that his thinking is the thinking of Niederkunft', it merely reveals the nature of his own 
perspective as that of one left behind. By definition, Zarathustra's down-going into the world 
begins at a point over and above the world: at the point, that is, which the thinker has 
claimed in the long history of dialectics. This is the very perspective that Nietzsche, too, 
inherited from the philosophical tradition of the West and it is from this point of view that he 
observes Zarathustra's down-going; hence, he describes it not as Niedergang but as 
Untergang. For notwithstanding the fact that the two terms are often very close in meaning 
and sometimes overlap, the Grimms' dictionary also records a significant difference between 
them. The term Niedergang denotes a down-going from the very point the summit has been 
passed; whereas Untergang means the descent, the disappearance proper. In this sense, 
Niedergang would describe the path of the sun from midday on, whilst Untergang refers only 
to the setting of the sun in the evening.88 Accordingly, if Nietzsche describes Zarathustra's 
down-going as Untergang, he suggests that Zarathustra is about to be truly immersed in the 
world and that he is about to complete what man, who is at best engaged in a process of 
decline, Niedergang, has barely started. And indeed, Niedergang is the term that Nietzsche 
uses with disconcerting frequency to describe mankind. 'What!', he exclaims in Ecce Homo,
could mankind itself be in decadence? has it always been? -  What is certain is that 
it has been taught only decadence values as supreme values. The morality of 
unselfing is the morality of decline [Niedergangs-Moral] par excellence, the fact 'I 
am perishing' translated into the imperative 'you all shall perish' [zu Grunde gehn]
-  and not only into the imperative! .. ,89
88 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XI. Band, III. Abteilung: Un-Uzvogel (1936), pp. 1558-1559.
89 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 102, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner /  Gotzen-Dammerung /  Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 370).
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At the same time as pointing out that man as he is today is essentially decadence and 
Niedergang, however, Nietzsche insists that this Niedergang of man should not be halted but 
must in fact be completed. For when the decline of man is about to be completed, when 
Niedergang becomes Untergang, it acquires a positive and constructive meaning again. 
Similarly, when Nietzsche speaks of man's Zugrundegehen, he already points past the decline 
of man and to the positive that is inherent it. No doubt zugrundegehen in this context means 
first of all to go to the ground, to perish; at the same time, however, it entails a sense of going 
to the bottom of things. In fact, the expression resounds with auf den Grund gehen, which 
means to get to the bottom of the matter and to seek its essence. It is in this very sense that 
Nietzsche regards man, who is but decline, Niedergang, as a great promise. He sees in man's 
Niedergang already the possibility of his Untergang; that is to say, he discerns in the decline of 
man also the prospect of man immersing himself in the world in his search for its essence 
rather than seeking the truth of the world in its transcendent negation. In this sense, there is 
nothing sinister in Nietzsche celebration of man's decline, for he anticipates simply a new 
definition of man. At times, it seems indeed that he already thinks of man in terms of 
Untergang; thus, as he writes:
What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in
man is that he is a going-across [Ubergang] and a down-going [Untergang].90
In fact, however, Nietzsche is very specific in that he says here that there is something in man 
that he can celebrate, which implies that man is precisely not something that can be 
celebrated in its entirety. In this sense, the passage confirms rather than contradicts the fact 
that Nietzsche thinks of man as Niedergang and not yet as Untergang; for as long as man is not
90 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 44, and 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/1: Also Sprach Zarathustra, pp. 10-11.
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in essence Untergang but only the implicit promise of it, he cannot be loved unreservedly. 
Only once his decline, his down-going, is complete, will man be something that can be 
affirmed again. In celebrating the decline of man, Nietzsche is effectively promoting the 
process by which man becomes essentially positive again; and it is in this sense that 
Nietzsche's thinking reveals itself to be fundamentally anti-dialectical. As opposed to the 
dialectic, Nietzsche seeks the positive not in the negation of the negation,91 but in the 
affirmation of the negation. In this sense, Nietzsche's thinking of the decline of man such that 
it can be celebrated as his improvement is essentially anti-dialectical. On the other hand, 
however, this very decline of man is also the profoundly dialectical death of the dialectical 
man. In that the dialectic only ever aims for the other, it only ever aims for its own 
annihilation and for the rise of the anti-dialectical. And what could be the final goal of the 
dialectical man, if not his death, his Untergang? What, if not his down-going, could be the end 
of him who always aspired upwards? In one sense, the Untergang of the dialectical man is, 
thus, merely his inevitable death. In another, however, it is the first incorporation of the anti- 
dialectical principle and the first manifestation of Nietzsche's thinking, for in the death of the 
dialectical man, man is reborn such as Nietzsche thinks him. And it is not a coincidence that 
Nietzsche's thinking first manifests itself in this manner. The anti-dialectical principle first 
emerges, as Adorno explains, at the very core of the dialectic,92 which is, ultimately, 
constituted by the negation that is man. Thus it is that Nietzsche's thinking begins with man 
and with the question of what man might be.
♦ ♦ ♦
91 Cf. Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
92 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
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It seems that Nietzsche's usage of the term Untergang in its different connotations is, indeed, 
suggestive of the way in which he sees in man's decline also the emergence of a new 
definition of man. For apart from 'to go under' and 'to perish', the Grimms' dictionary 
records for the verb untergehen the meanings of 'to get under a weight or a burden in order to 
lift and carry it', and 'to examine and to investigate'.93 The word which best renders these 
meanings in English is the term 'to undergo', which according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary counts among its connotations:
To get under, search below. [...] To occupy oneself with; to investigate. [...] To 
get knowledge of. [...] To bear, endure, sustain, suffer, go through (pain, 
suffering, danger, etc.). [...] To bear, sustain (a burden, etc.). [...]To experience, 
pass through (a change or alteration). [...] To partake of, enjoy. [...] To expose 
oneself to (risk). [...] To take in hand; to undertake.94
The decline of man, as Nietzsche thinks it, comprises all of these meanings and it is in this 
sense that it also constitutes the potential of man. This is not to say that it does not imply the 
end of man as he is -  on the contrary. A man capable of bearing and sustaining a burden, of 
exposing himself to risk and of taking matters in his own hand would be the very opposite of 
the dialectical man. In the dialectic, all action is in essence negation and therefore nothing 
can ever be done or undertaken in the true sense; nothing can ever be truly borne or carried. 
Every act of Aufhebung, that is, every attempt at lifting-up, every attempt at safe-keeping and 
at sublimation implies the annihilation of whatever was initially meaningful enough for the 
dialectical man to aim to keep it safe. And nothing is ever truly at stake, for everything is 
ultimately annihilated and yet ultimately preserved in the double meaning of aufgehoben. It is 
this dialectical man who meets his death in Nietzsche's thinking of the Untergang of man; 
quite clearly so in the Untergang thought as man's 'going under' but ultimately no less in the
93 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XI. Band, III. Abteilung: Un-Uzvogel, pp. 1570-1571.
94 Murray, James A. H. /  Bradley, Henry et al (eds), The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition 
prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), XVIII: Thro-Unelucidated, p. 
965.
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Untergang thought as man's new 'undergoing'. In that this Untergang of man, which 
Zarathustra anticipates, stipulates that man bear a burden and take matters into his own 
hand again, it implies that he will finally overcome the nihilism, the lightness and the 
hollowness which allowed the dialectical man to rise above himself. And once man becomes 
strong and grounded again, he will at last be able to bear the thought of eternal return which 
Nietzsche described first of all as a burden.95 In this sense, Nietzsche's usage of the language 
confirms that his controversial dictum of the 'overcoming' of man is such that it cannot be 
attained in the dialectics of AuJhebung. Somewhat curiously, perhaps, the overcoming of 
man, as Nietzsche thinks it, requires of man a movement first and foremost not of 'Auf- but 
of 'Nieder-. And conversely, he discerns in the dialectics of Aufhebung its inherent Niedergang, 
its downfall. This is not, however, simply an instance of Nietzsche's 'eccentricity'; in fact, it 
shows that he thinks through -  and sees through -  the dialectic, to the extent that he 
recognizes the end of the dialectic already in its very beginnings. In Twilight of the Idols, he 
ventures:
This irreverent notion that the great sages are declining types [Niedergangs-  
Typen] first dawned on me in regard to just the case in which learned and 
unlearned prejudice is most strongly opposed to it: I recognized Socrates and 
Plato as symptoms of decay.96
In the work of the first dialecticians, Nietzsche recognises the fact that contrary to its upward 
aspirations, the dialectic can achieve nothing but its downfall. He knows that from the very 
beginning, the dialecticians worked only towards their own down-going and that in this
95 Nietzsche, 'Die frohliche Wissenschaft7 in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, v/2: Idyllen aus 
Messina /  Die frohliche Wissenschaft /  Nachgelassene Fragmente, pp. 11-320 (p. 250). 'Das grosste 
Schwergewichif could be translated as 'The greatest burden', as it has been in: Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: 
The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 19-23.
96 Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in: Twilight of the Idols /The Anti-Christ, pp. 29-122 (pp. 39-40); and 
'Gbtzen-Dammerung' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen- 
Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 49-157 (p. 61).
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sense the dialectical principle of Aufhebung is always treacherous in its claim as an upward 
movement. Thus, he notes in Ecce Homo:
My readers perhaps know the extent to which I regard dialectics as a symptom of 
decadence, for example in the most famous case [Fall] of all: in die case [Fall] of 
Socrates.97
The expression ‘im Fall des Sokrates' certainly means here first of all "in the case of Socrates'. 
The term Fall, however, is somewhat ambiguous in that it can also refer to a fall. And it is 
precisely on this double meaning that Nietzsche is playing here, suggesting that the famous 
case of Socrates is also the famous fall of Socrates. Read thus, the expression anticipates the 
inevitable down-going of Socrates and implies that the down-going of man already began 
with the thinker who first aspired to elevate man in the dialectic. It is in this sense that 
Nietzsche's thinking is essentially related and yet fundamentally opposed to the dialectic. 
The decline of man that he describes has, in fact, already begun in the thought of those with 
high and ever higher aspirations for man; and conversely, in man's final Untergang he 
anticipates a down-going which will have an uplifting effect on man. Notwithstanding its 
tenor of decline and down-going, in other words, Nietzsche's understanding of man implies 
that 'all genuine human activity should have an upward propelling effect'.98 Indeed, 
Zarathustra, who precedes man in his down-going, is in essence a climber and shortly after 
his down-going already seeks out ascents again.
In the light of how profoundly his thinking is involved with the dialectic, it is 
remarkable how little Nietzsche mentions it explicitly. Most of his engagement with the 
dialectic, and certainly some of his most lucid criticism of it, takes the form of subtexts,
97 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 9, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, vi/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 262).
98 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, p. 168.
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similes and allusions. In a letter to Lou Salome, for instance, Nietzsche speaks of their 
relationship such that his comments could also be read in a broader context. He writes:
How often have I experienced in all possible ways just this -  everything perfectly 
clear, but also at an end! And how happy I am, my beloved friend Lou, that I can 
now think of the two of us -  "Everything is beginning, and yet perfectly clear!"99
Without the references to their personal relationship, which was incidentally not quite as 
clear as Nietzsche seems to think, these lines read like a reflection on the turn in Nietzsche's 
thinking which was imminent at the time. Everything perfectly clear, but also at an end -  is 
this not a very lucid diagnosis of the dialectic, all the more poignant for its simplicity? The 
letter was written about a year after Nietzsche first had the thought of eternal return, at a 
time, that is, when he is coming into his own as a thinker. In that he no longer abides by the 
fallacious rules of the dialectic, which grant clarity only after the event, but now sees 
everything as beginning, he is indeed beginning to think his fundamental thought in its full 
implications. As early as 1882, it seems, he was to some extent aware of the fact that his 
thinking constitutes the end of the dialectic; and he had begun to realize its consequences 
long before he staged in Zarathustra an example of the down-going of man. In this sense, his 
thinking engages with the dialectic from the very beginning of his creative life, even if it is 
only later on that his depictions of his position vis-a-vis the dialectic become more frequent 
and more expressive. More and more he recognizes himself as the thinker who thought 
beyond the principle of Aufhebung and who thought it through to the point where it turns 
downwards. In 1887, he writes to Franz Overbeck:
...I am now lacking ... this first and most essential condition, the loneliness, the 
profound undisturbedness, the remoteness, the strangeness, without which I 
cannot get down to my problems (for, between us, I am in a downright
99 Nietzsche to Lou Salome (around 20 July 1882) in: Christopher Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Christopher Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
pp. 188-189.
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frightening sense a man of depth; and without this subterranean work I cannot 
stand life any more).100
It is Nietzsche's last work, Ecce Homo, however, which contains what might well be the 
clearest statement of his intrinsic relationship with the dialectic. At the very end of his 
creative life, he notes:
I have a subtler sense for signs of ascent [Aufgang] and decline [Niedergang] than 
any man has ever had, I am the teacher par excellence in this matter -  I know both, 
I am both.101
Acknowledging his philosophical position between ascent and decline, between Auf- and 
Nieder-, he concedes here that his thinking is intrinsically linked to the dialectic. Indeed, in 
that he grants that he is not only familiar with both principles, but actually identifies with 
both, he locates his thinking at their intersection: at the turning point and at the end of the 
dialectical age. And yet, even in this account of his position vis-a-vis the dialectic he does not 
mention the dialectic explicitly. It is nothing short of curious how often Nietzsche speaks of 
the dialectic without actually mentioning it. And even less than the dialectic, he mentions the 
philosopher of the dialectic, Hegel. In this sense, his silence surrounding Hegel may well be 
what Heidegger calls a telling silence.102
100 es fehlt mir jetzt ... jene erste und wesentlichste Bedingung, die Einsamkeit, die tiefe Ungestdrtheit, 
Abseitigkeit, Fremdheit, ohne welche ich nicht zu meinen Problemen h i n u n t e r  kann (denn, unter uns gesagt, 
ich bin in einem geradezu erschrecklichen Sinn ein Mensch der Tiefe; und ohne diese unterirdische Arbeit halte 
ich das Leben nicht mehr aus).' Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (14 April 1887) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briefcvechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 56.
101 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 8, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Dammerung/  Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 262).
102 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 208.
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Nietzsche and Hegel: Between Immortality and Eternal Return
Where Nietzsche and Hegel are mentioned in the same context, the emphasis is usually on 
their differences. Hegel's thinking is thought to be incompatible with Nietzsche's, and 
Nietzsche is thought to be largely ignorant of Hegel. Their irreconcilable differences in their 
own right, however, betray the fact that theirs is not simply a reconciliatory and therefore 
dialectical relationship. And on the other hand, the two thinkers do, despite their differences, 
share some common ground. Heidegger recognized in Nietzsche 'the last metaphysician of the 
West',103 and to the extent that Nietzsche remains grounded in Western metaphysics, he 
remains grounded in the dialectical tradition, which Hegel's work epitomizes. Indeed, 
Nietzsche's writing often gives the impression that his thinking is haunted by the ghosts of 
the dialecticians. More than by anyone else, he is haunted by Plato, but in his many allusions 
to the dialectic it also seems that his thoughts are often accompanied by the ghost of Hegel. It 
is, thus, all the more curious that he hardly ever speaks of Hegel explicitly and never at 
length. And yet, if the 'utterance of thinking is', as Heidegger suggests, 'a  telling silence',104 
this peculiar silence of Nietzsche's would in fact confirm that his thinking is profoundly 
engaged with Hegel's.
Nietzsche gives the impression of being, at best, indifferent to Hegel and is often taken 
to have been unfamiliar with Hegel's work. He 'knew barely more of Hegel than a standard 
popularization',105 Bataille, for instance, notes. But a lack -  or at any rate a conspicuous 
absence -  of formal engagement with Hegel's work notwithstanding, Nietzsche's writing
103 Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 8.
104 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 208.
105 Bataille, Inner Experience, translated by Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1988), p. 109 (note 2).
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implies, however tacitly, an unprecedented depth in its understanding of Hegel's thought in 
all its implications. Like Hegel, and in fact as the first philosopher after Hegel, Nietzsche 
thinks the history of philosophy philosophically.106 And conversely, he thinks philosophy in 
historical terms, which not only allows him to recognize his own thinking as a moment in the 
philosophical tradition of the West but in a similar sense also grants him his particular 
perspective on Hegel. He does not mistake Hegel for the inventor of the dialectic or for an 
advocate of the dialectical method; he knows that the roots of the dialectic lie in ancient 
Greece. And to this extent he is aware that Hegel's thinking marks not the beginning but the 
end of the dialectic. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, man has attained absolute knowledge and 
has become god; thus, he has achieved the only goal that the dialectical age ever had. Hegel's 
work describes the end of this age and spells, thus, also the end of the dialectical method. In 
fact, Hegel never strictly speaking employed a dialectical 'method'; he merely describes the 
dialectical progress of the world. If, as Koj£ve explains,
... the thought and the discourse of the Hegelian Scientist or the Wise Man are 
dialectical, it is only because they faithfully reflect the 'dialectical movement' of 
the Real of which they are a part ...Hegel's method, then, is not at all dialectical, 
and Dialectic for him is quite different from a method of thought or exposition.
And we can even say that, in a certain way, Hegel was the first to abandon 
Dialectic as a philosophical method. He was, at least, the first to do so voluntarily 
and with full knowledge of what he was doing.107
If Hegel's thinking marks, thus, the end of the dialectical method at the same time as the end 
of the 'dialectical movement' of the real, it is because the dialectic is, as 'a philosophical 
method ... abandoned only at the moment when the real Dialectic of the active transformation 
of the given stops'.108 Thus it is that the Phenomenology of Spirit could have been written from
106 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 205.
107 Alexandre Koj£ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
assembled by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols jr (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 178-179.
108 Kojdve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 191.
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the point of view of absolute knowledge: it marks the historical moment at which absolute 
knowledge has become possible because the world does not change any more. And in that it 
describes the end of the dialectic, Hegel's work in fact describes the end of the philosophical 
tradition of the West as a whole, given that philosophy has been defined by dialectics since 
its inception in ancient Greece. In this light, it certainly seems that Hegel's thinking betrays a 
point of view that is not altogether different from Nietzsche's. Hence, if Nietzsche cannot, by 
all accounts, see very much of Hegel's thinking, could this be not because Hegel is too far 
away, but because he is in fact too close?
In many respects, Hegel's thinking already touches on the thoughts that Nietzsche 
would later express more explicitly. It was Nietzsche who proclaimed the death of god, but on 
second thoughts it seems doubtful that he actually killed him himself. If man, as Deleuze 
suggests, killed god in order 'to take his still warm seat',109 it would have been Hegel who 
killed god, for it was Hegel who, at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, took god's place. 
Similarly, Hegel already knew that 'there is no transcendence'110 before Nietzsche said so, 
and he already knew of the falsehood of truth before Nietzsche brought it to light in Beyond 
Good and Evil.111 It is not simply a case of Hegel anticipating Nietzsche's work, however; the 
relationship between the two thinkers is actually far more complex. Kojeve, for one, offers a 
clue as he mentions, more or less in passing, that Hegel
speaks of a period of total depression that he lived through between the twenty- 
fifth and the thirtieth years of his life: a 'Hypochondria' ... that was so severe as 
to 'paralyze all his powers', and that came precisely from the fact that he could 
not accept die necessary abandonment of Individuality -  that is, actually, of 
humanity -  which the idea of absolute Knowledge demanded. But, finally, he 
surmounted his 'Hypochondria'. And becoming a Wise Man by that final
109 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 151.
110 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 162.
111 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 187; cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as 
Knowledge and as Metaphysics, pp. 32-38.
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acceptance of death, he published a few years later the First Part of the 'System of 
Science', entitled 'Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit', in which he 
definitively reconciles himself with all that is and has been, by declaring that 
there will never more be anything new on earth.112
Is this experience of Hegel's not uncannily similar to Nietzsche's experience of thinking the 
thought of eternal return for the first time? It is not only that Koj&ve describes Hegel's 
coming to terms with his thought in its entirety as a life-changing experience; even the 
thought itself, the thought that there will never be anything new on earth, seems in both its 
content and its implications very similar to Nietzsche's thought of eternal return. But if 
Kojeve's account shows that Hegel, the thinker of the dialectic, already encountered a 
thought not unlike Nietzsche's, it also betrays the difference between the two. Indeed, the 
difference between these thoughts is no less significant than their similarity. Hegel's 
suffering, Koj&ve recounts, is caused by the thought that there will never be anything new 
and everything will remain the same. Nietzsche, on the other hand, suffers at the thought 
that the despicable will return; he suffers at the thought that
the little men, too, are; as beings they too recur forever. They cannot be put out of 
action; they pertain to that side of things that is dark and repulsive. If being as a 
whole is to be thought, the little men too wait upon their 'Yes'.113
So if Hegel suffers at the thought that everything remains the same and Nietzsche suffers at 
the thought that everything returns, they are, it seems, thinking the same thought but 
thinking it differently. The difference between their droughts could, thus, resemble the 
difference between Zarathustra's and the dwarf's respective take on the eternal return, 
separated as they are by only 'the smallest gap'.114 The dwarf's thinking of the eternal return, 
however, is characterized by the fact that he takes this thought lightly; he thinks it
112 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 168.
113 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 57.
114 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 234.
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'disdainfully'115 and such that it does not cause him any suffering. This is certainly not how 
Hegel's thinks this thought; he took it, after all, seriously enough for it to throw him into a 
five-year depression. And if he does not take this thought any more lightly than Nietzsche 
does, it is also clear that he does not think it like Zarathustra's animals, for
the animals' talk is only more effervescent, more buoyant and playful than -  yet 
at bottom identical with -  the talk of the dwarf, to whom Zarathustra objects that 
he makes things too easy for himself. [...] In spite of their marvelous talk about 
the Ring of Being, Zarathustra's animals too seem to dance over and beyond 
what is essential.116
Hegel may be the thinker of elevation, Aufhebung, but the fact that he describes die upward 
surge of the dialectic does not mean that his thinking is effervescent and dances over and 
beyond what is essential. Hegel thinks the thought of forever-the-same as thoroughly and 
painstakingly as Nietzsche thinks the eternal return, and no less than Nietzsche's, his 
thought refers to being as a whole. Indeed, if his thought makes him ill, it is because, as 
Heidegger notes, '[precisely the knowledge that chokes us is what must be known if being 
as a whole is to be thought'.117
It appears, thus, that Hegel's thought resembles not so much the dwarf's or the 
animals' as Zarathustra's own thinking of the eternal return. In this sense, the difference 
between his and Nietzsche's thought might simply reflect a different historical perspective. 
The difference might, in other words, show that they posed the metaphysical question 
differently; it might reveal what Heidegger calls a 'development7 of the metaphysical 
question.118 To be sure, Heidegger recognizes in Nietzsche's thinking a development of the
115 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 178.
116 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 54-55.
117 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 55.
118 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 184-197.
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metaphysical question; thus, it certainly seems that this could account for the difference 
between his thought and Hegel's. Ascribing the difference between their thoughts to a 
development in the strictest sense, however, implies that Hegel's determination of being 
clearly comes before Nietzsche's, whereas Blanchot suggests that
Nietzsche can only come after Hegel, but it is always before and always after
Hegel that he comes and comes again.119
In Blanchot's view, the relationship between these two thinkers is far more intricate than the 
notion of a development would indicate. If Nietzsche always comes before and yet always 
after Hegel, it would follow that he can only be understood in relation to Hegel; and 
conversely, it would follow that Hegel can only be understood in relation to Nietzsche and 
after Nietzsche in the strictest temporal sense. In this light, the originality of Kojeve's reading 
of Hegel in the 1930s is certainly no less a coincidence than the fact that it revived an interest 
in Hegel 'at a time when he seemed no longer of living significance'.120 It was Koj&ve, at any 
rate, who grasped the importance of the thought of forever-the-same, which threw Hegel 
into years of depression, but even the fact that he considers Hegel's life in a philosophical 
sense at all makes his reading stand out from other interpretations of Hegel. In general, 
commentaries on Hegel tend to focus on his work and do not explore his life in a 
philosophical way, whereas most commentators on Nietzsche agree that his work cannot be 
separated from his life. In Nietzsche's case, his illness is thought to be intrinsically linked to 
his thinking; in Hegel's, it is usually hardly mentioned beyond a passing remark to draw a 
background picture. It is, of course, much easier to disregard the illness in Hegel's case 
because he emerged as a philosopher only with the Phenomenology of Spirit, written a few
119 Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), p. 22.
120 Allan Bloom, 'Editor's Introduction' in: Koj6ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. viii.
44
<From ‘Wiederhunft to Nfcderhunft: Towards a reading o f the <EtemaC <R&tum
years after he finally 'surmounted this "Hypochondria"'.121 Nietzsche, by contrast, has been 
propelled towards the illness precisely by his thinking; and as the consequence of his 
thought, his illness can hardly been ignored even in the most rigorously philosophical of 
commentaries. If, however, the two thinkers are indeed tormented by the same thought, their 
curious relationship would simply indicate that Nietzsche comes before the illness and Hegel 
afterwards. It would mean that the profound crisis which is implicit in this thought is the 
axis of their relationship, Hegel's thinking picking up at the point of Nietzsche's collapse and 
Nietzsche's thinking, in turn, coming down with meaning once the upward surge in Hegel's 
thought turns against itself. Their relationship revolves, thus, around the crisis point in the 
history of the West which Heidegger describes as the end of metaphysics; they both, albeit 
from different perspectives, think the end of metaphysical thought.
♦ ♦ ♦
The convergence of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought at the crisis point in the history of 
philosophy confirms that the metaphysical tradition overcomes itself. Hegel's thinking 
epitomizes this tradition but describes thus also its inherent end. And Nietzsche, conversely, 
remains entrenched in it even as he expressly thinks its end; as the 'last metaphysician', he is 
still, after all, a metaphysician. In both cases, it is implicit that the philosophical tradition of 
the West will, and will have to, be overcome from within, as Heidegger indicates in his 
reading of Zarathustra's simile of the snake. Heidegger explains that
[t]he black snake is drear monotony, ultimately the goallessness and 
meaninglessness of nihilism. It is nihilism itself. Nihilism has bitten the young 
shepherd during his sleep and is now firmly entrenched. [...] When Zarathustra 
sees the young shepherd lying there, he does the first thing anyone would do. He 
pulls at the snake, tugs at i t , '-  in vain!'
121 Kojdve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 168.
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The implication is that nihilism cannot be overcome from the outside. We 
do not overcome it by tearing away at it or shoving it aside... The black snake of 
nihilism threatens to incorporate humanity altogether; it must be overcome by 
those who are themselves inflicted with it and endangered by it. [...] Here 
nothing avails if human beings themselves do not bite into the danger, and not 
blindly, not just anywhere. We must bite off the head of the black snake, its 
properly definitive and leading part, which looms at the forefront.
... everyone who is affected -  and that means each of us -  must bite into the 
matter for himself or herself; for if we leave it to another to tug at the darkling 
need that is our own, all will be futile.122
If the snake stands for nihilism itself, it also stands for metaphysics, for according to 
Heidegger, metaphysics is 'nihilism proper'; conversely, the "essence of nihilism is historically 
as metaphysics'.123 Metaphysics has always been nihilistic, and ultimately 'the metaphysics 
of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche'.124 In fact, all metaphysical thought since 
Socrates and Plato has been nihilistic because it has in essence been dialectical. And in this 
sense, Heidegger observes, even 'Nietzsche's metaphysics is not an overcoming of nihilism. 
It is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism'.125 In the terms of the simile, it is therefore not 
Nietzsche who bites the head off the snake. Indeed, it was Zarathustra who overcame the 
snake of dialectical reason, which worms its way into everything and winds itself out of 
everything. It was Zarathustra who finished off the elegant, majestic serpent, the most 
discerning of animals, which had turned into a thick, black constrictor, the snake that god 
had set upon man -  and man, in turn, had set upon god. So who is Zarathustra to bite its 
head off? Once again, he is at some distance from Nietzsche, and he is much more than a 
prophet. In the simile of the snake it is, indeed, Nietzsche who announces and prophesies 
and Zarathustra who realizes his prophecies. In this sense, Zarathustra clearly comes after 
Nietzsche, but in order to overcome the snake of dialectics in the only way it can be 
overcome, he must still be a dialectician at heart. And as a thinker of dialectics who comes
122 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p p .  179-180.
123 Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism, translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, p. 205.
124 Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism, p. 205.
125 Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism, p. 203.
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before and comes yet after Nietzsche, is Zarathustra not beginning to show an uncanny 
resemblance to Hegel?
♦ ♦ ♦
The relationship between Nietzsche and Hegel, where one comes after the other and comes 
yet always also before him, pertains to the temporality of the return in very much the same 
way as the relationship between Nietzsche and Zarathustra. In fact, Hegel and Zarathustra 
coincide not only in their position vis-a-vis Nietzsche; the thinker of Aufhebung and the 
mountain climber also share an essential upward aspiration. In this sense, Zarathustra may 
well be Hegel as he returns in Nietzsche's thinking; he may, in other words, be the 
reincarnation of Hegel in the eternal return. Since Zarathustra's down-going begins as 
'Zarathustra wants to be man again',126 it begins with Zarathustra not being man and in this 
sense at a point when man has become other than man: when he has become god. In this 
respect, it certainly seems that Zarathustra's down-going begins with Hegel. And it seems 
that Zarathustra's Prologue begins with Hegel, for is not Hegel's story precisely that of a 
thirty-year old who left behind what he knew, who left behind the lake in which he was 
threatening to drown, and set off into the heights?127 In this sense, Hegel comes very much 
before Nietzsche, and yet in his reincarnation as Zarathustra, he clearly comes after him; 
thus, he announces the end of his down-going:
I spoke my teaching, I broke upon my teaching: thus my eternal fate will have it -  
as prophet do I perish!
Now the hour has come when he who is going down shall bless himself. Thus - 
ends Zarathustra's downgoing.128
126 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 39.
127 Cf. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 39.
128 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 238.
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At the end of his down-going, Zarathustra blesses himself, reconciling himself with himself 
and with everything that is -  just as Hegel had done when he had convalesced after a long 
period of depression and set about writing the Phenomenology of Spirit. At this stage, Hegel is, 
conversely, reminiscent of Zarathustra, the 'Convalescent',129 who shortly after his down- 
going regained himself and begins to climb again. In many respects and certainly in his 
anticipation of the end of metaphysics, Hegel comes before Nietzsche; in this sense, however, 
he also returns as the convalescent who comes after Nietzsche and after the illness. 
Zarathustra, in turn, betrays his kinship with Hegel as he announces that he will die as a 
prophet. Unlike Nietzsche, who was no doubt prophetic but died not as prophet but as 
madman, Hegel, too, perished as a prophet; he perished from his teaching, from his word, 
which was in fact never anything but a prolonged death: for what is Hegel's word if not the 
equivocal and yet all-consuming annihilation and negation of Aufhebung? Hegel died, thus, 
as a prophet, even if he who declares that there will never be anything new on earth is a 
prophet who speaks but of the past. Ultimately, however, this is the fate of every prophet. A 
prophet is always too early and yet always already too late; in this sense, he pertains to the 
temporality of the return. And Hegel, who died of his teaching, of the promise, that is, of 
immortality, appears indeed to be no less adverse to down-going than Zarathustra is. In his 
lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger reminds us that
.. .we have to hear the positive in Hegel's negative, when he speaks of perishing:
Perishing is returning to the ground [Das Zugrundegehen ist das Zum-Grund-
Zuriickgehen].130
Essentially, Hegel's entire thinking depends on the ambiguity of perishing, given that death 
is the very life -  and the only life -  of the dialectic. In that Hegel anticipates the end of
129 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 232-238.
130 Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 83.
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metaphysics, he realizes that his own thinking works only towards its down-going; he 
knows the dialectic to be nihilistic to the point where it can only aim for its own annihilation. 
But it is precisely this realization which sparks his recovery after years of depression. In this 
sense, at least, it seems that Hegel embraces not so much the principle of Aufhebung as 
indeed the down-going in which it results. And conversely, Nietzsche seems at times to long 
for the end and the negation of the eternal return. In Zarathustra, he created after all a climber, 
someone who has the propensity for dialectics. And on a more personal note, he writes:
Can you understand my longing, the longing for the finite? Of him who saw the
ring of recurrence - m
In that he longs for the finite, it seems that Nietzsche, the thinker of the eternal return, longs 
for annihilation and perhaps even for the all-encompassing annihilation of the dialectic. 
Dialectical annihilation, however, is never complete and final. As it equates annihilation and 
preservation in the principle of Aufhebung, the dialectic promises eternal death and eternal 
life alike. In the dialectical death, there looms also immortality -  and in this sense a trace of 
the eternal return. This is the paradox at the heart of the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Hegel. Just as there is in HegeTs thinking an indication that the dialectic will come to an end, 
there appears to be in Nietzsche's thinking a sense that it will return. Separated in mutual 
antagonism which always returns but is never final, their thoughts intersect between 
immortality and eternal return.
♦ ♦ ♦
131 ‘Versteht ihr wohl meine neue Sehnsucht, die nach dem Endlicken? dessen, der den Ring der Wiederkunft 
schaute Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vll/2: 
Nachgelassene Fragmente: Friihjahr bis Herbst 1884 (1974), p. 224.
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"One could die of being "immortal"!',132 Nietzsche writes in the summer of 1888:'Man kann 
damn zugrunde gehn, "u ns terb l i ch" zu seinl7133 He hints, thus, no doubt at his own 
imminent tragedy; the neutral pronoun 'one', however, suggests that it is not only his own. In 
the broadest sense, he states that man could die of having become immortal, of having 
become god. Only in his death, thought as zugrundegehen in all its connotations, however, 
will the immortal man finally be able to realize the essence of the world. In this sense, 
Nietzsche recognizes in the paradox that one can die of being immortal the prospect of a new 
life for mankind, defined as Niederkunft and as eternal return of the same. The paradox that 
one can die of being immortal is, indeed, the paradox which harbours the end of the 
dialectic. And in the sense that he, too, anticipates the end of the dialectic, Hegel, too, 
realized this paradox. In Koj^ve's reading, at least, Hegel realized that man must be mortal 
despite all dialectical claims to the contrary and in fact even because of them. For, Kojeve 
explains, 'if Man lived eternally and could not die, he could not render himself immune to 
God's omnipotence';134 he would not be truly human and he certainly could not become god. 
Even the man who has in his quest for immortality become god -  and especially the man 
who has become god -  must die and must go down. In this sense, Hegel's thinking shows, 
no less than Nietzsche's, how the end of the dialectical age hinges on the paradox that one 
can die of being immortal. It is in this paradox that Hegel's and Nietzsche's thoughts 
coincide. They coincide at the end of the dialectical age as man's quest for immortality 
becomes the quest for eternal return. And they will converge again at the point which 
Nietzsche describes as the end of Zarathustra's down-going: as the thought of eternal return 
threatens to become tainted with a sense of forever-the-same and thus with a sense of
132 Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug (late July 1888) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, p. 302.
133 Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug (late July 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: 
Briefivechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 377.
134 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 247.
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immortality. The convergence of Nietzsche's and Hegel's thinking always marks a crisis, and 
at the juncture of immortality and eternal return, it is always a question and in fact a matter 
of life and death. That one can die from being immortal is, indeed, the tragic fate of Hegel 
and Nietzsche alike. Hegel's tragedy is that he sought convalescence, that is, the return to life, 
in the principle of Aufhebung, which only ever harbours death and annihilation. And 
Nietzsche's tragedy is that he perished, at least in his capacity as a rational human being, 
from thinking the thought that promises the return to life. In July 1888, when he wrote of his 
fear that one could die from being immortal, Nietzsche knew that his time was up. And he 
knew that his time had come. For -  incipit tragoedia135 -  is this not also his beginning?
135 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 274.
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I have been the first to discover the tragic. The Greeks, thanks to 
their moralistic superficiality, misunderstood it. Even 
resignation is not a lesson of tragedy, but a misunderstanding of 
it! Yearning for nothingness is a denial of tragic wisdom, its 
opposite!1
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power
Nietzsche is no stranger to tragedy: misunderstood during his lifetime, driven mad by his 
lucidity and perishing at last from being immortal, he suffers no doubt a tragic fate.2 But he 
is not just a tragic figure, a commentator on tragedy or a tragedian: he is a tragic thinker and 
the thinker of the tragic. It is not a coincidence that his oeuvre begins with an analysis of The 
Birth of Tragedy and that it is this work which marks his transition from a young philologist 
to a philosopher in the strictest sense, for Nietzsche's thinking pertains, no less than his life, 
essentially to the order of the tragic. Indeed, The Birth of Tragedy marks not only the beginning 
of Nietzsche's thinking proper; it foretells of the end of his thinking in a new tragic age. And 
in the sense that Nietzsche speaks specifically of the birth of tragedy, it seems that he 
anticipates in his first published work already his fundamental thought in its configuration 
as Niederkunft. It is certainly remarkable that his work on The Birth of Tragedy, whilst it does
1 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 531-532.
2 'In tragedy the hero dies ... of immortality'. Benjamin, 'Trauerspiel and Tragedy', translated by 
Rodney Livingstone, in: Bullock /  Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 1:1913-1926, pp. 
55-58 (p. 56).
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not mention the word Niederkunft as such, abounds in terminology that implicates precisely 
this thought. When Nietzsche speaks of tragedy, he speaks of birth and rebirth, of giving 
birth, of being bom and reborn, of fertility and of the mother's womb, so consistently, 
indeed, that his choice of the terms does not seem to be fortuitous. The imagery of The Birth 
of Tragedy suggests, thus, that Nietzsche is at the time already preoccupied with the thought 
of Niederkunft and in this sense with the thought that he is later to realize in all its 
implications as the eternal return of the same.
The Birth o f Tragedy as Nietzsche's first Encounter with his Central Thought
If Nietzsche claims that he 'discovered' the tragic it is because he was the first thinker in the 
West to interpret the tragic not in line with the scholarly opinion since Aristotle as a moral 
experience, but saw instead its primordial significance. Beneath the 'moralistic superficiality' 
of the Greek interpretation,3 he recognized the tragic as a metaphysical experience: as a 
glimpse into the nature of being. Tragedy, Nietzsche concludes,
wishes to convince us of the eternal delight of existence -  but we are to seek that 
delight not in phenomena themselves but behind phenomena. It wishes us to 
acknowledge that everything that comes into being must be prepared to face a 
sorrowful end. It forces us to look at the terrors of individual existence, yet we 
are not to be petrified with fear.4
In the tragic we are acquainted with the nature of being as perpetual birth and death, such 
that we are no longer terrified of the circle of life and of the pain it entails but learn to find 
consolation in die constant process of life bringing forth life. Tragedy, in other words, aims to 
console us in the revelation that being is a perpetual process of Niederkunft; in this sense, die
3 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 531.
4 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, translated by Shaun Whiteside (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p. 
80.
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tragic is essentially related to the thought of Niederkunft. In The Birth of Tragedy, it seems, 
Nietzsche makes precisely this connection. Although he does not mention the thought of 
Niederkunft as such, he always describes the tragic in the terminology of birth, and the absence 
of the term itself in a text that contains so many references to it makes the presence of this 
thought all the more striking; it reveals, indeed, what Heidegger calls a "telling silence": a 
silence that arises when a thought that is implicit everywhere is left unmentioned.5
In Nietzsche" s literal or at best figurative references to birth, the thought of Niederkunft 
is, indeed, well concealed; it is always implicit and yet, as a metaphysical thought it is left 
unmentioned. The images of birth in Nietzsche's first work certainly do not betray their 
metaphysical roots easily. In and of itself, none is particularly striking; it is only as a whole 
that the imagery of the text is remarkable -  and remarkable, indeed, not only for the sheer 
number of references to birth but for Nietzsche's specific usage of the terms. He always 
speaks of the birth and the rebirth of tragedy, and not, as one might expect, of its inception or 
its return. And it is only of tragic art that he speaks in these terms; he never relates the 
imagery of birth to what he calls "Socratic culture" or the culture of the "theoretical man".6 The 
distinction may not always be obvious or even straightforward, but the terms are never used 
arbitrarily. At first, it might not be clear why Nietzsche speaks not of the birth but of an 
"awakening" of tragedy as he remarks:
To return from these hortatory notes to a mood more appropriate to 
contemplation, I shall repeat that only the Greeks can teach us what such a 
sudden and miraculous awakening [Aufwachen] of tragedy means to the 
innermost soul of a people.7
5 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 208.
6 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 88-89.
7 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 99, and 'Die Geburt der Tragodie" in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, Ill/l: Die Geburt der Tragodie /  Unzeitgemafie Betrachtungen I-III, 1872-1874 (1972), pp. 3- 
152 (p. 128).
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In this context, however, Nietzsche's choice of the terms does not contradict his otherwise 
consistent usage but actually underlines his argument. It is in a contemplative mood, he points 
out, that he speaks of the 'awakening' of tragedy; in this sense, he is precisely in the sober 
and scholarly frame of mind which, as he explains prior to this passage, is not at all suited to 
discovering the tragic truth. Indeed, he holds the theoretical thought of the dialecticians 
responsible for putting an end to the tragic age of ancient Greece. The fact that he speaks of 
the 'awakening' of tragedy in this instance simply highlights, thus, that his notion of tragedy 
is such that contemplation, theory and dialectical thought will not and cannot reveal its 
origin as birth. And if tragedy commences essentially as birth, Nietzsche's argument also 
implies that the contemplative approach of an age that is in essence still dialectical will not 
allow us to grasp the essence of the tragic because it will not allow us to grasp the birth of 
tragedy as such.
On several other occasions, Nietzsche refers not to the 'birth' but to the 'origin' of 
tragedy, but since the translation renders more than one German word as 'origin',8 only the 
original can shed light on these passages. Of the 'Ursprung'9 of tragedy, Nietzsche writes:
We must now call upon all the aesthetic principles we have so far discussed in 
order to find our way around the labyrinth, which is how we must refer to the 
origin of Greek tragedy. I do not think I am making an extravagant claim when I 
say that the problem of this origin has not yet even been seriously tackled, 
however many times the tattered rags of the classical tradition have been sewn 
together in various combinations, and ripped apart again.10
The term Ursprung is indeed not altogether devoid of connotations of birth. Amongst its 
meanings, the Grimms' dictionary records 'das hervorgehen aus etwas, der ausgangspunkt,
8 Shaun Whiteside's translation of The Birth of Tragedy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993).
9 Nietzsche, 'Die Geburt der Tragodie' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Ill/l: Die Geburt der 
Tragodie/  Unzeitgemafie Betrachtungen, pp. 3-152 (p. 48).
10 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 35-36.
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anfang, begin, geburt, griindung u. dgl'.n Nonetheless, it seems that in the context of 
Nietzsche's argument the origin or Ursprung of tragedy denotes something altogether 
different from the birth of tragedy. When Nietzsche speaks of the 'origin' of tragedy, he 
speaks of it as a labyrinth and as a problem that has not been addressed beyond a patching 
together of the evidence in ever more random combinations. In this sense, he certainly does 
not speak of the origin of tragedy in the same way as he speaks of its birth. And read thus, 
would this passage not suggest that as long as one is looking for the 'origin' of tragedy and 
not its birth, the essence of tragedy will remain shrouded and the scholars' search will be 
reduced, as it has been hitherto, to random shots in the dark? A sense that the essence of 
tragedy cannot be grasped by looking for its origin certainly emerges in the wider context of 
Nietzsche's argument here and particularly in the light of the conclusion he draws. For, 
having considered the different attempts at determining the origin of tragedy and how they 
are flawed, Nietzsche concludes:
I fear that the birth of tragedy may no more be explained with reference to respect 
for die moral intelligence of the masses than with reference to the concept of the 
spectator without a play, and I consider this problem too profound even to be 
touched on by such shallow interpretations.12
As long as he spoke of the manifold misconception of the tragic, Nietzsche spoke of its 
'origin', but when he refers to the truth of tragedy, as he does here, he speaks of its 'birth'. In 
this sense, the passage proves to be one of the most perspicuous illustrations of the way 
Nietzsche's choice of the terms conveys that the birth of tragedy is something altogether 
different and altogether more profound than its origin, and that in order to grasp the origin
11 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XI. Band, III. Abteilung: Un-Uzvogel, p. 2540.
12 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 37 (my italics).
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of tragedy one must first of all grasp it as birth. On another occasion, Nietzsche says of the 
origin, 'Ursprung',13 of tragedy:
Let us remember our own surprise at the chorus and the tragic hero in that form of 
tragedy, which we could not reconcile either with our own habits or with 
tradition, until we recognized that this duality was the very origin and essence of 
Greek tragedy, the expression of two interwoven artistic impulses, the Apolline 
and the Dionysiac14
In this instance, Nietzsche's remark is no doubt informed by the preceding analysis of 
Euripidean tragedy, in the course of which he explains that contrary to popular belief, 
Euripides 'did not understand his great predecessors'15 and by 'confronting traditional 
conceptions of tragedy with his own',16 ended up being responsible for the death of tragedy. 
In Nietzsche's eyes, Euripides was actually ignorant of the true nature of the tragic. And his 
is the perspective that effectively still frames our understanding of tragedy today -  a 
perspective, that is, from which the beginning of tragedy will always appear to be its origin 
and not its birth. If the spirit of our age originated, indeed, in Euripides not realizing the 
essence of the tragic, it is no wonder that we are surprised at the origin of tragedy, as 
Nietzsche observes. In that he comments on 'our own surprise'17 at the tragic -  his, it seems, 
included -  he points to the fact that we still live in an age that is not receptive to the tragic 
because it depends in essence on forgetting die tragic truth. As long as our thinking stipulates 
the denial of tragic wisdom, we can contemplate the origin of tragedy but we will not grasp its 
birth; and hence we remain surprised at its inception. Similarly, Nietzsche notes our surprise 
at the origin of tragedy as he writes:
13 Nietzsche, 'Die Geburt der Tragodie' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, m/1: Die Geburt 
der Tragodie/  Unzeitgemafie Betrachtungen, pp. 3-152 (p. 78).
14 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 59.
15 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 59.
16 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 59.
17 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 59.
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The satyr, the Dionysiac chorist, lives in a world granted existence under the 
religious sanction of myth and ritual. That tragedy begins with him, that the 
Dionysiac wisdom of tragedy speaks through him, is for us a phenomenon just as 
surprising as the very origin of tragedy .. .18
Again, his words imply that our age is not ready to understand the tragic. In this instance, 
however, 'origin', stands not for Ursprung, but for Entstehung,19 which may, at least to the 
contemporary ear, sound a little more deliberate and controlled than Ursprung. In this sense 
it is only too fitting a word to describe how we of the dialectical age are approaching the 
question of the tragic and how we are, precisely for this reason, missing its essence. The 
word Entstehung, however, also has different connotations. According to the Grimms' 
dictionary, it can mean not only 'beginn', origin, but also 'abgang', exit, deficit, departure.20 In 
this sense, Nietzsche's wording of the passage would imply that our approach to tragedy 
leaves us in the dark not only as to its birth but also as to its death. And as the word 
Entstehung comprises both meanings, it points to the fact that the two are actually connected. 
In Nietzsche's reading of Euripides, it certainly seems that it was his failure to understand 
the origin of the tragic which led to the demise of tragedy in his works. Our own ignorance 
of the birth of tragedy leaves us, in turn, also blind to its end at the hands of Euripides. In 
this light, Nietzsche's use of the term Entstehung in this context actually reflects on the 
essence of his understanding of the tragic. Indeed, if Entstehung counts amongst its meanings 
also 'abgang' -  would this not imply that the misunderstanding of tragedy that we cultivate 
in our attempt to grasp its origins as Entstehung leads us not to the birth of tragedy but to a 
miscarriage?21
18 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 38.
19 Nietzsche, 'Die Geburt der Tragodie' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Ill/l: Die Geburt 
der Tragodie/ Unzeitgemafie Betrachtungen, pp. 3-152 (p. 51).
20 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, III. Band: E-Forsche (1862), pp. 634-635.
21 Abgang: miscarriage, in: W. Scholze-Stubenrecht /  J. B. Sykes et al (eds), The Oxford-Duden German 
Dictionary, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 37.
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♦ ♦ ♦
It is not only that Nietzsche always speaks of the birth and not the origin of tragedy when he 
speaks of tragedy proper; he is also consistent in that he reserves the imagery of birth for 
tragic art only. In this respect, his writing in The Birth of Tragedy is already every bit as 
precise as in his later years, even where this may not be immediately obvious. There are 
indeed a couple of occasions where Nietzsche, contrary to his customary usage of the terms, 
relates the word "rebirth" to opera, which by his own reasoning pertains to Socratic art. He 
asks:
Is it conceivable that the music of opera, thoroughly externalized and incapable 
of reverence, should have been enthusiastically welcomed and cherished, as the 
rebirth, so to speak, of all true magic, by an age that had just produced the 
ineffably sublime and sacred music of Palestrina?22
In this instance, however, the terms are connected in the context of a question and a rhetorical 
question at that, and in this sense, their connection is actually drawn into question from the 
outset. Nonetheless, Nietzsche immediately qualifies his expression by adding that it is only 
"so to speak that he considers opera as "rebirth", acknowledging thus that he does not actually 
consider it in terms of a rebirth proper. And in this sense, the passage testifies not to a break 
with Nietzsche's usage of the terms but, in fact, to its precision. On the other occasion that 
Nietzsche uses the image of birth in reference to opera, he writes:
Opera is the offspring of theoretical man, the critical layman, not the artist: one of 
the most surprising facts in the history of all the arts. It was truly unmusical 
listeners who demanded that the words should be understood above all else; so 
that a rebirth of music could only occur when a way of singing was discovered in 
which the words would hold sway over counterpoint as a master holds sway 
over his servant.23
22 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 89.
23 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 91.
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In this case, it is not only Nietzsche's usage of the term 'rebirth' that seems at odds. In that he 
introduces opera as the offspring, Geburt,24 of the theoretical man, he applies the imagery of 
birth not only to a 'theoretical' form of art but also to the theoretical man himself. Thus, no 
doubt, this excerpt contradicts Nietzsche's customary usage of the terms -  unless opera is 
understood in line with Nietzsche's view not as a paragon but as the degeneration of art. If 
opera is in essence degenerate, Nietzsche's phrasing of this passage does not contradict his 
usage of the terms elsewhere; it highlights, rather, his understanding of opera as the creation 
of those who are essentially incapable of creation: as the Geburt and more precisely even as 
the Missgeburt, the monstrosity, brought forth by the inherently unfruitful dialecticians. 
These 'theoretical' men, Nietzsche proceeds, demanded a rebirth of music on the terms they 
specified and thus created the aberration that is opera. Again, it appears that the use of the 
word 'rebirth' runs counter to Nietzsche's usage of the term elsewhere. But in the sense that 
Nietzsche, writing in the subjunctive now, clearly presents a hypothetical argument that 
demonstrates its own absurdity, his use of the word 'rebirth' in reference to opera does not 
actually contradict his usage of the term; it merely reflects the absurdity of the scenario he 
describes. And it is, indeed, the phrasing of Nietzsche's argument that most readily betrays 
the absurdity of the dialectical man's demand for a rebirth of music -  for is it not absurd to 
demand a birth? So alien, however, is the dialectical man to the concept of Niederkunft that he 
who still thinks in negation and in terms, incidentally, of master and slave, fails to realize 
that it is the essence of birth and rebirth that it cannot be demanded or plotted, that it 
happens to him and despite of him as well as because of him, and that it occurs, in this sense, 
tragically.
24 Nietzsche, 'Die Geburt der Tragodie' in Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Ill/l: Die Geburt der 
Tragodie/  Unzeitgemafie Betrachtungen, pp. 3-152 (p. 119).
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The closest Nietzsche comes in The Birth of Tragedy to spelling out that the link between 
birth and tragedy is an essential one is his statement that 'the idea of the birth of an "artistic 
Socrates" is itself a contradiction in terms'.25 In the first instance, it is no doubt in the notion 
of an 'artistic Socrates' that Nietzsche perceives the contradiction. The phrasing of the 
sentence, however, suggests that the idea of the birth of an artistic Socrates presents as much 
of a contradiction. Read thus, Nietzsche's statement reveals that he is indeed thinking birth 
metaphysically, that is, as Niederkunft here; for the biological birth of Socrates hardly presents 
a contradiction. And as he suggests, thus, that the thought of Niederkunft is essentially 
contrary to the Socratic task, Nietzsche illustrates how it coincides in precisely this respect 
with the tragic.
♦ ♦ ♦
In the sense that The Birth of Tragedy engages with the metaphysical thought of birth, it shows 
that Nietzsche was at the time already immersed in what is effectively his fundamental 
thought. And notwithstanding the fact that Niederkunft is the one formulation of his thought 
that he himself never clearly saw as such, his first published book shows that it is precisely 
as Niederkunft that his central thought first came to him. In this sense, it is actually The Birth of 
Tragedy which marks Nietzsche's first encounter with his fundamental thought, whereas his 
first mention of the eternal return in the summer of 1881 marks his recognition of the thought 
that had in one form or another been shaping his thinking for ten years. Now, Heidegger 
makes the case that
25 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 70.
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when he thinks it for the first time, each thinker thinks his sole thought in its 
completion, though not yet in its full unfolding; that is, not yet in the scope and 
the dangerousness that always grow beyond it and must first be borne out.26
It seems, thus, that if Nietzsche first encounters his fundamental thought in The Birth of 
Tragedy, it is actually its configuration as Niederkunft which describes his thought in its 
entirety and not, as Heidegger suggests,27 the thought of eternal return. Indeed, the thought 
of Niederkunft does not have 'the scope and the dangerousness' of the thoughts that come to 
Nietzsche later in his life; it seems positively benign compared to the thought of eternal 
return of the same, announced, quite fittingly, by a daemon, or the doctrine of the will to 
power. This conclusion certainly challenges Heidegger's view that Nietzsche first thinks his 
fundamental thought as eternal return on that summer's day in the Engadine, but in the 
sense that it actually follows from Heidegger's argument, it does not contradict his reading 
categorically. It seems, rather, that if Heidegger did not see Nietzsche's first encounter with 
his fundamental thought in The Birth of Tragedy, it is because his reading relies almost 
exclusively on Nietzsche's later material. This approach actually testifies to Heidegger's 
fidelity to Nietzsche's thinking, for Nietzsche's own verdict certainly advises against 
ascribing too much importance to The Birth of Tragedy. In his Attempt at a Self-Criticism, added 
to the new edition of the book in 1886, Nietzsche dismisses it as a work of youth, 'racked 
with every youthful defect for all its old man's problems';28 over the years, however, he 
gradually makes his peace with it. Indeed, he no longer depicts his first work as a youthful 
folly when he writes in December 1888:
Very curious! For four weeks now I have understood my own writings -  what is 
more, I appreciate them. In all seriousness, I never knew what they meant; I 
would be lying if I said that, except for the Zarathustra, they had impressed me. It 
is the mother with her child: perhaps she loves it, but in total ignorance of what
26 Heidegger, Nietzsche, ill: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 10.
27 Heidegger, Nietzsche, ill: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 10.
28 Nietzsche, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' in: The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 3-12 (p. 5).
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the child is. -  Now I am absolutely convinced that everything has turned out 
well, from the beginning, -  ... The day before yesterday I read the Birth: 
something indescribable, profound, tender, content.. ,29
At the point when he finally recognizes the full magnitude of his writings, Nietzsche 
illustrates his view of them in a metaphor of the mother and child: a metaphor, that is, which 
reveals more than shrouds the thought of Niederkunft. And as example of his new insight into 
the nature of his works he cites not Thus Spoke Zarathustra, often considered, not least by 
Nietzsche himself, as the pinnacle of his oeuvre, or the plans for what was to be his magnum 
opus, The Will to Power, he cites his first work, The Birth of Tragedy. It is not a coincidence that 
he is looking back to the very beginning of his creative life, for as he finally grasps his 
thought in its entirety, he grasps it in the way that it first came to him: as the thought of 
Niederkunft and as tragedy. And if 'Nietzsche's retrospective and circumspective glances at 
his life are never anything else than prospective glances into his task',30 as Heidegger 
suggests, the terms in which he looks back on his life here certainly betray his imminent task, 
his goal, his future: that he is to bring forth a tragic age.
29 'Sehr curios! Ich verstehe seit 4 Wochen meine eigenen Schriften -  mehr noch, ich schatze sie. Allen Ernstes, 
ich ha.be nie gewufit, was sie bedeuten; ich wiirde liigen, wenn ich sagen wollte, den Zarathustra ausgenommen, 
dafi sie mir imponirt hdtten. Es ist die Mutter mit ihrem Kinde: sie liebt es vielleicht, aber in vollkommner 
Stupiditdt dariiber, was das Kind i s t .  -  Jetzt habe ich die absolute Uberzeugung, dafi Alles wohlgeraten ist, von 
Anfang an ,-.... Ich las vorgestem die 'Geburt': etwas Unbeschreibliches, t i ef ,  zart, gliicklich../. Nietzsche to 
Heinrich Koselitz (22 December 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, III/5: Briefe von 
Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 545.
30 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 10.
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The Metaphysics of Niederkunft as Tragedy
Since its beginnings in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's thinking has been a promise and an 
anticipation of a tragic age 31 -  an age, that is, in which being is determined as tragedy. When 
we think Nietzsche's central thought, Heidegger explains,
... the tragic as such becomes the fundamental trait of beings. Viewed 
historically, this marks the beginning of the 'tragic age for Europe'.32
Heidegger refers here to the eternal return as Nietzsche's fundamental thought, but if the 
thought of Niederkunft is another configuration of the same thought, it is likewise connected 
to the tragic. Indeed, the thought of Niederkunft betrays its tragic essence much more readily 
than the thought of eternal return. If it is not usually recognized as tragedy, it is only because 
the West has to date never professed a great deal of philosophical interest in the act of giving 
birth. Even today, thinking of pregnancy and birth is largely confined to feminist discourses, 
although a truly philosophical account transcends the biological fact of birth as something 
pertaining strictly to the female experience. Johanna Oksala, for one, presents such an 
approach to thinking pregnancy and birth in the article 'Wfhat is Feminist Phenomenology? - 
Thinking birth philosophically'. Although Oksala, too, sets out from a feminist discourse, she 
suggests that the philosophical thinking of birth quickly exceeds this framework and 
challenges our philosophical tradition as a whole. Of the experience of giving birth, she 
writes:
First-person descriptions of giving birth often depict birth as an event ..., as an 
upheaval akin to being caught in a violent storm. In both, there is a cessation of
31 Cf. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 52.
32 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 28.
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time, of intention and activity, or there is an alien intention, an intention of life.
[...] The subject is wrenched from itself; instead of a constituting subject, in birth 
there is an upsurge of life beyond control or comprehension.. .33
In brief, giving birth constitutes an instance of human individuality being overcome by the 
forces of life; in this sense, it is an encounter with the Dionysiac and a veritable experience of 
the tragic as Nietzsche defines it. A similar picture emerges in Simone de Beauvoir's account 
of pregnancy and birth in The Second Sex, which remains one of the seminal texts on the 
subject. Pregnancy, de Beauvoir argues,
is above all a drama that is acted out within the woman herself. She feels it as at 
once an enrichment and an injury; the foetus is part of her body, and it is a 
parasite that feeds on it; she possesses it, and she is possessed by it; it represents 
the future and, carrying it, she feels herself vast as the world; but this very 
opulence annihilates her, she feels that she herself is no longer anything. A new 
life is going to manifest itself and justify its own separate existence, and she is 
proud of it; but she also feels herself tossed and driven, the plaything of obscure 
forces. It is especially noteworthy that the pregnant woman feels die immanence 
of her body at just the time when it is in transcendence; it turns upon itself in 
nausea and discomfort; it has ceased to exist for itself and thereupon becomes 
more sizeable than ever before. The transcendence of the artisan, of the man of 
action, contains the element of subjectivity; but in the mother-to-be the antithesis 
of subject and object ceases to exist; she and the child with which she is swollen 
make up together an equivocal pair overwhelmed by life. Ensnared by nature, 
the pregnant woman is plant and animal, a storehouse of colloids, an incubator, 
and egg; ... she is a human being, a conscious and free individual, who has 
become life's passive instrument.34
In de Beauvoir's reading, too, the experience of pregnancy and birth amounts to the 
annihilation of the woman's individuality and to her being thrown and immersed into life, 
'the plaything of obscure forces'; it constitutes, in short, an encounter with the incessant 
forces of life and in this sense a tragic experience. De Beauvoir also points out that during 
pregnancy the woman's body is in a state of transcendence. In pregnancy, she discerns thus a
33 Johanna Oksala, 'What is Feminist Phenomenology? -  Thinking Birth Philosophically', Radical 
Philosophy, 126 (July/August 2004), 16-22 (p. 19).
34 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 512- 
513.
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transcendence which is, contrary to the traditional Western concept of the transcendent, a 
bodily sensation and does not contradict but actually affirms the body's immanence. The 
transcendence of the pregnant body is a transcendence in and within the world; in this sense, 
it corresponds to the transcendent as it emerges in Nietzsche's thinking.35 De Beauvoir 
contrasts this transcendence in pregnancy with the transcendence of the artisan which, she 
argues, contains an element of subjectivity in that the artisan, unlike the pregnant woman, 
has a deliberate effect on the world. Thus, however, the artisan transcends the world in 
negation for, as Koj£ve explains, 'to act is to transform what is real. And to transform what is 
real is to negate the given'.36 But as a human being, the artisan is also part of the 'given' world 
himself; in negating the given, he ends up negating himself. The transcendence of the 
dialectical man -  the artisan, the worker, the slave -  is such that man comes to be regarded as 
a thing not only by the other but eventually even by himself. It is therefore not just the things 
around him that man experiences by way of their instrumentality, as Heidegger observes; 
ultimately, he also sees his fellow human beings and even himself as instrument, equipment, 
stuff.37 There is here, however, an essential difference between man and woman, and 
Heidegger's notion of the instrumentality of the world does not apply to woman or take the 
feminine experience into account.38 De Beauvoir argues that
[t]he world does not seem to woman 'an assemblage of implements' intermediate 
between her will and her goals, as Heidegger defines it; it is on the contrary 
something obstinately resistant, unconquerable; it is dominated by fatality and 
shot through with mysterious caprices.39
35 Cf. Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, p. 324.
36 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 54.
37 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), p. 97.
38 Sara Heinamaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 73.
39 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 609.
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In essence, woman cannot negate the given to the same extent as man. It is not that she 
cannot work in the same way as man and have the same effect on the world as him. But 
however persistent she is in her negation of it, the world is always more than an instrument 
at her disposal. Accordingly, she is much more conscious than man of being not only in 
command of the given world but also being, in turn, overcome by it. And as she cannot 
negate the world to the same extent as man, she cannot negate herself to the same extent; 
thus, she is also more aware than man of being an instrument not just of her own will but of 
life itself. In this sense, woman is essentially more adverse than man to the negative 
transcendence of the dialectic, and more disposed than him to the affirmative transcendence 
in an overcoming of life that is not its cessation but its upsurge. Her different standing in life 
shapes her consciousness differently to man's and this distinction determines, in turn, the 
relationship between the sexes. De Beauvoir concludes that
[t]he female, to a greater extent than the male, is the prey of the species; and the 
human race has always sought to escape its specific destiny. The support of life 
became for man an activity and a project through the invention of the tool; but in 
maternity woman remained closely bound to her body, like an animal. It is 
because humanity calls itself in question in the matter of living -  that is to say, 
values the reasons for living above mere life -  that, confronting woman, man 
assumes mastery. Man's design is not to repeat himself in time: it is to take 
control of the instant and mould the future. It is male activity that in creating 
values has made of existence itself a value; this activity has prevailed over the 
confused forces of life; it has subdued Nature and Woman.40
Woman's standing in society depends, thus, on her position vis-a-vis the forces of nature, but 
it is not inherent in it, for it is not her position in life itself but the interpretation of it which 
determines her social standing. As long as the dialectical man creates values over and above 
life, woman is but the uncomfortable reminder that life cannot be entirely negated. As living 
proof of the futility of the dialectical project, she becomes the alienated and suppressed 
other. Only a dialectical age, however, interprets the fact that woman is subjected to nature
40 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 97.
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more than man such that it rates her less than him, for only a dialectical age is essentially 
opposed to life. A tragic age, by contrast, values the encounter with the Dionysiac forces of 
life as a metaphysical insight, and will rate woman's standing in life accordingly. Indeed, in a 
tragic age, woman is by the fact of her position in life better disposed to metaphysics than 
man.
♦ ♦ ♦
In the sense that the experience of pregnancy and birth is one of being overcome by the 
forces of nature, it is an experience of the Dionysiac as Nietzsche describes it; thus, it is in 
essence tragic. And it seems, indeed, that the act of giving birth, the act of Niederkunft, is not 
just one tragic experience among many, but the tragic act per se -  even if this does not 
correspond to the Contemporary understanding of the tragic. Today, it is only an untimely 
death that we think of as being tragic. Our profoundly dialectical belief that there is no 
situation that cannot be amended and no fate that cannot be averted in and through work41 
makes us insensitive to die tragic truth of life. The only fact that even we of the dialectical 
age accept as inevitable is that of our death: that each and every man will have to die. The 
dialectical man can work at prolonging his life or he can take his own life, but he does not 
escape the fact of his death. No amount of dialectical work will change the fact that he has to 
die -  and die prematurely, for every human death is in a sense premature42 and therefore 
tragic. Despite all his efforts to the contrary, the dialectical man is aware that at the end of his 
existence, the eternal forces of life which he always denied will lay claim to him again, but he 
has practically convinced himself that his death is the only instance where he cannot avert the 
forces of nature. It is precisely this conviction that is reflected in the contemporary usage of
41 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 66.
42 Koj£ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 256.
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the word 'tragic'. In truth, of course, even the dialectical man is regularly overcome by the 
forces of nature during his lifetime, albeit less so than woman. And crucially, woman 
experiences in the act of giving birth the forces of life as such, that is, as life and as the 
propagation of life, whereas man never encounters the forces of nature immediately. As long 
as he defines himself dialectically, man never experiences the forces of life as such; he works 
at negating them all throughout his life and even when he succumbs to them in the end, he 
only acknowledges them in the negative: on his deathbed, he interprets the eternal forces of 
nature as the very absence of life. In this sense, even the most obviously tragic experience in 
the life of man is obscured by the dialectic. Woman, on the other hand, has an immediate 
experience of the eternal forces of life regardless of the spirit of the age. In a dialectical age, it 
is indeed only in the act of giving birth that the nature of being appears as such -  that is, as 
life; hence, it seems that the act of giving birth is the tragic act per se. And in this sense, 
Nietzsche's thought of Niederkunft actually describes an encounter with the forces of life that 
cannot be obscured and negated even in the dialectical age.
♦ ♦ ♦
In the wake of Nietzsche's thinking, the dialectical age is gradually becoming aware of the 
tragic and woman's essential role in the tragic, but even today it seems that we acknowledge 
the tragic at best in absences and implications. As Derrida inquires into The Gift of Death, he 
does make the point that to give life is to give death, but he does not speak of birth any 
further. He argues that
[d]eath is very much that which nobody else can undergo or confront in my 
place. My irreplaceability is therefore conferred, delivered, 'given', one can say, 
by death. It is the same gift, the same source,... and the same law.43
43 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 41.
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Since the same clearly holds true of birth, it is remarkable that Derrida does not discuss birth 
in this context at all. Being bom and giving birth, strictly speaking, also constitute events 
which nobody can undergo in the other's place; in this sense, birth speaks no less than death 
of someone's irreplaceability. The fact that Derrida omits this aspect altogether shows that 
his analysis is ultimately still grounded in a dialectical worldview. Derrida looks at death 
and not at life, and he still looks to god, to the altogether other and the one who is opposed to 
life, as the one who bestowed life and death upon him. The Gift of Death leaves out -  or leaves 
open, at least -  the question of giving life. It does not look into the possibility of living such 
that you have life bestowed upon you by woman, rather than death bestowed upon you by 
god -  which would amount to a life without a god and a world which is in essence 
immanence and tragedy. On the few occasions that the question of woman arises, Derrida 
comments on her absence, but does not go beyond a simple statement of this fact. The tragic 
and woman's role in the tragic remains, thus, in Derrida's thinking at best a conspicuous 
absence.
Of the most influential commentators on Nietzsche, it is Bataille who furthest explores 
Nietzsche's thinking of the tragic. He recognizes that the human is perpetually tom between 
the forces of Dionysos and Apollo and that man -  even the dialectical man -  is never entirely 
opposed to the forces of life, for he regularly succumbs to them in sacrifice, sexuality and 
religious ecstasy.44 Hence, Bataille is aware that the existence of the dialectical man in the 
negation of the world is condemned to failure and only propels him towards his death; and 
he also knows that god has in the wake of Nietzsche's thinking become a woman -  a whore,
44 Cf. Bataille, Eroticism, and The Accursed Share, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 
1991/1993).
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in fact.45 In this sense, Bataille certainly recognizes the implications of the tragic as they 
emerge in Nietzsche's thinking and at times also discusses die tragic explicitly,46 but even 
though he clearly sees man's and woman's respective standing in relation to the forces of life, 
he does not elaborate on woman's particular role in the tragic. He looks at woman only in 
terms of eroticism and sexuality and barely touches on her role in reproduction; he does not 
think about birth in a philosophical sense and he does not recognize its tragic essence.
Heidegger, on the other hand, does not even raise the question of woman; in fact, he 
does not speak about sexual difference at all, as Derrida notes in an essay which he 
introduces with the words:
Of sex, one can readily remark, yes, Heidegger speaks as little as possible, 
perhaps he has never spoken of it. Perhaps he has never said anything, by that 
name or the names under which we recognize it, about the 'sexual-relation', 
'sexual-difference', or indeed about 'man-and-woman'.47
In this very silence, however, Heidegger may well prove himself to be a faithful heir to 
Nietzsche, for it seems to be the silence of an unlikely intimate who cannot find the words 
for what he reads in Nietzsche's work. Derrida is, indeed, very careful to point out that it is 
not that Heidegger does not speak of sexual difference but that he does not appear to speak of 
it; thus, he states only that Heidegger does not speak of sexual difference in a way we would 
recognize. Heidegger, he argues,
45 Cf. Bataille, 'Mme Edwarda' in: My Mother/Mme Edwarda/The Dead Man, translated by Austryn 
Wainhouse (London: Marion Boyars, 1995), pp. 135-159.
46 Bataille, The Accursed Share, II: The History of Eroticism (1993), p. 119.
47 Derrida, 'Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference', translated by Ruben Bevezdivin, in: 
Kamuf (ed.), A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, pp. 378-402 (p. 380).
71
TThe (Birth of Tragedy: tNiederkynft as the Tragic Conception of (Being
... apparently said nothing about sexuality by name in those places where the 
best educated and endowed 'modernity' would have fully expected it given its 
panoply o f' every thing-is-sexual-and-everything-is-political-and-reciprocally'.. .48
It is, however, the very fact that Heidegger does not speak of sexuality where we would 
expect him to which suggests that he thinks of sexual difference in the aftermath of 
Nietzsche's work. In thinking being as a whole such that it is defined as Niederkunft, 
Nietzsche effects a paradigmatic shift in our understanding of sexual difference, which has 
now become a metaphysical question. It seems, thus, that if Heidegger remains silent on the 
question of sexual difference, it is because he knows that it can no longer be addressed -  or 
even posed -  as it had been before Nietzsche. He knows that we can no longer speak of 
sexual difference in the way we used to and in those places where Derrida still half expects 
him to, for in Nietzsche's thinking the question of sexual difference has changed essentially. 
It is not just that the tragic age that Nietzsche heralds will value the experience of the 
Dionysiac as a true insight into the nature of being and will, therefore, appreciate woman's 
standing vis-a-vis the forces of life. In a tragic age, all human beings, irrespective of their 
biological sex, will know themselves to be prey to the forces of life and will recognize their 
metaphysical essence in creation, in bringing forth, in Niederkunft. In this sense, Nietzsche's 
thinking introduces an age which will, in philosophical terms, define all human beings as 
women.
Socrates, Faust, Bartleby: The Tragedy of the Dialecticians
In Nietzsche's thinking, the question of sexual difference is not a question of biology but one 
of metaphysics; it bears not so much on gender relations as on the definition of the human
48 Derrida, 'Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference' in: Kamuf (ed.), A Derrida Reader: 
Between the Blinds, pp. 378-402 (p. 381).
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essence. The dialectical age considers man to become truly human in and by his work; 
accordingly, it discerns more of a disposition towards a truly human existence in the 
working, world-and-life-negating man than in woman. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
man is truly human only when he is a creator and affirms life in bringing forth life. '[I]t shall 
be your curse', he warns the 'immaculate' men of dialectical knowledge,
... that you will never bring forth \gebdren], even if you lie broad and pregnant on 
the horizon!49
It is precisely because they will never bring forth that the dialectical men will never be truly 
human in Nietzsche's eyes: such is their 'curse'. In the German original, Nietzsche does not 
even use the more neutral expression 'to bring forth', but actually says 'to give birth', gebdren. 
In this sense, his wording of the argument accentuates, if anything, that it is only as woman 
that he considers man to be truly human. This is not to say that he aims to obliterate the male 
consciousness. In the aftermath of Nietzsche's thinking, men and women will of course 
coexist as they always have done. Whilst the dialectical age, however, perceives the male 
situation in life to lend itself more to a truly human existence, Nietzsche thinks the human 
such that it is the female situation which facilitates a truly human life; but both perspectives 
persist in either age, just as the tragic and the dialectic coexist in every life and in every age. 
Thus, Nietzsche traces the roots of the dialectical culture to the tragic age of ancient Greece, 
as he observes that
[t]he Greeks knew and felt the fears and horrors of existence: in order to be able 
to live at all they had to interpose the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians 
between themselves and those horrors.50
49 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 145-146 and 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' in: Colli /  Montinari 
(eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/1, Also Sprach Zarathustra, pp. 153-154.
50 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 22.
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In the need to avoid the gaze into the true nature of being, Nietzsche describes the dialectic 
in its nascent form as it arises out of the tragic. Dialectics originates as a method for not 
looking into the essence of things; it amounts to a refined complication of thinking which 
averts the realization of the true nature of being. And in the sense that it thinks being such 
that it does not think it, a dialectical age is an age of metaphysics.51 It is, thus, also essentially 
unaware of its own essence and of its inherent contradictions: for metaphysics is blind to the 
blindness of metaphysics. This is the tragic aspect of the dialectical age -  and the tragedy of 
the dialectical man, who, however hard he works at escaping his fate, is always caught out 
by it in the end. He cannot see that his incessant efforts at negating the world are ultimately 
futile and that he ends up negating himself in the process; he does not realize that his actions 
propel him only towards his demise. The tragedy of the dialectic unfolds as the history of the 
West; and its stages are epitomized in the fate of Socrates, Faust and Bartleby the scrivener.
Socrates is, even at a cursory glance, a profoundly tragic figure. For all his love of 
wisdom, he can only conclude that he knows nothing at all -  and he dies for this insight. In 
the fate of its founding father, the dialectic reveals thus already its pitfalls, and more clearly 
perhaps than ever since. As it does not look at the essence of being, however, the dialectical 
age proceeds unaware of its own essence and its inherent contradictions, and builds its 
wisdom on this initial ignorance. And indeed, the extent to which Socrates grounds his 
philosophy and therefore the Western tradition as a whole on a refusal of knowledge is 
nothing short of remarkable. In his lectures on The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, Nietzsche says of 
Socrates:
51 Cf. Heidegger's argument that '[b]eing itself necessarily remains unthought in metaphysics'. 
Heidegger, 'Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being' in Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism, pp. 197-250 (p. 
211).
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Astronomy he considered among the divine secrets, which would be nonsense to 
investigate. There is indeed advantage to knowing the motion of the celestial 
bodies as a leader of sea and land journeys and nightwatches -  one may learn 
this much from navigators and watchmen -  but everything beyond that is 
wasting valuable time. Geometry is necessary insofar as it puts everyone in the 
position properly to carry out buying, selling, and measuring land -  a man with 
normal attentiveness learns this without a teacher -  but silly and worthless if it 
leads to the study of juxtaposed mathematical diagrams.
He dispenses entirely with physics: "Do these researchers think that they know 
human relations sufficiently that they begin to mix into the divine? Do they think 
that they are in the position to provoke wind and rain in any way they want? Or 
will they content themselves only with idle curiosity? They should remember 
how the greatest men diverge in their results and present opinions just as the 
mad do'. Socrates never came to know physics ... Likewise, he thinks nothing of 
art; he grasped only its practical and agreeable aspects, and he belongs among 
the despisers of tragedy.52
This account of the foundations of Western philosophy certainly betrays the fact that the 
dialectical quest for absolute knowledge rests essentially on a determined ignorance. With 
the first dialectician, the tragedy of the dialectic is set out: for Socrates7 life and thought 
illustrates at the very beginning of the dialectical age already the circumstances of its 
inevitable downfall.
It is only centuries later, however, that the dialectical age begins to suspect something 
of its essence, most prominently in the case of Faust, who is the first scholar to realize the 
futility of dialectical knowledge in modem times. Thus, Nietzsche remarks:
How unintelligible to a true Greek must Faust appear, the modem man of 
culture, intelligible in himself, as he storms unsatisfied through all the faculties, 
devoting himself to magic and die devil because of his urge for knowledge. We 
need only compare him with Socrates to see that modern man has begun to sense 
the limitations of the Socratic delight in knowledge, and yearns for a shore from 
the wide and barren sea of knowledge.53
52 Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, translated by Greg Whitlock (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001), pp. 143-144.
53 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 86.
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In Faust's plight, the dialectical man begins almost despite himself to see the truth of the 
dialectic. It is in this sense that Faust is a tragic figure: for in the vacuity of his knowledge, he 
is beginning to recognize something of the truth of existence. As opposed to Socrates, who 
knew that he knew nothing but still delighted in knowledge, Faust has grown disillusioned 
with knowledge itself and turns instead to magic and to the devil. He has realized that the 
truth of existence is not to be found by means of 'grey theory'54 but only in life itself; indeed, 
this eminent scholar professes himself to feel truly human only when he mingles in the 
village festivities Without the City-Gate.55 And yet, Nietzsche makes of Faust as much, if not 
more, of a mockery than he does of Socrates. 'Faust, the tragedy of recognition?', he teases, 
'Really? I laugh at Faust'.56 He is, however, never just poking innocent fun at Faust, for his 
mockery always harbours a poignant diagnosis of Faust's position; thus, as he mimics the 
chorus at the end of the second part of Faust:57
Dedicated to All Creators [Allen Schaf fenden geweiht
Inseparable from this world Welt-Unabtrennliche
Let us be! Lafit uns sein!
The Etemally-Masculine Das Ewig-Mannliche
Draws us in. Zieht uns hinein.58]
As he dedicates these lines to 'all creators', Nietzsche speaks here to all that bring forth and 
in this sense to all those who are metaphysically speaking women, and he suggests that it is
54 Cf. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: Parts I & II, translated by Albert G. Latham (London: Dent 
& Sons, 1908), p. 91.
55 Goethe, Faust: Parts I & II, p. 43.
56 'Faust, die Tragodie der Erkenntnifl? Wirklich? Ich I ache iiber Faust'. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene 
Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vll/1: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 
1883/84, p. 102.
57 'All things corruptible /  Are but reflection. /  Earth's insuffiency /  Here finds perfection. /  Here the 
ineffable /  Wrought is with love. /  The Eternal-Womanly /  Draws us above.' Goethe, Faust: Parts I  & 
I I , p. 342; from the German: 'Alles Vergangliche /  Ist nur ein Gleichnis; /  Das Unzulangliche, /  Hier wird's 
Ereignis; /  Das Unbeschreibliche, /  Hier ist's getan;/Das Ewig-Weibliche /  Zieht uns hinan'. Goethe, 'Faust: 
Der Tragodie zweiter Teil', in: Werke, III: Dramatische Dichtungen, Erster Band (Hamburg: Christian 
Wegner, 1957), pp. 146-364 (p. 364).
58 Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, vn/3: 
Nachgelassene Fragmente: Herbst 1884-Herbst 1885 (1974), p. 5.
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precisely the etemally-masculine which draws us towards this state of being. The parody 
serves, thus, not only to highlight Nietzsche's own position in contradistinction to Faust's 
striving for pointless knowledge; it also makes a general statement about the relationship 
between the tragic and the dialectic. The passage that Nietzsche refers to suggests in the 
original version that the eternaUy-feminine draws us upwards, out of this world and into the 
transcendence that is the proper position of the philosopher in the dialectical age. In this 
sense, Nietzsche's parody points not only to the contradictions but also to the reciprocity 
between the tragic and the dialectic. The dialectical man, who is determined by his aim to 
negate the world, is in essence man. His ultimate incentive, however, is the eternally- 
feminine, for he strives to negate precisely that part of himself which will always fall prey to 
the forces of life. As such, the etemally-feminine is the goal and the end of the dialectical 
man. Conversely, the etemally-masculine, that is, man's eternal negation of himself, is the 
inherent crux of the dialectic and the reason for its inevitable downfall; in this sense, the 
etemally-masculine is, indeed, the force that propels us towards a tragic age which will 
define the human as creator and in this sense as woman. In Faust7 s disillusionment with 
knowledge, the West has no doubt taken a significant step towards the age that Nietzsche 
heralds. If Nietzsche mocks him nonetheless, it is because he remains even in his criticism of 
the dialectic a dialectician at heart. Although he can no longer share Socrates' enthusiasm 
about knowledge, is still driven by a quest to understand, to rationalize and to come to terms 
with the world. He has realized the vacuity of his own knowledge, but he has not given up 
on other ways of acquiring knowledge or mled out the possibility of another truth about the 
world. The fact that he dispenses with his own method, however, and looks for the truth 
elsewhere, and indeed all his probing and negotiating, only make Faust's thinking all the 
more dialectical in essence. It is in this sense that Faust's fate shows the plight -  and the truth 
-  of every dialectician: for whatever the dialectical man apprehends as the truth, it is always
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the opposite and in all his questioning, he only perpetuates the negation at the heart of the 
dialectic. Ultimately, whatever he does, he still acts and therefore negates. In his quest for 
ever more mastery over the world, the dialectical man must therefore eventually negate 
himself: he must cease to act. This spells of course his death, but such is the impasse of the 
dialectical man that he ceases to negate himself only when he is no longer. At its culmination, 
the tragedy of the dialectician is the tragedy of Herman Melville's 'Bartleby'.
Bartleby the scrivener eschews every 'yes' or 'no' and reacts to every stimulus with the 
words 'I would prefer not to'. He has nothing 'ordinarily human'59 about him and resembles 
not so much a man as a ghost.60 Eventually he ceases whatever little activity he used to 
undertake and dies through his inactivity -  because he 'preferred not to' eat. In his active 
indecision, Bartleby succeeds Faust in the philosophical tradition of the West, for where 
Faust was merely pessimistic, he is a nihilist proper -  and as such also the more 
accomplished dialectician. Hegel may dismiss the nihilist who dies because he is no longer 
'an agent of historical evolution',61 as Koj&ve points out, but would it not seem that the 
nihilist plays a role in the historical change of the world, even if he dies, insofar as his death, 
his suicide, is one last action on his part? On several occasions towards the end of his life, 
Bartleby repeats that he 'would prefer not to make any change',62 but precisely in no longer 
striving to change anything about the world, he does make a change, for his death, though 
seemingly passive, is in fact a conscious and wilful act. The only way for Bartleby to achieve 
his wish of not making any more changes would have been to live forever -  as is indeed the 
ultimate aspiration of the dialectic, which under the pretence of change strives for eternity. It
59 Herman Melville, 'Bartleby7 in: The Standard Edition of the Works, X: The Piazza Tales (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1963), pp. 19-65 (p. 30).
60 Melville, 'Bartleby7 in: The Standard Edition of the Works, X: The Piazza Tales, pp. 19-65 (p. 55).
61 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 54.
62 Melville, 'Bartleby7 in: The Standard Edition of the Works, X: The Piazza Tales, pp. 19-65 (p. 58).
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is in this sense that Bartleby's death illustrates the paradox of the dialectic. On the one hand, 
it is clearly a dialectical action that changes the world; on the other, it ends Bartleby's 
existence as a dialectician and returns him to the eternal forces of life. And yet, in this 
respect, too, it is essentially a dialectical act, for the dialectical man works ultimately only 
towards his death. It seems, thus, that Bartleby's story puts him amongst those who 
Nietzsche praises for willing their own downfall,63 although he generally dislikes nihilists 
and suicides and the 'preachers of death'.64 In negating his dialectical existence, however, 
Bartleby rejects the denial of life that it amounts to and succumbs of his own volition to the 
forces of life again. In this sense, his tragic end illustrates the ambivalence of the dialectical 
death which Nietzsche felt so keenly, particularly in Zarathustra's speeches Of the Preachers 
of Death and Of Voluntary Death. In principle, Nietzsche objects to those who advocate death 
and wish to die, but he celebrates their death nonetheless as the dawning of a new age. And 
it is, indeed, not only in this sense that he appreciates the pessimists and the nihilists. He 
actually credits them with a metaphysical insight, for he knows that if dialectical men cease 
to act, it is a sign that they have seen the fallacy of the dialectic. 'This', he explains,
is something that Dionysiac man shares with Hamlet: both have truly seen to the 
essence of things, they have understood, and action repels them; for their action 
can change nothing in the eternal essence of things, they consider it ludicrous or 
shameful that they should be expected to restore order to the chaotic world. 
Understanding kills action, action depends on a veil of illusion -  this is what 
Hamlet teaches us, not the stock interpretation of Hamlet as a John-a-dreams 
who, from too much reflection, from an excess of possibilities, so to speak, fails to 
act. Not reflection, not that! -  True understanding, insight into the terrible truth, 
outweighs every motive for action, for Hamlet and Dionysiac man alike.65
And, indeed, for Bartleby the scrivener: he, too, ceases to act because he has seen into the 
essence of things. Even if, as a dialectician, he does not experience the tragic truth as such, he
63 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 44-45.
64 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 71-73.
65 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 39.
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can see the essence of being in the negative. He recognizes the truth of the dialectic in its 
shortcomings, in its pitfalls, in its irrelevance to life -  and there could hardly be a better place 
for this insight than the Dead Letter Office where he used to work. The more a dialectician 
sees of the truth of the dialectic -  which is always artefact, fabrication, untruth -  the closer he 
is to understanding the tragic truth; in this sense, Bartleby is closer to the tragic than Faust or 
Socrates, although he is, by the same token, also the more accomplished dialectician. And 
this is his tragedy: Bartleby has seen something of the truth of the dialectic and negates it 
now to the point of his own death, but in this very death he still negates the negation that is 
the dialectic -  and in this sense he ultimately remains true to the dialectical formula. Adorno 
identifies as the first principle of the dialectic that it equates the negation of the negation 
with positivity.66 In this light, putting a positive slant on the death of the dialectical man 
would essentially still be dialectical reasoning. At the end of the dialectical age, however, it 
seems that this first assumption of the dialectic is no longer just its flawed axiom. The 
dialectical man works in order to change the world according to his idea of it, and in the 
sense that the basic "idea7 of the dialectical age is that the negation of negation equals 
positivity, he works to change the world such that this initially flawed axiom becomes true. 
And at the end of the dialectical age, he has indeed effected a situation where the negation of 
the negation becomes something positive -  even if it is only in his own death. In the history 
of the dialectic, Koj&ve explains,
it was not the (erroneous) discourse that changed in order to conform to given 
Being ...; it was that Being that was transformed in order to conform to the 
discourse. The action which transforms the given real so as to make true a human 
error -  that is, a discourse that was in disagreement with this given -  is called 
Work.67
66 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
67 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp. 188-189.
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In the sense that the dialectical man strives to change the world according to his initially 
fictitious idea that the negation of the negation should be something positive, the dialectical 
age aims, for all its inherent negativity, above all for something positive to come out of the 
dialectic. It is, indeed, the unshaken belief that something positive will come from his work 
that spurs the dialectical man into action -  and into tragedy. This is, no doubt, Socrates' 
belief, when he lets himself be killed; it is Faust7 s, when he lets the other, the woman, be 
killed, and it is Bartleby's, when he lets himself kill himself.
It is the tragedy of the dialectical man that he is always already condemned to death 
and cannot, for all his efforts, avert his fate; in fact, all his efforts at escaping his fate only 
propel him further towards it. All dialecticians, from Socrates, who dies because he believes 
that there is something more important than this world, to Bartleby, who dies because he has 
realized that there is nothing other than this world, are driven by the belief that they can 
master their fate in the eternal course of life. The dialectical age does, indeed, go to great 
length to sustain this view, but for all its obscurantism it can never shield the nature of being 
entirely. There always remains a sense of tragedy in the thought of the dialecticians -  and 
there always remains the question of woman. In the story of Bartleby, however, Derrida is 
struck by the distinct absence of woman. He observes that 'Bartleby ... doesn't make a single 
allusion to anything feminine whatsoever, even less to anything that could be construed as a 
figure of woman',68 and takes this to be a point which distinguishes the story from tragedy, 
where 'woman is present, her place is central'.69 But even if woman is largely absent from the 
story of Bartleby, it seems that she actually plays a central part in its unfolding. The scrivener 
enacts his death in the conscious surrender to the eternal forces of life; thus, he works at 
becoming, metaphysically speaking, woman and he dies in order to become woman. In the
68 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 76.
69 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 76.
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biological sense, woman is no doubt conspicuously absent from Bartleby7 s story; but in the 
metaphysical sense, she is actually its driving force, for the story of Bartleby is the story of 
the last of the dialecticians and the man who takes the dialectical quest for positivity to its 
conclusion in woman.
♦ ♦ ♦
Just as there is in all dialectics an element of tragedy, the tragic always conveys a sense of 
imminent dialectics. Nietzsche7s account of tragic art certainly illustrates how the tragic 
harbours a potential for dialectics, in the sense that he discerns in tragic art the play, the 
conflict and the opposition of two forces -  the Apolline and the Dionysiac. He explains that
[t]hese two different tendencies walk side by side, usually in violent opposition 
to one another, inciting one another to ever more powerful births, perpetuating 
the struggle of the opposition only apparently bridged by the word 7 art7; until, 
finally, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 7will7, the two seem to be 
coupled, and in this coupling they seem at last to beget the work of art that is as 
Dionysiac as it is Apolline -  Attic tragedy.70
In their perpetual interplay, it seems almost as if the relationship between these two forces 
could pertain to the order of the dialectic. The crucial point, however, is that Nietzsche 
thinks the conflict of the Dionysiac and the Apolline in tragic art such that no one of the two 
forces ever gains the upper hand for good; the conflict is never annihilated, never 
superseded and never taken to another level. And as long as it recurs in forever the same 
way, with no one force gaining a lasting advantage, the relationship between the two powers 
is essentially not dialectical. Indeed, the relationship between the forces of life actually 
remains unchanged throughout the ages; it is only people's interpretation of it that varies in 
the course of history. In this sense, the tragic awareness of the conflict at the heart of life
70 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 14.
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precedes the dialectic -  and will also succeed it. The dialectic, by contrast, purports to free 
man of the grip of life; and to this effect, the dialectician has to deny his knowledge of the 
Dionysiac and convince himself that in the conflict of the forces the Apolline has now won 
the upper hand. As the interplay of the two forces proceeds, however, as always, the 
dialectical attempt at denying the Dionysiac must lead to ever greater absurdities; and rather 
than providing man with an insight into the nature of being, it removes him ever further 
from it. Ultimately, the dialectic cannot altogether deny the existence of two contradicting 
forces even by its own logic, and its fundamental reliance on opposition readily reveals the 
absurdity of its aim for totality. Hence, it harbours the illusion that the forces of life could be 
reconciled into one universal power and that what it likes to call evil could be defeated, but it 
only ever pictures this in the future and in another world. Indeed, Christianity -  the 
dialectics or the 'Platonism for "the people"'71 -  is only too aware that it has not yet defeated 
the devil, even if it claims that this aim can ultimately be achieved. At the time of Goethe's 
Faust, however, the Christian relationship between god and the devil has already changed 
fundamentally. In the Prologue in Heaven, god and the devil are hardly depicted as serious 
opponents any more; they get on fabulously and enjoy their game with Faust. It does not 
seem that Faust's fate, whatever the outcome, will have a lasting impact on their 
relationship; theirs is, precisely, a game that could be played over and over again. In the days 
of Bartleby the scrivener, god and the devil do not actually exist any more. At the height of 
the dialectic, this antagonism is resolved and superseded -  aufgehoben. Bartleby's fate is in the 
hands of his fellow human beings, and in particular in the hands of his employer, who never 
appears to be anything but a rational and humane man and yet, by his seemingly well- 
meaning actions, propels Bartleby further towards his demise. In his employer, Bartleby 
faces the man who has become god and the god who has become man -  and who is, thus,
71 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 32.
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also the devil set on his ruin. At the end of the dialectical age, there are, despite all efforts to 
the contrary, still both forces at work. The distinction between god and the devil may now 
appear to be resolved in man, but ultimately, life is still determined in the balance of the two 
opposing forces that constitute the basis of tragedy.
The tragic and the dialectic coincide to a certain extent in every age of human history, 
but the interpretation of the nature of being that defines an age characterizes it as tragic or 
dialectical in spirit. Thus, Nietzsche usually ascribes philosophy and tragedy to different 
ages, delineated by Socratic thought and again by his own, which marks the end of 
philosophy and the rebirth of tragedy. On one occasion, however, he equates the end of 
philosophy with the end of tragedy and suggests that every philosophy is 'in  its inception a 
long tragedy7.72 This remark may be at odds with his usage of the terms elsewhere, but it 
seems that Nietzsche indicates, thus, that dialectical thought will eventually also lead to the 
realization of the tragic and therefore to the truth that it denied so ardently. In this sense, his 
comment highlights the intricate relationship between the tragic and the dialectic, which 
actually remains in either age arcane. The dialectical age denies, above all, the tragic truth 
and the fact that its own reasoning leads to tragedy. And the tragic age, in turn, denies its 
potential for dialectics. The tragic truth depends, indeed, very much on its claim to eternity 
and crumbles at the possibility of lasting change. The 7consolation ... with which ... every 
true tragedy leaves us773 -  that is, the knowledge that life is indestructible and remains 
forever the same -  rests on the premise that the world can not be changed permanently. The 
claim of the dialectic, however, is precisely that it can; and this is the threat it poses to the 
tragic age. Tragic wisdom therefore denies the dialectical project, just as dialectical 
knowledge, in turn, denies the tragic truth. In his remark that 7 [e] very philosophy also
72 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 57.
73 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 39.
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conceals a philosophy7/ 4 Nietzsche highlights, thus, the essence of the relationship between 
the tragic and the dialectic as one of mutual dependence and mutual denial.
♦ ♦ ♦
The intricate relationship between the tragic and the dialectic certainly accounts for the fact 
that Nietzsche feels himself to have been close -  and too close -  to Hegel when he first 
thought his fundamental thought in The Birth of Tragedy. It is not a coincidence that he sees 
HegeTs proximity more clearly here than in his later writings. The Birth of Tragedy and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit are the two thinkers7 first works, and despite their authors7 later 
concern that they are unsophisticated works of youth,75 it is in these early works that they 
think their fundamental thoughts in their entirety. At this stage in their respective 
development, it is more apparent than ever again that Hegel and Nietzsche approach the 
same thought. In the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel announces that his task is
[t]o help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can 
lay aside the title 'love of knowledge7 and be actual knowing.76
In the sense that he aspires to the end of philo-sophy as the love of wisdom and as it has been 
hitherto, his task appears to be the same as Nietzsche's. And indeed, as Hegel anticipates the 
end of philosophy, his language abounds in the terminology of Niederkunft, just as 
Nietzsche's does in The Birth of Tragedy. 7[I]t is not difficult to see7, he writes,
... that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has 
broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to
74 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 216.
75 Cf. J. N. Findlay, foreword7, in: G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. v-xxx (p. v); and Nietzsche, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' 
in: The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 3-12 (p. 5).
76 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 3.
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submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is 
indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first 
breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness 
of merely quantitative growth -  there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born -  
so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new 
shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering 
state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms.77
The fact that Hegel, quite contrary to his habit, speaks here in the terms and the images of 
childbirth shows the extent to which his thinking anticipates the final destiny of the dialectic 
and its end in the thought of Niederkunft. Indeed, even the very first image that Hegel 
employs to illustrate the dialectical nature of being -  the image of the bud and the blossom - 
actually speaks also of the tragic and of Niederkunft. Hegel writes:
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that 
the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom 
is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now 
emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from 
one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the 
same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which 
they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and 
this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.78
The image of the bud and the blossom, however, not only illustrates the dialectical process 
from one state to the other that Hegel describes; it also shows that underneath all the 
dialectical changes life itself lies unperturbed and remains in essence the same. In this sense, 
Hegel's illustration of the dialectical mutability of the world also points to its primordial 
tragic constancy. And in the bud and the blossom, Hegel actually chooses an example which 
could likewise be described as an act of Niederkunft; thus, he betrays how close he comes to 
Nietzsche's thought. As Hegel speaks from the point of view of absolute knowledge, 
however, he contemplates the bud and the blossom from a perspective where their 
transformation does not appear as Niederkunft. From Hegel's point of view, the bud
77 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 6.
78 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 2.
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disappears in the blossom and is refuted by it, but from the point of view of life, the bud 
gives birth to the blossom, which in turn brings forth the fruit. And yet, even Hegel's 
position in its own right reveals something of the tragic. As a philosopher, he looks at being 
in retrospect, and in the futurity of this position alone, there is a sense of the tragic: a notion 
that everything has been and will be repeated as it is in all eternity. Again, Hegel's thinking 
betrays how close he comes to anticipating Nietzsche's fundamental thought. And indeed, 
when Nietzsche later says of The Birth of Tragedy that 'it smells offensively Hegelian'79 -  ‘sie 
riecht anstofiig Hegelisch'80 -  it seems that he acknowledges not only the fact that his first book 
engages with Hegel more than the rest of his work. The word anstdfiig and the corresponding 
noun Anstofi -  like the English terms 'repulsive' and 'repulsion' -  denote not only offence or 
disgust but can also describe an impulse. In this sense, Nietzsche's remark about The Birth of 
Tragedy is the singular occasion where he acknowledges Hegel as the departing point of his 
thinking and as its impetus.
'The trees have nothing to teach me': Beyond the Anthropomorphism of Being
As Nietzsche thinks his fundamental thought for the first time in The Birth of Tragedy, he is 
for the first time confronted with his task in its entirety. Indeed, the analysis of the forces of 
life that he undertakes as his first published work describes his standing in the history of 
philosophy and his philosophical project at least as precisely as his later works. Nietzsche, A. 
R. Orage argues, believes that he 'would transform Europe, and deliver men's minds from 
the dull oppression of Apollo'.81 In this sense, Orage, whose insight into Nietzsche's position
79 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 48.
80 Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/Gotzen- 
Dammerung /  Nachgelassene Sckriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 308).
81 A. R. Orage, Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age (London: Foulis, 1914), p. 41.
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is second to none at the time, recognizes in the conflict between the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac the question at the heart of Nietzsche's task. He writes:
Sworn deadly enemy of Apollo as Dionysos might be, could Apollo really live 
without him? Might not Dionysos, the eternal foe, be also the eternal saviour of 
Apollo? The question was afterwards put by Nietzsche in a myriad of forms. The 
whole of his work may be said, indeed, to be no less than the raising of this 
terrible interrogation mark. He divined and stated the problem for modem 
Europe as it had been stated for ancient Greece. He asked Europe the question 
which Greece had already asked herself, and which Greece had magnificently 
answered. For the answer of Greece is recorded in her Tragic Mysteries. In Greek 
tragic drama the answer of the Greek mind to the momentous question is a 
splendid affirmative. Not Apollo alone; not Dionysos alone; but Apollo and 
Dionysos. -  What will be Europe's reply?82
This is the awe-inspiring question that Nietzsche's thinking presents for all of us at every 
moment to answer. In his discussion of the Apolline and the Dionysiac in The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche is no doubt already confronted with this question, but at the time he does 
not yet mention his task explicitly. He introduces the book as a study of ancient Greece and 
does not relate it to his own task in the history of thought. Even in retrospect, he treads very 
carefully in judging its significance for his future oeuvre. The closest he comes to tracing his 
first realization of his task to The Birth of Tragedy is an unpublished note, which reads:
Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of art to truth seriously: 
even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance. My first book was 
devoted to it. The Birth of Tragedy believes in art on the background of another 
belief -  that it is not possible to live with truth, that the 'will to truth' is already a 
symptom of degeneration.83
In the question of the relationship between art and truth, Nietzsche recognizes the question 
that has preoccupied him since the very beginning of his philosophical life, namely, the 
question of the relationship between the two principal forces of life. In The Birth of Tragedy,
82 Orage, Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age, pp. 32-33.
83 Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vlll/3: 
Nachgelassene Fragmente: Anfang 1888-Anfang Januar 1889 (1972), p. 296; translation as quoted in: 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 74.
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he argues that the Greeks needed the beauty of Apolline art in order to endure the truth of 
life. The lives of the founding fathers of Western civilization illustrate, thus, that art is the 
first requisite of a human life, that it is essential to man and belongs to the core of his being. 
Accordingly, Nietzsche concludes that it is 'only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and 
the world are eternally justified,u  and that 'art -  . . .  not morality -  is ... the properly 
metaphysical activity of man'.85 And as art is essentially creation, Nietzsche's first major work 
already reveals that he thinks man such that he is truly human only in creating, in bringing 
forth, in Niederkunft, and in this sense as woman. Although this notion of the human emerges 
throughout Nietzsche's writing, it is never explicit; in fact, Nietzsche seems to be at pains to 
emphasize that he is opposed to a 'woman's aesthetic'.86 '[Ojne ought not', he notes, 
'demand of the artist, who gives, that he should become a woman -  that he should receive'.87 
This juxtaposition of woman and the artist certainly seems to be at odds with Nietzsche's 
notion of their essential kinship as creators, but it does not contradict it categorically. Even 
the fact that Nietzsche characterizes woman in this instance not as bringing forth but as 
receiving does not undermine her essence as the human being defined in Niederkunft, for she 
is, indeed, destined to bringing forth only because she receives the given more readily than 
man. And similarly, the artist is able to create because he is in the first instance receptive to 
the tragic truth of life, which he brings to light in his art. In this sense, Nietzsche's 
juxtaposing of woman and the artist betrays not an inconsistency in his understanding but 
shows, indeed, that in its manifestation as Niederkunft, Nietzsche thinks his fundamental 
thought in its entirety, but not in its full unfolding.
♦ ♦ ♦
84 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 32.
85 Nietzsche, 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' in: The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 3-12 (p. 7).
86 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 429.
87 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 429.
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In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche reads in ancient Greek art the essence of the tragic age and 
establishes, thus, that art is the truly metaphysical activity of man, which determines the 
nature of being as a whole and defines the spirit of an age -  whether or not the age actually 
acknowledges its metaphysical quality. Indeed, Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard's inquiry into The 
Postmodern Condition shows that there is a fundamental connection between the art and the 
essence of the dialectical age, even though the dialectic denies the metaphysical aspect of art. 
Lyotard, to be sure, does not discuss the metaphysical quality of art explicitly, but in the 
sense that he reads in different forms of art the changing spirit of the age, it is, no doubt, 
implicit in his work.88 As he compares the 'fantasy to seize reality'89 that he discerns in realist 
art with the terrorsome demand for unity, simplicity and totality inherent in Enlightenment 
reason, his argument implies, conversely, that the perspective developed by the artists of the 
Italian quattrocento reveals the essence of the dialectical age. In modern works of art, by 
contrast, Lyotard reads the '"lack of reality" of reality',90 which points to a significant change 
in the essence of the age, even if Lyotard's distinction is not primarily a chronological one. If 
modem art represents a lack of reality, if it represents 'the fact that the unpresentable exists'91 
and shows the unpresentable as the 'missing contents',92 it grants an insight into the essence 
of the age, which thinks being such that 'thinking ... always passes over Being itself in
88 To read into Lyotard's text a more fundamental connection than he himself makes between the
essence of the age and the art it produces is not, incidentally, to agree with Fredric Jameson, who, in
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism appears to make this connection much more 
explicitly. For Jameson, however, this connection is not essential but contingent upon circumstances of 
politics, economics and culture. And unlike Lyotard's, Jameson's account does not even indicate a 
growing sensitivity of the age to the metaphysical character of art, on the contrary; for Jameson, art 
remains very much an instrument at the hands of the capitalists, politicians and pedagogues. Cf. 
Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' in: Thomas Docherty: 
Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 62-92.
89 Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 82.
90 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 77.
91 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 78.
92 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 81.
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thought, not as an oversight, but in such a way that it does not enter into Being as such, into 
what is questionable about its truth7.93 In this sense, Lyotard7s reading of the changes in 
artistic expression in the West reveals the changing spirit of an age that is becoming 
increasingly aware of its dialectical essence and of the void at its core. As 7the modem 
aesthetic question7, Lyotard identifies, 7not "What is beautiful?77 but "What can be said to be 
art ...?777,94 implying, thus, that modem art does not even profess an interest in anything 
besides itself and certainly does not lay claim to metaphysical revelations. And yet, precisely 
in that it refers only to itself, modem art reveals the essence of the dialectical age: its self­
centredness and its dismissal of anything outside of itself and hence, its inherent totality. In 
this sense, Lyotard's inquiry certainly shows, albeit stealthily, that art grants an insight into 
the essence of being, even if it most ardently denies its metaphysical grounds.
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory gives a very different account of contemporary art, but his 
reading equally points towards its metaphysical quality. What Lyotard celebrates as 'the 
invention of new mles of the game7,95 Adorno reads as an 'uncertainty about the purpose of 
art and the conditions for its continued existence7; thus, he asks whether art did not 'lose its 
foundation when it gained complete freedom from external purposes7.96 Notwithstanding 
their differences, however, both interpretations concede that art has begun to question itself, 
and both illustrate, thus, that contemporary art reveals the essence of the dialectical age, 
which ever more frantically undermines not just everything other, but ultimately even itself. 
That contemporary art lends itself to different interpretations does not contradict its 
metaphysical quality; indeed, it testifies to it in its own right, for the art of the dialectical age 
discloses the contradictions and complications at the heart of the dialectic in the very fact
93 Heidegger, Nietzsche, W: Nihilism, p. 211.
94 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 75.
95 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 80.
96 Adomo, Aesthetic Theory, translated by C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 2.
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that it is self-referential, but never self-explanatory. Today', Adorno notes, 'it goes without 
saying that nothing concerning art goes without saying, much less without thinking'.97 And 
in this sense, the art of the dialectical age reflects the dialectical intolerance of all immediacy 
and the linguistic roots of dialectics. In the dialectic, nothing is as it appears and nothing 
goes without deliberation or indeed without thinking and saying also its opposite. If art has 
become such that it involves thinking and if it has actually become thinking, it shows, 
conversely, that thought is the dialectical form of art. In fact, the refinement of thought that is 
dialectics is the only truly creative deed of the dialectical man, and ultimately, it is what 
confronts him with the essence of being as a whole, albeit not in the sense that it claims to do 
precisely that. The dialectical system of thought eventually reveals the impossibility of 
dialectics, and as such the tragic truth; thus, it affords a real metaphysical insight and proves 
to be a work of art in the Nietzschean sense.
In this light, Lyotard's inquiry into The Postmodern Condition is not only a Report on 
Knowledge, as the title suggests, but, inasmuch as his reasoning reveals the essence of being in 
its own right, also a work of art. Especially his concluding plea to '[l]et us wage a war on 
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable, let us activate the differences and save the 
honor of the name',98 brings to light the essential contradictions at the heart of the dialectical 
age. Lyotard appeals against the claim to totality that he discerns in the dialectics of 
Enlightenment reason, but in declaring what appears, by all accounts, to be a total war on 
totality, is he not closing his eyes to the primordial totality, to the first and last universal that 
is being as a whole? In this sense, he rejects the totality inherent in dialectics, but as he 
avoids, thus, the question of being as a whole, he still perpetuates the dialectical tradition of 
thinking being as a whole such that it remains, in essence, unthought. In urging us to 'be
97 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 1.
98 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 82.
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witnesses to the unpresentable ... and save the honor of the name', Lyotard similarly rejects 
the dialectical aspiration to totality, which he recognizes, in this instance, in its efforts to 
represent even the unpresentable. And yet, in his concern for the honour of the name, he 
replicates precisely this totalitarian aspiration, for the name itself -  any name -  is already a 
form of representation and a dialectical attempt at ordering reality. It is in this sense that 
Lyotard's essentially dialectical reasoning reveals the essence of the dialectic and grants a 
metaphysical insight into the nature of an age that anticipates its own demise.
In the dialectical age, only thought is acknowledged as a metaphysical activity of man, 
and only thought is defined such that it is a form of art in the Nietzschean sense. The 
dialectical age, however, does not acknowledge thinking as art and is, indeed, always at 
pains to emphasize the distinction between the two. Accordingly, it entertains the view that 
art is in decline. Adorno certainly expresses the Zeitgeist when he concedes that 'art may, as 
Hegel speculated it would, soon enter the age of its demise',99 for this is the sentiment 
generated by an age that does not acknowledge the metaphysical quality of what it calls art 
and therefore treats the truly human activity of man as a pastime. And on the other hand, the 
dialectical age does not recognize its ever-more-refined system of thought as art. It is 
precisely in this blindness to its own metaphysics, however, that it reveals its metaphysical 
essence. The dialectic denies art as the human activity that reveals the essence of being 
because the truth it seeks is not the truth as it is revealed -  it seeks its own truth elsewhere; 
indeed, it creates its own truth in thinking. In the dialectic, the truth is only ever to be found 
in the artefact that is dialectical thought; and in this sense, the dialectical age, for all its claims 
to the contrary, seeks the truth only in art.
99 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 5.
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♦ ♦ ♦
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's quest for the truth of being opens with a study of art, and 
in this sense, his philosophical project certainly betrays its roots in the dialectical tradition of 
the West. It is only in his early work, however, that he privileges the contemplation of art in 
his metaphysical inquiry, and even there he already extricates himself from the dialectical 
tradition in that he actually acknowledges the metaphysical quality of art. As the first thinker 
of the dialectical age, Nietzsche seeks not the manufactured truth of the dialectic but the 
tragic truth of life, which resides not only in art. And in his later writings, particularly in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, he actually proves to be the first thinker of the West to recognize the 
essence of being in the mountains, the sea and the sun: in short, in the natural world. Since 
Socrates, philosophy has rested on the premise that the natural world is not the object proper 
of metaphysics. T m  an intellectual', Socrates declares,'... and country places with their trees 
tend to have nothing to teach me, whereas people in town do'.100 Thus, Koj&ve explains, 
Socrates communicates the dialectical premise that,
starting from (false or true) myth and opinion, one can attain science and truth
only by way of discussion -  that is, by way of dialogue or dialectic.101
Only the engagement with other people can produce the truths that the dialectic hankers for, 
but conversely, it is, of course, only the artificial, dialectical truth and not the tragic truth of 
life that can be attained in this way. It may seem as though Socrates qualifies his statement 
and actually 'avows that trees can teach people some things, if their ears are sensitive enough
i°° piato, Phaedrus, translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 7.
101 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 180.
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to hear',102 as he discusses the speaking oak later on in the dialogue. '[Tithe people at the 
sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona', he recounts,
say that the original prophecies there were spoken by an oak. In those days 
people weren't as clever as you young ones nowadays, and they were so foolish 
that they happily listened to oak and rock, as long as they told the truth.103
The speaking oak, however, is no ordinary tree and does not instruct people as other trees 
would. If it teaches people, it teaches them in the same way as another human being, for in 
its speech, it already has the propensity for dialectics. And in his day, Socrates points out, 
people are no longer foolish enough to listen to oak and rock, even if they do speak, which 
implies that they have already realized that in the dawning age of dialectics only human 
beings can produce the truth in their dialogue. In this sense, Socrates' tale of the speaking 
oak only confirms that the trees do not have anything to teach the dialectician.
It is not until Hegel, who in many ways already thinks the end of the dialectic, that the 
West contemplates the trees in a philosophical sense again. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel turns to the natural world to demonstrate the ubiquitous truth of the dialectic, 
choosing the examples of the bud and the blossom104 and the acorn and the oak tree105 to 
describe the essence of being in its entirety. Even if in Hegel's interpretation as Spirit, being 
as a whole has a potential, a tendency and indeed a need for self-consciousness reminiscent 
of the human, it therefore seems that he is the first thinker of the West who seeks the essence 
of being also in the trees around him. Hegel, Koj£ve argues,
... does not need a God who would reveal the truth to him. And to find the truth, 
he does not need to hold dialogues with 'the men in the city', or even have a
102 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 79.
103 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 69.
104 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 2.
105 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 7.
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'discussion7 with himself or to 'meditate7 a la Descartes. [...] He can find it all 
alone, while sitting tranquilly in the shade of those 'trees7 which taught Socrates 
nothing, but which teach Hegel many things about themselves and about men.
But all this is possible only because there have been cities in which men had 
discussions against a background of fighting and work, while they worked and 
fought for and because of their opinions (cities, moreover, which were 
surrounded by these same trees whose wood was used in their construction).
Hegel no longer discusses because he benefits from the discussion of those who 
preceded him.106
Koj&ve grants, thus, that Hegel's philosophical thought takes account of the natural world, 
but he actually opposes Hegel's 'absurd philosophy of Nature',107 and argues against Hegel 
that 'it is only History that can and must be understood dialecticalhf.108 Indeed, he takes it to 
be Hegel's 'basic error'109 that he extends the dialectical interpretation of being to being on 
the whole. And ultimately, his account of how Hegel learns from the trees illustrates, in fact, 
that Hegel does not learn from the trees as such, for in looking at the trees, Hegel sees only 
the cities that human work can build from them and hence only the course of human history. 
This is, indeed, not just a foible on Hegel's part, for the fact that he can see in everything only 
man actually reflects the essence of the dialectic, which describes being only in human terms. 
As the human is, thus, at the heart of the dialectical determination of being, the essence of the 
dialectic emerges at its clearest in the fate of dialectical men like Socrates, Faust and Bartleby. 
Woman, on the other hand, who is always and even in a dialectical age to a greater extent 
subjected to life, reveals the essence of the dialectic less clearly, perhaps, but all the more 
poignantly, in that she actually reveals it as aberration: thus, in the case of the hysteric, who 
escapes, however briefly, the tyranny of reason or the anorexic, who deprives herself of the 
life that the dialectic threatens to appropriate. In either case, however, the dialectical age is 
anxious not to recognize in her its own essence; it attributes the negation not to itself but to
106 Kojdve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 186.
107 Kojfcve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 146.
108 Koj6ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 146.
109 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 146.
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her, and dismisses her as a pathological aberration, incongruous with proper philosophical 
considerations. In its reading of the women who resist its dominance, the dialectical age 
betrays the anthropocentrism at its core and the fact that woman, inasmuch as she is tied to 
the forces of life, teaches the dialecticians no more than the trees that surround them. As the 
dialectic strives for totality, however, it vehemently denies the anthropomorphism at its 
centre and lays claim to a universal definition of being. It is not a coincidence that Hegel's 
philosophical work comprises accounts of the natural world, even if his is essentially still the 
anthropocentric perspective of the dialectical age. The clearest illustration of Hegel's view of 
the natural world emerges therefore not in his philosophical writing but in his impressions 
of the Swiss Alps, which he recorded on a journey undertaken in his youth:
Hegel's descriptions of the journey nowhere reveal any sense of awe or 
astonishment in the face of the overpowering might of the mountains around 
him. Even the glacial formations of Grindelwald could hardly stir his interest in 
their geological constitution. And why not? 'The sight of them presents nothing 
of further interest to the view. One can only really describe it as another kind of 
snow which offers nothing of any further interest to the spirit'. [...] As he 
contemplates the upper slopes of the region in all its barren bleakness the 
Enlightenment notion of a nature perfectly fitted to serve our human needs and 
purposes strikes him as an absurdity ... The sheer 'might and necessity of nature' 
cannot properly be understood or appreciated in Hegel's eyes...
[...] However, Hegel was pleased to record one thing at least, namely that he 
now understood the local language of the Alpine dwellers rather better than he 
did that of the Bernese townspeople. And after all, in order to know what such 
people think, one must possess some 'knowledge of the older form of the 
German language' which has survived in these regions better than it has in 
Germany itself.110
Hegel's experience of the Alps is essentially that of a dialectician. Although he has 
recognized the Enlightenment notion of nature adapted to man's need as an absurdity, he 
still looks at the natural world as, at best, an instrument at the hand of man and otherwise 
irrelevant to a thinker. His is interested only in the people he encounters and particularly in
110 Horst Althaus, Hegel: An Intellectual Biography, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity,
2000), p. 22.
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their language, and thus reveals an essentially dialectical focus on man and on his propensity 
for dialectics in his thinking. Nietzsche's experience of the Swiss Alps barely a century later 
could hardly be more different. His correspondence and his notebooks show that he, too, is 
concerned with the people he encountered on his travels and interested in their way of life. 
But he is also affected by the mountains themselves; his experience of the Alps is integral to 
his thinking and in fact prompted his fundamental metaphysical thought. As he mentions 
the thought of eternal return for the first time, Nietzsche adds the postface:
Early August, 1881, in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level and much higher 
above all human things!111
For Heidegger, '[t]he very fact that Nietzsche expressly records the time and occasion of the 
note speaks for the extraordinary nature of its content and its intent',112 but it could also 
indicate that the time and the occasion of his thought are actually integral to it. Nietzsche's 
descriptions of the thought of eternal return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra certainly suggest that it 
pertains essentially to the mountains and to the height of summer. And if it is, indeed, the 
mountains of the Upper Engadine which grant him his principal metaphysical insight, 
Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West who recognizes the essence of being in the natural 
world, although he is also the first who consciously sought it in art. The contradiction 
actually reflects the nature of the dialectic and testifies, thus, in its own right to Nietzsche's 
historical position at the end of the dialectical age. Similarly, the inference that Nietzsche 
thinks being as Niederkunft would suggest that, if anything, Nietzsche introduces an 
anthropocentric definition of being,113 when in fact his thinking spells the end of the 
dialectical anthropocentrism and determines being such that it has become truly universal.
111 Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, v/2: Idyllen aus 
Messina/Die frohliche Wissenschaft/ Nachgelassene Fragmente, p p .  337-585 (p . 392); translation as in 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 75.
112 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p . 75.
113 The term Niederkunft is commonly used only in reference to human beings.
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Again, the contradiction simply reflects that the dialectic is overcome only in the exposition 
of its tacit assumptions, which may initially appear like an endorsement of them. And it is, 
indeed, only when he first thinks his fundamental thought that Nietzsche thinks it as 
Niederkunft. In his later years, he thinks it in its full implications as the eternal return of the 
same, and in this configuration, it clearly shows that for Nietzsche, man is not at die centre of 
the metaphysical question any more.
♦ ♦ ♦
At the same time as man loses his position at the centre of the metaphysical question, he 
gains at last a grasp on it. The dialectical man, who thinks being as anthropomorphism, 
never looks into the essence of being as such and cannot even apprehend what he takes to be 
the nature of being other than in reflection and in retrospect. Hegel thus notes:
Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to 
be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as 
the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its 
formative process, and made itself ready. [...] When philosophy paints its grey in 
grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be 
rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the 
shades of night are gathering.114
Indeed, Hegel's own work epitomizes the way in which the dialectical age can only ever look 
back and has its truth in the past, for it is only he who, as the last thinker of the dialectical 
age, begins to see its essence. In that he sees the retrospection inherent in the dialectic not 
least as a shortcoming of philosophy and realizes that philosophy cannot tell the world what it 
ought to be, Hegel proves that he is aware of the tragic fact that philosophy and indeed all 
human endeavours will not change life itself essentially. The work of the last dialectician
114 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by S. W. Dyde (London: Bell, 1896), p. xxx.
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shows, thus, how the tragic truth that life goes on regardless is the very premise of the 
dialectic, even if the dialectical age has more faith in its own power of negation than in the 
tragic, to the extent that it harbours thoughts of apocalypse. To be sure, thinking the 
apocalypse through reveals it to be a dialectical impasse,115 but the dialectical age avoids this 
encounter with its essence at all cost and therefore proceeds in the belief that man could 
negate all being. Indeed, it seems that even Nietzsche nurtures doubts about the dawning of 
a tragic age; although he has seen through the self-deception of the dialectical age, his 
thinking reflects, thus, the impasse inherent in the dialectic. At moments in his writing, the 
'incipit tragoedia' has, no doubt, less of an air of inevitability than elsewhere; thus, as he 
muses:
I myself, having made this tragedy of tragedies all by myself, insofar as it is 
finished -  I, having first tied the knot of morality into existence before I drew it 
so tight that only a god could untie i t ... -  I myself have now slain all gods in die 
fourth act, for the sake of morality. Now, what is to become of the fifth act? From 
where am I to take the tragic solution? -  Should I begin to think about a comic 
solution?116
In contemplating a comic solution, Nietzsche contemplates essentially a dialectical solution, 
for comedy resides in the scope for misunderstanding and mishap, falsity and deceit that is 
peculiar to the dialectic. Comedy requires men to be individual in the way that only 
dialectical men can be individual; thus it is that Nietzsche argues, conversely, that "all 
individuals, as individuals, are comic and consequently untragic'117 -  that is, dialectical. In 
ancient Greece, Nietzsche interprets the rise of comedy as a monument to the 'miserable and 
violent death'118 of tragedy; hence, if he contemplates a 'comic solution' to the dialectical age, 
he does not altogether dismiss the possibility that the decline of tragedy in antiquity was,
115 Cf. Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)', 
translated by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14/2 (1984), 20-31.
116 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 197.
117 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 51.
118 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 55.
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indeed, its final death and that the dialectic will reign now in all eternity. The prospect of 
man trapped in the dialectic, entangling himself in ever more absurd negations and 
achieving in all his actions the very opposite of what he intended would certainly make for a 
comic solution to the dialectic age. Heidegger, it seems, does not dismiss the possibility of 
this outcome either. It is not so much his Nietzsche lectures which convey doubts about the 
dawning of a tragic age in the wake of Nietzsche's thinking, but a posthumously published 
interview in the Spiegel magazine, where he concludes:
Philosophy will not be able to effect an immediate transformation of the current 
state of die world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human 
brooding and striving. Only a god can save us now. There remains for us only 
die possibility of preparing in thought and in poetic composition a willingness 
for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in decline; that we go 
down in the face of the absent god.119
In the realization that philosophy -  and indeed all human activity -  will not be able to 
change the world, Heidegger accepts the truth of life, but unlike a truly tragic experience, 
this insight does litde to console him. His famous phrase that 'only a god can save us now' 
resounds, no doubt, with dialectical worry more than with tragic joy. Indeed, it seems that 
Heidegger describes here not die inception of a new tragic era but precisely what Nietzsche 
refers to as the comic solution to the dialectical age. Man has over-zealously killed the god 
that could have saved him and is now praying to a god that he knows does not exist any 
more. The absent god, however, is still a god, and a dialectical god at that; and in this sense, 
the dialectical determination of being persists: even in the face of the absent god, the world is 
still only the world. 'Around the hero', Nietzsche notes, 'everything becomes a tragedy,
119 'Die Philosophie wird keine unmittelbare Verdnderung des jetzigen Weltzustandes bewirken konnen. Dies 
gilt nicht nur von der Philosophie, sondem von allem blofi menschlichen Sinnen und Trachten. Nur noch ein 
Gott kann uns retten. Uns bleibt die einzige Moglichkeit, im Denken und im Dichten eine Bereitschaft 
vorzubereiten fur die Erscheinung des Gottes oder fur die Abwesenheit des Gottes im Untergang; dafi wir im 
Angesicht des abwesenden Gottes untergehen'. Martin Heidegger, 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', 
Der Spiegel, 23/1976 (31 May 1976), 193-219 (p. 209).
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around the demi-god a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes -  what? Perhaps a 
'world'? - '12° Now, in the Spiegel interview, at least, Heidegger anticipates precisely a world 
that still revolves around the now-absent god and in this sense remains only the world. In a 
tragic solution to the dialectical age, on the other hand, god is not just absent, but no longer 
even possible; thus, the question of being itself has to be posed differently. Man can 
transcend the dialectical age only once he has acknowledged the dialectical 
anthropomorphism of being and realized that being as it is determined in the dialectic is 
determined not by nature or by god, but by himself. In the wake of Nietzsche's thinking the 
question of being is therefore no longer directed at god, or even at the semi-god or at the 
hero: it is directed at man and woman. Around man and in work, everything remains 
dialectics and metaphysics, past, nightfall and grey theory; around woman and in labour, in 
Niederkunft, everything becomes tragedy, futurity, return, midday and noontide: everything 
becomes life and everything comes to life.
120 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 102.
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From lack of rest, our civilization is ending in a new barbarism.1
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human
It is not often that Nietzsche speaks of work at all, and where he does, he makes no secret of 
his distaste for the industriousness of the modem man. He considers art, not work, to be the 
truly human activity of man and speaks of work practically only to vent his suspicions and 
to advocate, against the restless toiling of the world, a life of contemplation, leisure and 
otium.2 Accordingly, Nietzsche's thoughts on work are not given much consideration in most 
commentaries on his work. Where they enter the discussion at all, they are thought of as 
entertaining curiosities, on a par, perhaps, with his dietary advice; they are read as 
illustrations of his unconventional ways as a philosopher, but they are hardly seen to pertain 
to the core of his thinking. Most remarkable, however, is not what he says about work, but 
the fact that he does not seem to think in terms of work in the first instance. This is deeply 
rooted in his philosophical system and marks his position at the end of Western metaphysics. 
Since Socrates and certainly since Plato, philosophy has always -  explicitly or implicitly - 
been concerned with what man does or is to do; in this sense, it has always been concerned 
with man's work. Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West who looks at man not in terms of
1 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 172.
2 Cf. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 11 and p. 171, and The Gay Science, p. 259.
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what he does -  not in terms of his work -  but in terms of what he is, what he is becoming and 
what he is to become. And as he defines the human not in work but in creation and in 
bringing forth, in Niederkunft, Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West who thinks the human 
essentially not as man but as woman.
*A rbeif and 'Werk': Notions of Work and Labour in Nietzsche's Writing
Work, to Nietzsche, is not something that is essential to the human and indeed not even 
something that befits a man. It is, thus, no surprise that he does not refer to his own thinking 
as work, Arbeit -  despite the fact that he is often troubled by what he is, to all appearances, 
working at. Especially during the most introspective periods of this life -  around 1883/1884 
and towards the end of his creative life -  he speaks a great deal about his tasks and his goal, 
but never about his "work'. To Heinrich von Stein, he writes:
I would have to reveal to you what I have never yet revealed to anyone -  the task 
[Aufgabe] which confronts me, my life's task [Aufgabe].3
Similarly, he confides in Franz Overbeck:
I have an aim [Ziel], which compels me to go on living and for the sake of which 
I must cope with even the most painful matters,4
adding some months later that his 'aims [Ziele] and tasks [Aufgaben] are more embracing 
than anyone else's'.5 At the time, the true scale of Nietzsche's thinking is only just beginning
3 Nietzsche to Heinrich von Stein (early December 1882) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, p p .  197-198, and in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: 
Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p . 288.
4 Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (14 August 1883) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, p . 214, and in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 
1880-Dezember 1884, p . 426.
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to dawn on him, but his correspondence shows that he is already very much aware of the 
nature of his enterprise. Even where he uses the term Arbeit, it is never so as to challenge the 
standing of his project as something that is precisely not work. From Sils-Maria, he reports, 
thus, to his sister:
It has been extremely cold here for weeks; right to the bottom, the mountains are 
deeply snow-covered, and the visitors are disgruntled. I myself am very 
industrious [arbeitsam], but when I come to from my work [Arbeit], I am prey to 
melancholy -  this is unavoidable.6
At the time, his relationship to his sister was particularly strained;7 hence, he may have been 
adapting the tone and the vocabulary of his letter to his sister's tastes, so different to his own. 
What is remarkable about this passage, however, is the fact that it depicts work as something 
out of which Nietzsche feels he has to return to himself. In this sense, the term Arbeit denotes 
here something categorically different from his thinking, which he usually describes such 
that it cannot be dissociated from himself.8 Even as he declares: 'I am one thing, my writings 
are another',9 it seems that he does not point to a difference in kind but lists, rather, the two 
parts that make up the whole of his oeuvre. It is, indeed, only in this letter to his sister that 
Nietzsche's writing appears as something distinctly other than himself, and it is only here 
that he refers to it as work, Arbeit. And in this sense, his use of the term in this instance does
5 Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (30 April 1884) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
p. 224, and in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, I l l / l :  Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880- 
Dezember 1884, p. 497.
6 'Es ist hier, seit Wochen! aufierst kalt, die Berge tiefbis hinab beschneit, die Fremden unzufrieden. Ich selber 
bin sehr arbeitsam, wenn ich aus meiner Arbeit zu mir komme, bin ich aber die Beu t e  der  Me l a n c h o l i e  -  
das ist nicht zu andemY Nietzsche to Elisabeth Nietzsche (late July 1883) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 416.
7 Only a few weeks later, he confides to Franz Overbeck that his relatives are too different from him to 
understand him. Cf. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (14 August 1883) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 425.
8 Thus, he speaks of himself as the 'father of Zarathustra'. Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz (6 April 1883) 
in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 211.
9 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 39.
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not constitute an exception to his otherwise consistent usage of the terms, but actually 
testifies to it.
Indeed, in Nietzsche's writing, the term Arbeit always has negative overtones. As he 
writes to Franz Overbeck:
We -  work too much: that is probably the reason why our engines have to crack 
up every now and then,10
Nietzsche even pauses before the word 'arbeiten', as if he hesitates to use it. And his usage of 
the terms becomes, if anything, more conspicuous towards the end of his creative life. In Ecce 
Homo, he refers to his tasks [Aufgaben]11, his writings [Schriften]12, his books [Bucher]13, his 
ambition [Ehrgeiz]u  -  but he hardly ever speaks of his work as Arbeit. The English translation 
may in fact give the impression that he speaks of work more than he actually does. Thus, 
where the translation reads '[a]t times when I am deeply sunk in work you will see no books 
around me',15 Nietzsche does not actually speak of work, Arbeit, in the original, but declares: 
'in profoundly industrious [arbeitsamen] times, one will not see any book around me'.16 The 
term arbeitsam, of course, still contains the word and the concept Arbeit, but it seems that 
there is nonetheless a crucial difference in that the original evokes notions of Arbeit in rather
10 Wir -  arbeiten zuviel: da steckt wahrscheinlich der Grand, warum unsere Maschine ihren periodischen 
Knacks haben mufi'. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (18 March 1884) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: 
Briejwechsel, ill/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 488.
11 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 36, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V I/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Ddmmerung /  Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 ( p. 293)
12 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 39 and p. 42, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, 
vi/3: Der Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 296 and p. 300).
13 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 43, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 300).
14 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 93, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 360).
15 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 26.
16 'In tief arbeitsamen Zeiten sieht man keine Bucher bei mir...'. Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  
Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner /  Gotzen-Ddmmerung /  Nachgelassene Schriften, 
pp. 253-372 (p. 282).
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more remote a way than the translation would suggest. In fact, Nietzsche does not say that 
he immerses himself in work; he speaks, rather, of 'arbeitsamen Zeiten', of industrious times. 
Work is, thus, not something that he relates to himself to the extent that it would appear in 
the translation; in this sense, the passage actually illustrates the discrepancy between his 
notion of work and the understanding he has of his own task. And indeed, as he proceeds to 
speak about his thinking proper, he speaks of it not as work but as a 'pregnancy' of the 
spirit.17
Another instance where the English term 'work' renders a German word other than 
'Arbeit is Nietzsche's statement that
Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and evil the actual 
wheel in the working of things: the translation of morality into the realm of 
metaphysics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, is his work.18
The phrase 'in the working of things' renders the German expression 'im Getriebe der Dinge',19 
which actually evokes quite different meanings from those of work in the sense of Arbeit. The 
word Getriebe does not have the negative connotations of Arbeit20 or of work understood in 
the strict sense as the negation of the world; it describes, rather, the working of things in 
terms of their impetus, drive or initiative.21 It seems, thus, that when Nietzsche speaks about 
the way that Zarathustra grasps the world, he speaks precisely not of work. And 
correspondingly, what the translation renders as Zarathustra's 'work' in this passage does 
not, in the original, evoke the connotations of work in the strictest sense either; for Nietzsche
17 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 26.
18 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 98.
19 Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen- 
Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 365).
20 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, I: A -  Biermolke (1854), pp. 538-541.
21 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, IV. Band, I. Abteilung, III. Teil: Getreide -  Gewdhniglich (1911), 
pp. 4529-4535.
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speaks not of Zarathustra7s Arbeit but of his 'Werk'.22 The term Werk is indeed one that 
Nietzsche also uses in reference to his own writing,23 and the English word "work7 is 
certainly its obvious translation. Nonetheless, the connotations of Werk are quite different 
from those of work in the sense of Arbeit. In modern usage, Werk usually lacks the negative 
associations of work as something burdensome.24 The word does have another, less common 
and now somewhat archaic meaning of pain and misery; this meaning, however, emerged 
only as the term Werk came to acquire the meaning of work in the sense of Arbeit in some 
contexts.25 In its prevalent meaning, Werk denotes a work, often, as the Grimms7 dictionary 
records, in explicit contradistinction to rhetoric or theory,26 and sometimes also with an 
emphasis on the creative nature of the work.27 Werk can also refer to the creative deeds of 
god and the devil or of nature and other forces, the effects or results of which are discernible 
in human works and deeds.28 In this sense, Werk describes a manifestation of the forces of life, 
a manifestation of being and as such quite the opposite of Arbeit, understood as the 
dialectical negation of the world. Again, Nietzsche's choice of the terms is not fortuitous but 
reveals, in fact, that he does not perceive his work as Arbeit but precisely as Werk. Of Arbeit, 
he speaks only where he refers to a concrete chore as opposed to a creative process. When he 
recounts writing the Twilight of the Idols, he speaks of it as Werk -  until he recalls a point 
where the completion of the book was no longer in the conceptual stages but had become a
22 Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl / 3 :  Der Fall Wagner/Gotzen- 
Ddmmerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, p p .  2 5 3 -3 7 2  (p . 365).
23 Cf. Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo7 in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V l/3 : Der Fall Wagner/ 
Gotzen-Ddmmerung/ Nachgelassene Schriften, p p .  2 5 3 -3 7 2  (p . 353).
24 Cf. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, I: A -  Biermolke, p p .  538-541 , and XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, 
II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking, p . 328.
25 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking, p . 347.
26 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking, p . 329.
27 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking, p . 329 and p .
341.
28 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking, p . 343.
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question of committing it to paper; in this instance, he speaks of Arbeit.29 Similarly, he 
juxtaposes the terms when he writes to Malwida von Meysenbug:
... out of profound work [Arbeit] a word! [...] Nice has on average 210 days a 
year such as I need them: under this sky I want to advance my life's work [Werk], 
the hardest and most forfeitful work [Werk] that a mortal could take upon 
himself.30
In his introductory phrase, Nietzsche emphasizes the word Arbeit by the italics as well as by 
the exclamation mark, such that it seems almost as if work, Arbeit, is precisely not what he 
expects to be doing, or expects others to think he is doing. And in fact he speaks here, too, of 
Arbeit only in the sense of the actual physical chore, which he interrupts to write the letter, 
contrasting it thus with Werk, by which he refers to the accomplished work as well as to his 
life's great task.
On those occasions where Nietzsche is most explicit about his task, he underlines its 
nature as creation and actually describes it not just as Werk, but in terms of pregnancy and of 
giving birth.31 And he actually points out that his oeuvre, his Werk, is such that it could not 
have been achieved in work, strictly speaking. He grants that he knows
29 Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner /  Gotzen- 
Ddmmerung /  Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 354).
30 \..aus tiefer A r b e i t  heraus ein Wort! [...] Nizza hat im Jahre durchschnittlich 210 solcher Tage, wie ich sie 
brauche: unter diesem Himmel will ich schon das Werk meines Lebens vorwarts bringen, das harteste und 
entsagungsreichste Werk, das sich ein Sterblicher auflegen kann'. Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug 
(late March 1884) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, I l l / l :  Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 
1880-Dezember 1884, p. 489.
31 C f ' Ver s pr ochen  ist Alles schon in 'Schop<enhauer> als Erz<ieher>'; es war aber ein gutes Stuck Weg 
von 'Menschl<iches>, Allzum<enschliches>' bis zum 'Ubermenschen' zu machen. Wenn Sie jetzt einen 
Augenblick an die 'frdhl<iche> Wiss<enschaft>' zuriickdenken wollen, so werden Sie lachen, mich welcher 
Sicherheit, ja impudentia darin die b e v o r s t e h e n d e  G e b u r t  'annoncirt' wird...'. Nietzsche to Heinrich 
Koselitz (21 April 1883) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, I l l / l :  Briefe von Nietzsche: 
Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 364. Or: ' es gehort zu meinen Aufgaben, auch daruber Herr zu werden und 
fortzufahren, alle meine Schicksale zu Gunsten meiner Aufgabe 'in Go l d  zu  v e r w a n d e l n ' .  Es gab doch 
wieder Stunden, wo diese Aufgabe ganz deutlich vor mir steht, wo ein ungeheures Ganzes von Philosophie (und 
von Mehr als je Philosophie hiejl!) sich vor meinen Blicken auseinander legt. Dies Mai, bei dieser gefdhrlichsten 
und schwersten 'Schwangerschaft', mujl ich mir begilnstigende Umstdnde zusammen holen und alle Sonnen
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... of no other way of dealing with great tasks [Aufgaben] than that of play: this is, 
as a sign of greatness, an essential precondition. The slightest constraint, the 
gloomy mien, any kind of harsh note in the throat are all objections to a man, 
how much more to his work [Werk]\32
It is only in play that man can approach the kind of task that Nietzsche faces and that he 
envisages for mankind in general, for work, in the strict sense of Arbeit, entails precisely the 
constraint, the gloom and the negation that is detrimental to all creation. And thus, work is 
indeed an objection to man as Nietzsche defines him: to him who is in essence play and 
pregnancy.
♦ ♦ ♦
At times, Nietzsche is actually explicit about his objections to work, but his argument that 
work does not befit a man, much less a woman, that it pertains to the slave and makes of 
man a slave, is often so polemical that it does not make for comfortable reading and lends 
itself to all sorts of misconceptions. He argues that
[ejvery elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work [Werk] of an 
aristocratic society -  and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long 
scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man and needs 
slavery in some sense or another [in irgend einem Sinne].33
In those cases where Nietzsche seems to advocate slavery, as he does here, his reasoning is 
particularly hard to bear for a contemporary reader. Ultimately, however, he never calls for a
mir leuchten machen, die ich noch kennen lernte'. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (18 August 1884) in: Colli /  
Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, III/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, pp. 520- 
521.
32 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 37, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V l / 3 : Der 
Fall Wagner/Gotzen-Dammerung/Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 295).
33 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 192, and 'Jenseits von Gut und Bose' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, Vl/2: Jenseits von Gut und Bose/Zur Genealogie der Moral (1886-1887) (1968), pp. 1-255 
(p. 215).
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return to the ancient world order or for a reintroduction of slavery, although some of his
comments could no doubt be interpreted in this way. In this instance, too, Nietzsche does not
actually claim that for the elevation of man society requires slavery or even a form of slavery.
He asserts, rather, that the elevation of man presupposes "slavery in some sense or another",
and read thus, the phrase may not even refer to slavery in the most literal sense but to the
enslavement of man by himself. In this sense, Nietzsche" s insistence on the necessity of
slavery is not a political but a metaphysical statement and touches on the core of his
thinking. Indeed, man remains a slave as long as he negates the world in his work, and if he
is concerned with the elevation of himself, he is essentially working on himself. In his
assertion that a society requires slavery in order to attain a higher type of man, Nietzsche
simply states that a society which aims for a higher type of man is still a society of slaves who
work on themselves. And conversely, his statement implies that only a society of slaves can
bring forth a higher type of man and illustrates, thus, that the dialectical slave plays an
essential part in Nietzsche's thinking of the human. In the sense that the elevation of man,
which Nietzsche advocates so urgently, depends on man's existence as slave, Nietzsche's
thinking emerges precisely from the impasse of the dialectic. He is the thinker who thinks the
dialectic to its conclusion, who thinks it through -  and who thinks through it. In terms of the
human, his thinking originates in the inherent problematic of the dialectic, that is, in the
dialectical aspiration for the elevation [Erhohung]34 of man, which actually, however,
perpetuates the fact of his debasement and his existence as a slave. Nietzsche's view on
slavery, however, shows that he thinks beyond the impasse of the dialectic. He acknowledges
that man, even man as he has been and will be elevated, emerges from dialectical work, and
yet, he describes the accomplished elevation of man as Werk and in this sense as a
manifestation of life rather than as testimony to its negation. In his usage of the terms,
34 Nietzsche, 'Jenseits von Gut und Bose' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, vi/2: Jenseits von 
Gut und Bose/ Zur Genealogie der Moral, pp. 1-255 (p. 215).
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Nietzsche highlights, thus, that thought to its conclusion, the impasse of the dialectical man 
leads to a new determination of man in creation, bringing forth and Niederkunft.
Notwithstanding the fact that all of us who are still aspiring to improve man remain in 
essence slaves, Nietzsche argues that we do not appreciate distinction because we do not 
actually know proper slavery. 'We lack', he explains,
the classical coloring of nobility because our feelings no longer know the slaves 
of classical antiquity. A Greek of noble descent found such tremendous 
intermediary stages and such distance between his own height and that ultimate 
baseness that he could scarcely see the slave clearly; even Plato could not really 
see him anymore. It is different with us, who are accustomed to the doctrine of 
human equality, though not to equality itself. One who is not at his own disposal 
and who lacks leisure does not by any means seem contemptible to us for that 
reason; perhaps too much that is slavish in this sense sticks to each of us, in 
accordance with the conditions of our social order and activities, which are 
utterly different from those of the ancients.
The Greek philosophers went through life feeling secretly that there were far 
more slaves than one might think -  meaning that everybody who was not a 
philosopher was a slave. Their pride overflowed at the thought that even the 
most powerful men on earth belonged among their slaves. This pride, too, is 
alien and impossible for us; not even metaphorically [im Gleichnis] does the word 
'slave' possess its full power for us.35
Again, Nietzsche's apparent approval of slavery rings very uncomfortably in contemporary 
ears, but again, he speaks as a philosopher and not as a politician. His argument is in fact not 
so much a call for slavery as, indeed, a call for the acknowledgement of slavery. The ancients, 
he points out, practised slavery but did not really acknowledge it because they thought 
themselves to be so far removed from the fact of the slave. And we, who are accustomed to 
the doctrine of human equality, do not acknowledge slavery either -  not because it no longer 
exists, and not because we are too far removed from the reality of the slave, but precisely 
because we are too close to it. According to Nietzsche, it was only the ancient Greek
35 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 91, and 'Die frohliche Wissenschaft' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, v/2: Idyllen aus Messina /  Die frohliche Wissenschaft /  Nachgelassene Fragmente, pp. 11- 
335 (pp. 63-64).
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philosophers who recognized slavery and therefore knew the pride and the nobility that, in 
the face of slavery, pertains to the free man. Indeed, only the philosophers could have defied 
slavery, for in the West, the question of the master and the slave is always a metaphysical 
question. In order for the slave to be understood as such, he has to be understood 
metaphysically. If Nietzsche suggests that Plato might not have seen die slave as such, he is, 
thus, questioning Plato's standing as a philosopher. Here as elsewhere in his writing, 
however, Nietzsche is not inferring that we lack nobility because we do not keep slaves; he 
argues, rather, that it is because our feelings no longer know of slavery. The question of 
nobility is decided within us and does not depend primarily on the external circumstances of 
whether or not we have slaves to carry out the mundane tasks of life. Thus it is that even the 
ancients, who kept slaves, could have thought themselves to be so far removed from the slave 
that their feeling also lacked the knowledge of the slave and they, too, fell short of nobility. If 
nobility is to this extent an inner question, it is also and perhaps most importantly a question 
of acknowledging the slave within ourselves. This is, indeed, the tenor of Nietzsche's 
thinking of the slave. He is not revelling in nostalgia for the way of life of the ancients and 
his notion of nobility certainly does not apply to the master who keeps slaves; for he who 
needs the slave is precisely not noble. Nietzsche's thinking of slavery actually reaches beyond 
the master and, indeed, beyond the slave as such. In the dialectic of master and slave, as 
Hegel describes it, the existence of the master is already impossible and has, in fact, been 
made impossible by the slave.36 In the realization that the slave remains a slave even when 
he has freed himself of the master, Nietzsche communicates what had in Hegel's account 
remained implicit, and shows, thus, that the existence of the slave is equally impossible. His 
notion of nobility pertains neither to the master nor to the slave, but it implies the awareness 
that what he calls the 'free spirit' arises out of slavery. Nobility, for Nietzsche, entails an
36 Cf. Koj6ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp. 21-30.
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acknowledgement of the free spirits' dialectical ancestry and of the dialectic in general, but 
without the dialectical desire for reconciliation. This is, indeed, not unlike the Greek 
philosophers' acknowledgement of the slave: they knew of the circumstances of the slave, so 
different to their own, but rather than aiming to reconcile the situation, they prided 
themselves on their distinction. 'This pride, too', Nietzsche concludes, 'is alien and 
impossible for us; not even metaphorically does the work 'slave' possess its full power for 
us'. What the translation renders as 'metaphorically' here reads in the original as 'im 
Gleichnis', and the Grimms' dictionary records that Gleichnis is only seldom employed in the 
sense of 'metaphor'.37 In fact, the term usually evokes a sense of simile, comparison or 
equation, and connotes a similarity, a copy, a representation, an apparition, also a false or an 
apparent similarity.38 It often describes an indirect, as opposed to an open comparison,39 and 
can sometimes refer to the act of comparison itself. In a rare and now antiquated usage, the 
word can also be employed' in der aktiven bedeutung "gleichmachung"',40 that is, in the sense of 
making-the-same. It is this usage which best illustrates the dialectical connotations of the 
term, in that it describes the barter principle which constitutes the basis for the 'exchange of 
things that are equal and yet unequal'41 at the heart of the dialectic. The term Gleichnis 
denotes, thus, a fundamentally dialectical concept. If the word slave cannot, even as 
Gleichnis, have any real meaning for us, as Nietzsche argues, it is precisely because we look at 
the slave as Gleichnis, that is, in terms of a dialectical equation which inevitably obscures the 
truth as such. But for all its cunning, dialectical reason cannot convincingly reconcile the
37 ‘selten nur wird als gleichnis auch eine eingliedrige figur bezeichnet, bei der das gemeinte unausgesprochen 
bleibt und aus dem bild zu erschliessen ist'. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, IV. Band, I. Abteilung, 
IV. Teil: Gewdhnlich-Gleve (1949), p. 8197.
38 Cf. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, IV. Band, I. Abteilung, IV. Teil: Gewdhnlich-Gleve, pp. 
8184-8204.
39 'hdufig wird gleichnis als eine umschreibende, verhiillende, indirekte, nur bildliche aussage einer 
unmittelbaren, unverhullten und offenen duszerung entgegengestellt'. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches 
Worterbuch, IV. Band, I. Abteilung, rv. Teil: Gewdhnlich-Gleve, p. 8201.
40 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, rv. Band, I. Abteilung, IV. Teil: Gewdhnlich-Gleve, p. 8203.
41 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 147.
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difference between feeling like a slave and actually being a slave; it cannot obscure the 
poignant truth of the slave entirely. A comparison with the slave will always resound with 
the inherent hollowness of the dialectic. If Nietzsche nonetheless uses the term, it is to show 
that we, who think of ourselves as free, have not actually proceeded beyond the master- 
slave-dialectic in our understanding of ourselves. Since the existence of the master became 
impossible very early on in the dialectical age,42 man has been restricted to the possibilities of 
the slave. And in order to transcend the determination of the human as slave, Nietzsche's 
comment suggests, we will have to acknowledge the slave -  that is, the slave within us and 
our heritage as slaves -  such that our recognition does not fall prey to the distortion inherent 
in dialectics. We would have to apprehend the slave precisely not as Gleichnis, not as 
metaphor, simile, or comparison, but as the thing as such. And we would have to realize that 
im Gleichnis, in equation and in barter, in dialectics and in a word, we can never apprehend 
the truth as such, and certainly not the truth of 'the slave'.
♦ ♦ ♦
Even where Nietzsche's opinions about work are less controversial but seemingly light­
hearted and indeed often amusing, they go against the grain of our age and touch, not least 
in the reaction they prompt, upon die spirit of our times. We are incredulous when he lists 
'[o]verwork, curiosity and sympathy' as 'our modem vices',43 for we recognize these precisely 
as our virtues. And there is nothing light-hearted about Nietzsche's remark at all, given that 
he lists as our vices the essential characteristics of the dialectic: its need not just to work but 
to overwork, its incessant curiosity for the other and its delusional faith in its 'sympathetic' 
and 'reconciliatory' nature. Nietzsche reveals, thus, that he recognizes that our vices have
42 Cf. Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 20.
43 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 48.
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their roots in the dialectic and that the dialectic is, in fact, the modern vice. Our reactions to 
his comments on work, on the other hand, show how central the concept is to our 
understanding of the human and how deeply engrained the premise is in us that there is 
nothing worse for man than being idle. For all his objections to work, however, Nietzsche 
does not advocate idleness. He criticizes the negativity inherent in work, but he does not 
promote indolent passivity in its stead, which constitutes, in fact, not so much an alternative 
to dialectical work as its logical conclusion. In recommending a life of contemplation, he 
certainly does not suggest that such a life would be easier than a life of work -  on the 
contrary. He observes that '[t]he industrial races find leisure very hard to endure',44 and 
raises the idea -  later explored above all by Georges Bataille45 -  that the organization of its 
leisurely expenditure might be a more pressing task for a society than the accumulation of 
wealth in work, for 'it requires more genius to spend than to acquire'.46 Where Nietzsche 
openly criticizes his contemporaries' industriousness, he is indeed very specific and does not 
dismiss all human action. He warns of 'a  new kind of stupidity', which he traces to the 'desire 
to do and to undertake'.47 Again, it is his choice of the terms which reveals that his criticism 
is directed at the dialectical man, for in ' thun' and 'untemehmen' he criticizes not doing per se 
but a very specific mode of doing. The term 'untemehmen' can have connotations of 'to 
examine', 'to take into care' or 'to take into one's possession', also on the sly. Its main 
meaning today is 'to do' or 'to undertake' and in this usage it refers specifically to an 
undertaking or an enterprise, often also with the economic connotations that this entails.48 It 
seems, thus, that in its various connotations, untemehmen describes a specifically dialectical
44 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 112.
45 Cf. Bataille, The Accursed Share, passim.
46 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, pp. 93-94.
47 'Eine neue Art V e r d u m m u n g  -  durch die Lust am Thun und Untemehmen'. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene 
Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V/2: Idyllen aus Messina /  Die frohliche 
Wissenschaft/ Nachgelassene Fragmente, pp. 337- 585 (p. 495).
48 Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XI. Band, III. Abteilung: Un-Uzvogel, pp. 1696-1701.
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mode of doing, and particularly in that it stresses the economic -  which, in the form of the 
barter principle, lies at the heart of the dialectic.49 Along with 'untemehmen', Nietzsche 
suspects doing in the sense of 'thun', which largely corresponds to the English term "to do' 
and is certainly as broad in its meanings and usages. The crucial point, however, is that 
Nietzsche chooses the term 'thun' over 'machen', which roughly corresponds to the English 
'to make', although the distinction is more equivocal in German. Broadly speaking, 'thun' is 
the more general and abstract term, whereas 'machen' implies that something is being made 
and therefore connotes a sense of creation and of bringing forth.50 Nietzsche's choice of the 
terms reveals, thus, that he does not object to doing in the sense of 'machen', but to the 
blindly raging necessity to undertake at all cost, without even bringing forth anything. And 
just as he is very specific in describing this particular mode of doing, he is very specific in his 
description of its effects: it leads, he suggests, to a new kind of ' Verdummung', stupidity, or 
rather, to a new way of becoming stupid -  'new' in that it is different from the dialectical 
notion of stupidity. In general, the dialectical age thinks stupidity as an un-reflected or ill- 
reflected action, that is, as doing something without thinking. This definition highlights, 
conversely, the connection between thinking and doing at the heart of the dialectic. The 
dialectic does not rate thinking in itself, without implementation of the thought, as Koj&ve's 
reading of the Stoic shows.51 And on the other hand, all dialectical action is the result and the 
realization of thought. Stupidity, in the dialectical age, denotes a break in the connection 
between thought and action, but the ultimate stupidity in the dialectical understanding is 
total idleness: not thinking and not acting. The new kind of stupidity that Nietzsche cautions 
against emerges precisely from the dialectical premise that what is being thought must be
49 Cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 146.
50 For 'thun', cf. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, XI. Band, I. Abteilung, I. Band: T-Treftig (1935), 
pp. 434-456; for 'machen', cf. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, VI. Band: L-M (1885), pp. 1363- 
1395.
51 Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 119-124, and Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp. 
53-54.
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'realized'. This fixation with doing leads, by the dialectic's own logic, to the severing of the 
connection between thinking and doing that gave rise to it in the first place; quite 
independently of thinking, doing acquires validity in its own right. Thus originates the new 
kind of stupidity that Nietzsche anticipates. It corresponds essentially to the dialectical 
definition of stupidity as doing without thinking; it occurs, however, not as an oversight but 
in the systematic compulsion to act at any rate and at every cost. Ultimately it amounts, thus, 
not just to doing without thinking, but to doing at the expense of thinking. In this respect, the 
stupidity that arises from the dialectical fetishization of doing is quite unlike the placid 
stupidity that the dialectic acknowledges; the new kind of stupidity that Nietzsche warns us 
of is the raging stupidity that the dialectic generates but does not recognize.
It may, thus, seem odd that elsewhere Nietzsche discusses the ill effects of not working, 
noting that what 'the pessimists and art fanciers' lack is the 'feeling of well-being after an 
accomplished day's work [Tagewerk]'.52 Once again, however, his argument rests on his 
specific choice of the terms. He does not suggest that it is work in the sense of Arbeit that 
these characters lack, but the satisfaction that comes from an accomplishment in the sense of 
Werk. Indeed, Nietzsche warns specifically against a lack of creative work, which he believes 
is just as detrimental to man as an excess of dialectical work. His thinking of the human 
hinges, thus, on the distinction between Arbeit and Werk. In a sense he is therefore still 
concerned with man's activity, even if he is the first philosopher of the West who thinks man 
in terms of what he is rather than of what he does. And indeed, Nietzsche explores in the 
mode of man's activity not the question of what man does -  which, in comparison, barely
52 'Wohlgefuhl nach vollbrachtem Tagewerk -  das f e h i t  den Pessimisten und Kunst-Schwarmem'. Nietzsche, 
'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, IV /3 : Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches (Zweiter Band) /Nachgelassene Fragmente: Fnihling 1878-November 1879 (1967), p p . 343- 
479  (p . 420).
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scratches the surface -  but precisely the question of what man is, or is to be: worker or 
creator.
♦ ♦ ♦
The two modes of activity that Nietzsche describes in the terms Arbeit and Werk are 
essentially different, but separated only by a very small gap. Nietzsche's remark that '[t]he 
Devil is merely the idleness [Mufliggang] of God on that seventh day.. ,'53 suggests, in fact, 
that they coincide. God created the world initially and does not work, whereas the devil, 'the 
Spirit that Denies',54 aims to change the world and hence works in the strict sense. Nietzsche, 
however, illustrates how they are connected, even if they are in this respect categorically 
different. If the devil is 'god's idleness', his doings are actually prescribed by god, who 
advised rest on the seventh day; and the devil is, at any rate, part of god's creation. In this 
sense, god affirms the devil; and the devil, in turn, affirms god in his insatiable appetite for 
his creation. The most articulate of devils, Goethe's Mephistopheles, certainly entertains 
cordial relations with god and despite his protestations to the contrary appreciates god's 
creation; he readily declares his indifference to dull corpses and his love for all things living, 
for all things 'frolicsome'.55 In this sense, god's creation and the devil's work complement 
each other and make up the world. Today, it may indeed seem that god is becoming more 
and more akin to the pessimists and art fanciers that Nietzsche identifies as lacking creative 
work, whilst the devil has turned into a nihilist who ends up destroying all of god's work, 
god, and finally himself. Thus, however, their relationship merely reflects the essence of the 
dialectical age. And yet, Nietzsche's remark also shows that he does not renounce dialectical
53 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 83, and 'Ecce Homo' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Vl/3: Der Fall Wagner/ 
Gotzen-Dammerung / Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 253-372 (p. 349).
54 Goethe, Faust: Parts I & II, p. 64.
55 Goethe, Faust: Parts I & II, p. 22.
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work altogether but accepts it as part of the world despite its self-perpetuating nihilism. In 
fact, his choice of the term 'Miifliggang' for god's idleness highlights in allusion to the 
German proverb 56 that ultimately it is not the devil but god who is the root of all the devil's 
doing and hence also of all dialectics.
The life that Nietzsche recommends instead of the compulsive working of the 
dialectical man is one of contemplation and of Miissiggang -  and as such, as the term 
suggests, clearly not one of inactivity.57 It does, however, entail a certain amount of boredom. 
'For thinkers and all sensitive spirits', Nietzsche explains,
boredom [Langeweile] is that disagreeable 'windless calm' of the soul that 
precedes a happy voyage and cheerful winds. They have to bear it and must wait 
for its effect on them. Precisely this is what lesser natures cannot achieve by any 
means. To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar, no less than work without 
pleasure.58
As a 'windless calm' of the soul, boredom could indeed be interpreted as emptiness, 
nothingness and void, such as it is commonly understood. The German term Langeweile,59 
however, denotes not so much an absence as, indeed, an abundance -  an abundance of time 
or rather, an awareness of the abundance of time and as such a glimpse of eternity. It may 
well be painful and 'disagreeable', as Nietzsche points out, but it is not to be understood in 
the negative. The thinker who affirms boredom as something that is necessary to his task 
affirms not nothingness, but anticipates, in fact, Nietzsche's glimpse into the eternal return of 
the same. In this sense, the experience of boredom grants a metaphysical insight and
56 'Miifliggang ist aller Laster Anfang'.
57 The word Miissiggang has its roots in gehen, to go.
58 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p . 108, and 'Die frohliche Wissenschaft' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, v/2: Idyllen aus Messina/Die frohliche Wissenschaft /  Nachgelassene Fragmente, p p . 11- 
335 (p. 83).
59 Langeweile: from lange ('long') and weile ('while, moment7); cf. Grimm /  Grimm, Deutsches 
Worterbuch, VI. Band: L-M, p . 173.
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constitutes a kind of knowledge. Hence, Nietzsche criticizes the "flight from boredom" that he 
detects in the West, and notes that "[i]n the Orient, wisdom puts up with boredom, a feat that 
the Europeans find so difficult that they suspect wisdom to be impossible".60 In its relentless 
fear of boredom, the West shies away from the glimpse into the abundance of time that 
boredom affords. And because we avoid the thought of eternity, we believe that wisdom is 
impossible. In the West, wisdom always remains an idea in the Platonic sense: it remains 
unattainable on earth. It is only when thinking allows for boredom and withstands, thus, the 
prospect of eternity that wisdom will be attainable in this world. Wisdom, in other words, 
descends, kommt nieder, into the world only when we can endure the thought of eternal 
return, which is the thought of Niederkunft. The Orient, Nietzsche suggests, already knows 
wisdom in this world, and in notions of rebirth and reincarnation, it has indeed come much 
closer than the West to thinking the thought of eternal return.
From ‘Otium et Bellum' to 'Alea et Parturio': The Human in Western Thought
In advocating a life of Miissiggang and boredom, Nietzsche clearly dissents from the 
philosophical tradition of the West, which has defined the human in his work for the last two 
thousand years. To be sure, the dialectical age actually began in "the City-State of the 
nonworking warlike Masters',61 where, as Koj£ve explains,
[o]nly he who makes war is a citizen, and it is only the citizen who makes war.
The work is assigned to the Slaves, who are on the fringe of the Society and the
State.62
60 'Die Flucht vor der Langeweile! Im Orient findet sich die Weisheit mit der Langeweile ab, das Kunststiick, das 
den Europaem so schwer ist, dafl sie die Weisheit als unmoglich verddchtigen'. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene 
Fragmente" in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, v/1: Morgenrdthe /  Nachgelassene Fragmente: 
Anfang 1880-Fruhjahr 1881 (1971), pp. 337-769 (p. 452).
61 Kojdve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 60.
62 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 57.
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In the ancient city-state, work was deemed unsuitable for man; and yet, by this fact alone it 
was already a criterion of the human -  albeit in the negative. According to Hegel's account of 
master and slave, man ends up having to work only if he did not realize his human potential 
in the initial fight and stopped short of risking his life. To the master, work has therefore 
always a taste of the not-quite human; conversely, the master suspects work to be at the very 
least detrimental to the exercise of man's human capacities. In antiquity, man is truly human 
only as long as he does not work; and correspondingly, the 'ancient prejudice', as Nietzsche 
points out, attaches '[njobility and honor ... solely to otium and bellum/.63 Even in the work of 
the dialecticians, the notion that leisure and war are the truly human pursuits of man is still 
prevalent, although dialectical thought eventually eradicates it. Aristotle captures the 
turning point in the history of thought as he argues that it is 'generally acknowledged' that
in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide 
for their daily wants ..., but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be 
attained.64
On the one hand, Aristotle admits thus that he can see the problems with the idea of a 
leisurely existence for the citizens, but on the other, he still perpetuates it as the way man 
should live in order to realize his human potential. Aristotle is, in other words, certainly not 
openly embracing the 'slaves' revolt'65 in Western thought -  and yet, as a dialectician, he is 
propagating it in his thought. For even though he still advocates mastery as the truly human 
existence, he is already aware that it is problematic to realize: in this sense, he is beginning to 
see the life of the master as the 'existential impasse'66 that it is.
63 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 260.
64 Aristotle, 'Politics' in: Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume II (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1986-2129 (p. 2014).
65 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, p. 21, and passim.
66 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 46.
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The transition from the ancient understanding of man in otium et bellum towards the 
idea that man works and ought to work plays a particularly important role in the work of the 
very first dialecticians, Socrates and Plato. Plato, to be sure, does not actually speak of work 
very much and does not advertise its merits as explicitly as Hesiod did three centuries before 
him.67 In fact, The Republic still reveals a good deal of the ancient belief that work does not 
befit a man. Those who are engaged in work in the strict sense are, at best, third-class 
citizens, and Plato does not dwell on their existence but moves on to discuss the lives of the 
guardians, who specialise in warfare and not in work.68 He is certainly not concerned with 
the work of the slaves or, indeed, with the slaves as a distinct social class. They 'are not 
mentioned, but their existence ... is assumed7, and Plato regards them 7as appendages to the 
classes he has defined rather than a separate class on their own7.69 In this sense, and to this 
extent, The Republic reflects the old world order -  and yet, Plato's ideal state is certainly not a 
state of masters, for everybody works and everybody is defined -  and defined solely -  by 
what they do. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates observes th a t '... no two of us are 
born exactly alike7, and from the fact that 7[w]e have different natural aptitudes', infers that 
these 'fit us for different jobs'.70 His reasoning constitutes a departure from the ancient 
mindset, in more than one sense, for not only is work depicted as a natural expression of 
people's talents here; it also seems -  and not only in this instance -  that people's occupations
67 Cf. Hesiod's statement that 'Work is no disgrace'. Hesiod, 'The Works and Days', in: The Works and 
Days /  Theogony /  The Shield of Herakles, translated by Richmond Lattimore (n. p.: University of 
Michigan Press, 1959), p. 55. Hesiod is no doubt a precursor to the Greek philosophers; it is not quite 
clear, however, if he anticipates the dialectical understanding of work in this instance or if he even 
speaks of work in the strict sense at all, given that he refers to the management of a smallholding -  
which, strictly speaking, could be understood as labour rather than as work.
68 Plato, The Republic, translated by Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 66.
69 Plato, The Republic, p. 56.
70 Plato, The Republic, p. 59.
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precede and indeed take precedence over other distinctions between the citizens of The 
Republic.
In the sense drat die guardians specialise in warfare, it may seem that fighting, as 
opposed to work, is still the distinction of the ruling class of The Republic. The guardians, 
however, are not masters in the strict sense. Like everybody else in The Republic, they work: 
they work at warfare. Socrates argues that the "rulers must be trained for war",71 and when 
asked whether the citizens could not, in the manner of the master, fight for themselves, 
explains that this would not be desirable, for "soldiering is a profession" and "one man could 
not do more than one job or profession ... well'.72 What may seem obvious today actually 
constitutes a paradigmatic shift in thought at die time; it marks the transition from the era of 
the master, which maintained the categorical distinction between work and fighting, to the 
dialectical era, in which fighting becomes work like everything else. And the dialogue also 
illustrates the reason for this transition; it implies that mastery is inefficient because it is 
resistant to change. In order to defend his view that the guardians need to be trained for 
battie and need to work at warfare, Socrates argues that
... soldiering is not so easy a job that a man can be a soldier at the same time as 
he is a farmer or a shoemaker or follows some other profession; why, you can't 
even become a competent draughts or dice player if you don't practise seriously 
from childhood.. .73
Nothing, Socrates argues, can be done at its best unless one works at it; and thus originates 
the predicament of the master, who does not work. Indeed, Socrates objects to the guardians 
leading the life of masters, that is, of those who fight but do not work, on the grounds that in 
comparison to the soldiers who work at warfare, they would be inefficient. The masters,
71 Plato, The Republic, p. 266.
72 Plato, The Republic, p. 65.
73 Plato, The Republic, p. 65.
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whose essence is fighting, cannot remain successful at it; their existence is an impasse because 
they cannot change,74 and therefore cannot get better at anything, whereas the slave perfects 
himself in work. In an ideal dialectical state, everybody is therefore a worker -  as indeed 
they are in The Republic, which, to be sure, does not depict Plato's own circumstances but an 
imagined future. His vision of a state where women as well as men work,75 and are defined 
predominantly by their work, is no doubt a premonition of what is to come. As a vision of an 
ideal state, however, Plato's Republic nonetheless reflects the spirit of the time and illustrates, 
thus, the shift in the understanding of man that took place in the thought of the early 
dialecticians.
♦ ♦ ♦
Christianity, the 'Platonism for the people',76 only consolidates the conception of man that 
arises in the thought of the first dialecticians, and makes it explicit. It is not a coincidence that 
in the Christian understanding, man begins to be truly human at the same time as he begins 
to work and that god, when he orders man to work, also speaks of his death, of his 'return 
unto the ground';77 the connection is essential. According to Genesis, man begins to work 
after he has been expelled from paradise; and it is only then that he becomes mortal. It is, 
therefore, only then that he becomes truly human, for the concept of an immortal man is an 
absurdity, a 'squared circle'.78 And conversely, Kojeve explains, it is his work that makes 
man mortal -  and therefore human. Through his work, man changes the world essentially
74 Cf. Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 51.
75 Cf. Plato, The Republic, p. 175.
76 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 32.
77 Genesis 3.19 in The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, translated out of the original 
tongues: and with the former translations diligently compared and revised by his Majesty's special 
command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, n. d.).
78 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 56.
125
On Man and Woman: The (Determination of the 'Human in Worh^andLa6our
and thus creates time.79 Therefore, Koj&ve concludes, work is time -  and time is man,80 for 
time is the change of the world introduced only by human work. Since man changes the 
world in time, his own life is a life in time, that is, a mortal life. This is why god warned the 
first man of knowledge, Bildung, and advised him that
... of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the 
day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.81
Accordingly, the Christian era is increasingly aware of the role of work as the essential 
criterion of its concept of the human. Very early on, it coins the phrase 'ora et labora'82 as the 
maxim of man's existence on earth, stating thus expressly that it seeks the truly human 
aspects of man in prayer and in work. And subsequently, the Reformation accentuates the 
role of work in the Christian understanding of man even further. In his analysis of The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber discusses as 'one of the most important 
results of the Reformation' and particularly of Luther's work the 'moral justification of 
worldly activity',83 and the conception of man that it entails. In the Protestant understanding, 
Weber argues, 'the fulfilment of worldly duties is under all circumstances the only way to 
live acceptably to God. It and it alone is the will of God'.84 Whereas Catholicism prescribes a 
degree of contemplation, if not leisure, Protestantism understands man as human only as 
long as he works and to the extent that he works. Work is not only the means to salvation; it 
has become an end in itself -  and in fact, the only worthy goal for man. Doing has become
79 The 'creative education of Man by work (Bildung) creates History -  i. e., human Time'. Koj&ve, 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 53.
80 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 133.
81 Genesis 2.17.
82 'Ora et labora', 'pray and work', is a Latin proverb and the motto of the Benedictine order. The New 
Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, edited by David J. Atkinson, David H. Field et al 
(Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995), maintains that '[t]he influence of Benedict's Rule upon Christian 
spirituality in Western Europe is incalculable' (p. 189).
83 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: 
Unwin University Books, 1974), p. 81.
84 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 81.
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the only acceptable and the only truly human way of being. The rise of Protestantism marks, 
thus, a significant change in the Christian understanding of man in 'ora et labora', such that 
work is now prayer -  and the only true form of prayer.85
♦ ♦ ♦
It is only in the thought of Karl Marx, however, that the West actually begins to examine the 
role of work for the human in earnest. As the 'first premise of all human history', Marx 
presumes 'the existence of living human individuals',86 but thus alone man is no different 
from other living beings. Human beings, Marx argues, 'begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence'87 In Marx's 
understanding, too, man is truly human as soon as he works. Marx then proceeds to show 
how the nature of work in a capitalist system of production creates the proletariat -  which, as 
the truly universal and revolutionary class,88 will bring about the 'appropriation of the human 
essence through and for man'89 in communism. Work is, thus, the means by which the 
realization of the human essence is attained. The worker recognizes his work as alienation 
and his estrangement from others90 as a perversion of his human essence, and therefore 
comes to find his essence in the 'true community of man'.91 Hence, work will be abolished,92
85 Cf. Holger Schatz, Arbeit als Herrschaft: Die Krise des Leistungsprinzips und seine neoliberale 
Rekonstruktion (Munster: Unrast, 2004), p. 81.
86 Karl Marx /  Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, edited by C. J. Arthur (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1970), p. 42.
87 Marx /  Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42.
88 Marx /  Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' in: Selected Works in Two Volumes, volume I 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1950), pp. 21-61 (p. 42).
89 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in: Early Writings, translated by Rodney 
Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1992), pp. 
279-400 (p. 348).
90 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in: Early Writings, pp. 279-400 (pp. 329-330).
91 Marx, 'Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economf in: Early Writings, pp. 259-278 (p. 
265).
92 Marx /  Engels, The German Ideology, p. 94.
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and man will be able to produce in accordance with his human essence. His activities would 
then no longer be work in the strict sense, but 'the free expression and ... the enjoyment of life'.93 
Thus far, Marx's thinking does not actually differ very much from Hegel's, although Hegel 
treats the role of work for the constitution of the human essence more implicitly and in the 
abstract.94 Ultimately, however, Marx also thinks beyond the man who is defined solely in 
work. He famously envisages a world where it would be possible
... to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in 
the afternoon, rear cattle in die evening, criticize after dinner, ... without ever 
becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.95
Man would, thus, no longer be defined by his work, but as a man who can engage in these 
various activities if and as he pleases. In this attempt to think beyond an understanding of 
man in work, however, Marx also reproduces this very definition, for to think of man as 
somebody who hunts in the morning and fishes in the afternoon is still to think of man in 
terms of what he does. And yet, it is in this respect that Marx departs from Hegel and from 
the whole Western tradition. Hegel, too, had already begun to fathom a notion of man 
beyond work. Once man, Kojeve explains, 'is truly and fully satisfied by what is, he no 
longer desires anything real and therefore no longer changes reality'96 in his work; indeed, he 
'no longer acts in the full sense of the term'.97 In this sense, Hegel's thinking certainly 
anticipates a notion of the human which does not depend on work. But even if man was now 
satisfied with the world and did not desire to change it any longer, he would still be defined 
in the negative. Now that he no longer negates the world in his work, he negates himself as
93 Marx, 'Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economf in: Early Writings, pp. 259-278 (p.
278).
94 Hence, Marx's criticism that Hegel only accounts for'abstract mental labour' (Cf. Marx, 'Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts' in: Early Writings, pp. 279-400; p. 386), that is, 'thought' (cf. also pp. 
279-280).
95 Marx /  Engels, The German Ideology, p. 54.
96 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 192.
97 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 191.
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negation; and now that he is no longer defined as negation, he is in essence not doing: 
nothingness. When Marx, by contrast, thinks of man beyond the worker, he seems to revert 
to a definition that presumes work; and yet, in this very paradox he avoids the dialectical 
trap of defining man once again in the negative. In his vision of a man who hunts in the 
morning and fishes in the afternoon, he anticipates an understanding of man that 
incorporates action without, however, implying that man must therefore be defined in the 
negative.
In the terms of the master-slave-dialectic, Hegel had recognized the existence of the 
master as an 'impasse'98 and therefore believed that the human essence would find its 
fulfilment in the working slave. Marx, however, also saw the nihilism inherent in work and 
hence the predicament of the slave. He saw 'the worker's own physical and mental energy, 
his personal life ... as an activity directed against himself'99 in and by his work. In this sense, 
he recognized in alienated work the structure of work per se and the fact that it is essentially 
a negation of the worker. He realized that in and by his work man would end up killing 
himself; ultimately, however, he believed that man could avert his fate yet again and abolish 
work,100 and he did not see how this would also be man's doing away with himself. It is 
Nietzsche who first recognizes the impasse of the working slave in all its implications and 
who thinks, thus, the dialectic of master and slave to its conclusion. The mantra that man is 
'something that must be overcome',101 reiterated throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is a 
poignant description of the predicament of the dialectical slave. For as long as he is in 
essence a working slave, man realizes himself only in order to become other than he is; he 
realizes himself only as 'something that must be overcome' and therefore in the negation of
98 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 46.
99 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in: Early Writings, pp. 279-400 (p. 327).
100 Marx /  Engels, The German Ideology, p. 94.
101 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 279 and passim.
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himself. He whose essence is becoming can no more than the master be satisfied by what 
is.102 Hence, the dialectical man cannot simply cease the negation of himself, as Marx 
presumed; he has to negate himself in work until his untimely death. In his predictions of a 
"period of catastrophe'103 and 'the new warlike age',104 Nietzsche also foretells of the 
implications of the slave's predicament. Having seen the full paradox of the slave's existence, 
he anticipates in the soon-to-come horrors of the twentieth century the work of the man who 
cannot stop negating and in all his fervour cannot see his fervour as negation.
Not even a century after Hegel had pinned all hope for the future of man on the 
potential of the working slave, Nietzsche's thinking marks, thus, the end of the 
understanding of man in 'ora et labora'. The dialectical age believed that it had mastered the 
forces of life and that there is no longer any tragedy,105 in that there is nothing that cannot be 
changed or averted by work. Even Marx still believed that the dialectical man could avert his 
fate and 'do away with' work before it kills him. Nietzsche, however, shows this belief to be 
an illusion and shows the price of this illusion -  and he speaks of tragedy again. He is the 
first to see the tragedy of the dialectical man in its entirety and in this tragedy, the truth of 
man. He recognizes even in the dialectical distortion of man, trapped as he is in deadly 
negation, man as he essentially is. In the sense that he sees man in play and in creation, in 
Niederkunft, his understanding of the human resembles not so much the dialectical notion of 
man as that of woman. And thus it is that his thinking heralds the end of the dialectical
102 Cf. Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 46.
103 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 39.
104 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 138.
105 Kojfrve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 66.
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understanding of man and a new conception of the human in play and chance, in creation 
and bringing forth: in 'alea et parturio' .106
A Marginal Threat: Woman's Standing in the Dialectic
In all the time that the human has been defined in terms of work -  from Socrates until Marx, 
even until Derrida -  philosophy has hardly been concerned with woman. The fact that the 
West has for a long time viewed woman with suspicion is nowadays a much discussed 
commonplace for which various reasons are sought and given; ultimately, however, the 
position of woman on the margins of the human is defined in the structure of dialectical 
being. Dialectics determines being such that it is essentially anthropomorphic: such that man 
is at its centre, whereas woman, who remains more closely tied to the forces of life, is of 
barely more interest to the dialecticians than the natural world. In an era that defines the 
human as the negation of the world, the position of woman is always precarious and her 
humanity is constantly in question. And yet, although woman is left out of the dialectical 
understanding of the human, she is required for its perpetuation and she is the other for 
which the dialectic strives eternally. The dialectical age aims, thus, to eradicate the difference 
between man and woman, whilst at the same time maintaining it in all the dimensions of
106 The notion of the working man, however, is so deeply engrained in Western thought that even a 
century after Nietzsche it has not been entirely dissipated. Derrida's theorizing of work in Specters of 
Marx leads him to the conclusion that 'the work of mourning is not one kind of work among others. It 
is work itself, work in general' (Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and 
the New International, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 97). In the sense that 
Derrida sees in all work the structure of mourning, he is aware of the fact that all work seeks meaning 
in negativity and, seeks indeed, to make of negativity meaning. Nonetheless, the texts assembled in The 
Work of Mourning 'not only speak of or about mourning but are themselves texts of or in mourning' 
(Pascale-Anne Brault /  Michael Naas, 'Editors' Introduction' in: Derrida, The Work of Mourning, edited 
by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 3). Derrida 
mourns, no doubt, his deceased friends, but he also mourns the work that he knows to be impossible. 
In the full knowledge of the impossibility of his task, Derrida mourns work and mourns the fact that 
the only form of work that is still possible is mourning.
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dialectical Aufhebung. At the very beginning of the dialectical era, Plato's Republic already 
depicts its goal -  and its end -  in a world where everybody, men and women, are defined 
solely in and through their work. It is because 'natural capacities are similarly distributed in 
each sex', Plato argues, that 'it is natural for women to take part in all occupations as well as 
men'.107 The Laws, however, a later and more pragmatic text, reveals very different motives 
behind his argument for the equality of women. Here, Plato argues that
... the common tables of men are ... a heaven-born and admirable institution, but 
you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no 
similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the 
human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their 
weakness -  I mean the female sex -  has been left alone by the legislator as 
hopelessly undisciplined, which is a mistake. [...] For women are accustomed to 
creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light while exerting their 
utmost powers of resistance, will be far too much for the legislator.108
In this instance, it is clear that Plato does not advocate the equality of women in education 
and work for the benefit of women -  very much on the contrary. He readily acknowledges 
that his policies on woman's place in society amount to dragging her out of her secret dark 
hiding places into the light of day in order to have a better account of her. In advocating the 
education of woman, Plato demands, thus, of woman that she, too, aim for the utmost 
negation of her essence. Woman, however, is always more bound up by the forces of life and 
can never negate herself to the same extent as man; hence, she always remains an 
uncomfortable reminder of the futility of the dialectical task. And as she represents the 
impossibility of the dialectical definition of the human, she is always portrayed as the 
downfall of man. In Hegel's understanding, Kojeve argues,
107 Plato, The Republic, p. 175.
108 Plato, 'Laws' in: B. Jowett (ed.), The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett, volume IV (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1964), pp. 189-544 (p. 349).
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the pagan World perishes because it excludes Work. But the immediate agent of 
its ruin is ... Woman.109
The dialectical age ascribes, thus, the demise of the ancient world to woman and has 
considered woman as a threat to a truly human existence ever since. In his analysis of the 
demise of Sparta, Aristotle may seem suspicious of the virtually equal standing of women in 
Spartan society; ultimately, however, he blames the demise of the city not on the women 
being educated and working just like the men, but precisely on the fact that they were not. 
Sparta, he believes, declined because
... the legislator wanted to make the whole state hardy, and he has carried out 
his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in 
every sort of intemperance and luxury.110
The women, Aristotle argues, cause the downfall of Sparta because they do not, despite all 
appearances, negate themselves in work to the same extent as the men. In the works of the 
earliest dialecticians, it is, thus, already evident that woman poses a threat to a life defined 
purely in work and in negation and that such a life is indeed ultimately impossible for man.
In Christian thought, the notion of woman as the downfall of man is only accentuated 
further. She who ate of the forbidden tree prompted, after all, man's expulsion from 
paradise; she brought toil and suffering on mankind and in this sense led to his demise. And 
yet she is, thus, also the reason for man's human existence, which commences precisely with 
his expulsion from paradise. In this sense, woman -  who is in the dialectical understanding 
never truly human to the same extent as man -  is, in fact, human before man. The dialectical 
man seeks his realization in working on the given, but in working, he is obedient to god. He 
could breach god's command only in no longer working; hence, his predicament is that he
109 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 62.
110 Aristotle, 'Politics' in: Bames (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume II, pp. 1986-2129 (p. 2015).
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can only ever negate the world or negate god. And because he cannot fully realize himself in 
the negation of the given, he will incessantly seek to exceed himself in negation -  until, at 
last, he ends up negating himself. Woman, on the other hand, acted against god and the 
given world -  except, perhaps for the serpent -  when she ate of the tree of knowledge. She 
has already realized her human essence at the time, and the expulsion of mankind from 
paradise confirms that she has changed the world. And because she has already realized 
herself universally in the world that began when she ate of the forbidden tree, she does not 
have to exceed herself in nihilism. She never negates the world as categorically as man and 
she does not negate herself as comprehensively as he does. Whereas man's existence after his 
expulsion from paradise is pure negation, she affirms the world she has created in her initial 
negation of the world by propagating it in childbirth, in Niederkunft.
In her initial deed of eating of the tree, woman has already negated die given more 
universally than man ever will; and yet, she can never define herself as negation to the same 
extent as man. Her position vis-a-vis the dialectic is, thus, always more complex than that of 
man, who is the very heart of dialectical being. Woman always remains left out, but she is 
never outside of die dialectic; she is not in essence un-dialectical. In the imagery of Genesis, 
the one thing she has not negated is the serpent -  the serpent of dialectical reason, which, 
'more subtil than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made',111 worms itself into 
everything and winds itself out of everything. Woman in fact obeyed the serpent when she ate 
of the tree of knowledge; she was 'beguiled'112 by the cunning of dialectics to delve into the 
other, the forbidden, and in the end to eat it. In this sense, woman has already affirmed the 
dialectic and has already acted in the dialectical sense. After she first ate of the tree, however,
111 Genesis 3.1.
112 Genesis 3.13.
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god announced to the serpent that he "put enmity between [it] and the woman';113 and there 
has been much enmity between woman and the serpent of dialectical reason ever since. 
Woman's life on earth is such that she is much less susceptible to the cunning of dialectics 
than man. And yet, precisely in forever opposing the dialectical serpent, she also affirms it, 
for it was the serpent who initially seduced her into this existence. In opposing the dialectic, 
in other words, woman constitutes the other that the dialectic stipulates; in this sense, her 
resistance to the dialectic contains an element of affirmation and is, ultimately, always an 
affirmation. In the imagery of Genesis, woman is, indeed, depicted as the anti-dialectical 
principle at the heart of the dialectic. She is, after all, made from man114 and emerges, thus, 
out of the dialectical principle; but inasmuch as she originates in a division of man, she is 
essentially anti-dialectical. She testifies to the division at the very heart of the dialectic, which 
is negated in its subsequent aim for reconciliation. In this sense, the woman who was taken 
out of man is the first division and the first difference that the dialectic presumes in its quest 
for reconciliation; thus, she stands for the 'logic of disintegration'115 that Adorno identified at 
the core of the dialectic.
In the Christian imagery, woman may be made from man, but it is she who marks the 
beginning of his human existence -  as well as its end. In her first act of negation, she initiated 
man's life on earth and achieved thus already what the dialectical man is prepared to kill or 
risk his own life for: she attained recognition of herself as human, and recognition even by a 
god. In eating of the forbidden tree, woman has challenged and in a sense negated god, and 
unlike man, who can negate god only in his death, she did this without killing him. Woman 
is in this sense much better prepared for the sort of relationship with god that in Deleuze's
113 Genesis 3.15.
114 Genesis 2.22.
115 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 144.
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reading of Nietzsche pertains to the Overman. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's notion of the 
Overman as a transformation of man's relationship to god: as an end to his present feelings 
of guilt, debt, ressentiment and revenge towards god and the beginning of a relationship of 
enjoyment and love that would be reminiscent of Dionysos and Ariadne.116 The dialectical 
man, who strives for the other and the altogether-other117 only to negate it, is essentially 
incapable of this kind of relationship with god. As Nietzsche emphasizes time and again, he 
needs to be 'overcome' for the relationship between man and god to be transformed. 
Woman, on the other hand, is in essence such that she could, indeed, establish a relationship 
of enjoyment and love with god; they already live in mutual recognition.118 Ultimately it is, 
thus, only woman who can live with a god. Man can never realize himself as long as there is 
a god, because he has not yet negated the other; nor, however, can he realize himself once he 
has killed god, for now that he has negated everything and even the altogether other, he 
whose essence is negation ends up killing himself. Thus it is that, in Heidegger's famous 
words, only a god can save us now119 -  a god who will spell the end of the negation that is 
the dialectical man and subsequently becomes woman's lover. This, indeed, is the future of 
man that Nietzsche anticipates in his thinking of woman. His words on women are not the 
lightly spoken wisecracks of a misogynist, for which they have at times been mistaken, and it 
is not simply a curiosity that whole sections of his work are dedicated to women and the
116 Cf. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 147-194.
117 Derrida, The Gift of Death, pp. 78-91 and passim.
118 Thus, Zarathustra mocks: /Ah, how you stand there, you unfruitful men, how lean-ribbed! And, 
indeed, many of you have noticed that. And they have said: 'Perhaps a god has secretly taken 
something from me there as I slept? Truly, sufficient to form a little woman for himself!' (Nietzsche, 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 143) His remark illustrates that god, as Nietzsche thinks him, created 
woman not as a companion for man, as he claims in Genesis, but as a lover for himself; and he 
deprived man in order to do so, and then fooled him into believing that it all happened for his benefit. 
Thinking the human as woman rather than as man would, thus, change god's attitude to man and in 
therefore change god essentially. In this sense, the West faces in Nietzsche's thinking not only the 
question of what it means to be human; it faces the question of who -  or what -  god is.
119 Heidegger, 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', Der Spiegel, 23/1976  (31 May 1976), 193-219 (p.
209).
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question of woman,120 whilst he hardly speaks of men in the narrow sense, of Manner, 
anywhere at all. The translation may actually be deceptive here, because the German term 
Menschen, human beings in general, also translates into English as 'man' or 'men'.121 
Nietzsche's choice of the terms, however, is never fortuitous. He speaks of woman and not of 
man because he thinks the human as woman and not as man. Marx had, no doubt, made out 
the impasse in the life of the dialectical slave, but like all thinkers before him, he still believed 
that the solution to man's predicament lay in the existence of man. Nietzsche, on the other 
hand, saw not only that the dialectical slave is an existential impasse; he also realized that the 
future of man lies in the existence of woman. And thought as woman, the Overman or the 
man of the future as Nietzsche conceives him, is such that he is in essence man - as he 
appears to be in Heidegger's reading -  and yet precisely not man, as he appears to be for 
Deleuze.
In that he thinks the human as woman, Nietzsche poses the question of the human 
anew and poses it for die first time in the history of philosophy in earnest. The question of 
what man is has, strictiy speaking, not been asked before Nietzsche; thus far, the West has 
been preoccupied with the question of what man does or ought to do -  which presumes 
already that man is a doer, a worker. The West has, in fact, always asked of man what he does 
and of woman, what she is.122 This is not a coincidence but emanates from the structure of
120 Most notably, perhaps, in 'Of Old and Young Women' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and 'Woman and 
Child' in Human, All Too Human.
121 The chapter 'Of Manly Prudence' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is called 'Von der Menschen-Klugheit7 
in the German original. Indeed, Zarathustra speaks mostiy not of man in the sense of Mann, but in the 
sense of Mensch; thus, also in Nietzsche's mantra that man is something that must be overcome. 
Nietzsche, 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V I/1: Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, passim.
122 When Freud declares: 'The great question that has never been answered and which I have not yet 
been able to answer, despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is "What does a 
woman want?'" (Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, II: Years of Maturity: 1901-1919 (London: 
Hogarth, 1955), p. 468), he is in essence asking what woman is, since in the Western tradition, being is 
ultimately determined as willing. In Heidegger's words, '[t]o conceive of beings according to their
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the dialectic, which sees itself and the dialectical man at its centre only ever as doing, but 
seeks to discover in the other, in woman, the essence -  it seeks being. As the first philosopher 
to ask what man is, Nietzsche is also the first to grant that man could become truly other 
than he is. And if, as Koj&ve suggests,
to attribute value to a being not in relation to what he does ... but simply because 
he is, because of the simple fact of his Sein, his Being -  is to love him,123
he is also the first philosopher to love man. The West has never loved man and could not love 
man as long as it saw him solely in the negative. In this sense, it is no coincidence and 
certainly no contradiction that Nietzsche, who thinks man as woman, is the first thinker of 
the West who truly loves man.
♦ ♦ ♦
Although Nietzsche's thinking marks the end of the dialectical understanding of man, it does 
not 'overcome' the dialectic in the strictest and the dialectical sense of the term. Indeed, when 
Hegel returns after Nietzsche and after the crisis, he returns as Zarathustra, as Nietzsche's 
prophet who carries as his animal still the serpent of dialectical reason. Zarathustra, 
however, carries the serpent, rather than being beguiled and ultimately overthrown by it. 
This image is perhaps die best illustration of the impact of Nietzsche's thinking in the history 
of philosophy. Nietzsche does not abolish or even negate the dialectic, but determines man's 
relationship to the dialectic anew. He is not aiming to eradicate dialectical work, but he 
warns that it must not be understood as an end in itself, as it has been in the dialectical age. 
Accordingly, he notes that
basic character as will is not a view held by particular thinkers; it is a necessity in the history of the 
Dasein which those thinkers ground7. Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 36.
123 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 61.
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[w]oman and the genius do not work. Woman has hitherto been the greatest 
luxury of mankind. In all those moments where we are doing our best, we are not 
working. Work is merely a means to those moments.124
In Nietzsche's thinking, work ceases to be the absolute essence of man and becomes a mere 
means to an end; correspondingly, the existence of woman is revaluated from the barely 
human to the highest luxury of mankind -  and the end, the goal, the future of man. 
Nietzsche, in other words, does not abolish man; he redefines the human so that it is no 
longer as man that he is truly human, as he had been hitherto, but so that man is truly human 
only as woman. And in metaphysical terms, the difference between man and woman is, 
ultimately, the difference between the human as he is determined in work and the human as 
she is determined in labour.
Being-Towards-Death or Living on Earth: The Theory of Work and Labour
The distinction between work and labour plays an integral part in Western thinking but it 
does not, to all appearances, feature very much in the philosophical writing of the West. 
Hannah Arendt's analysis of The Human Condition is perhaps the most comprehensive study 
on the theory of work and labour to date. Arendt certainly notes the curious silence of the 
Western tradition on the topic of work and labour, but she argues that against this
scarcity of historical evidence stands one very articulate and obstinate testimony, 
namely, the simple fact that every European language, ancient and modem, 
contains two etymologically unrelated words for what we have come to think of
124 'Weib und Genie arbeiten nicht. Das Weib war bisher der hochste Luxus der Menschheit. In alien 
Augenblicken, wo wir unser Bestes th u n , arbeiten wir nicht. Arbeit ist nur ein Mittel zu diesen Augenblicken'. 
Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, vil/l: Nachgelassene 
Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 2883/84, p. 192.
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as the same activity, and retains them in the face of their persistent synonymous 
usage.125
The fact that there are, or were, two different terms for work in circulation in most European 
languages, Arendt points out, would indicate that the distinction is ingrained in Western 
thought. She presents a somewhat 'unusual'126 and yet apparently obvious argument for a 
distinction that corresponds to 'the distinction between productive and unproductive labor', 
on the grounds that the latter already 'contains ... the more fundamental distinction between 
work and labor'.127 Accordingly, she explains that
[i]t is ... the mark of all laboring that it leaves nothing behind, that the result of 
its effort is almost as quickly consumed as the effort is spent. And yet this effort, 
despite its futility, is bom of a great urgency and motivated by a more powerful 
desire than anything else, because life itself depends on it.128
The defining characteristic of what Arendt calls labour is, thus, that it 'leaves nothing 
behind' and therefore does not change the world essentially. Labour, 'understood as a noun, 
never designates the finished product'129 and does not, in fact, even imply a product; it 
'never "produces" anything but life'.130 In Arendt's understanding, the difference between 
work and labour is therefore the difference between producing objects for persistent and 
repeated use and producing objects for immediate consumption. She readily admits, 
however, that this difference is becoming more and more blurred today, for 'a chair or a 
table is now consumed as rapidly as a dress and a dress used up almost as quickly as
125 She explains that 'the Greek language distinguishes between ponein and ergazesthai, the Latin 
between laborare and facere or fabricari, which have the same etymological root, the French between 
travailler and ouvrer, the German between arbeiten and werken. In all these cases, only the equivalents 
for Tabor' have an unequivocal connotation of pain and trouble. The German Arbeit applied originally 
only to farm labor executed by serfs and not to the work of the craftsman, which was called Werk. The 
French travailler replaced the older labourer and is derived from tripalium, a kind of torture'. Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 80.
126 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 79.
127 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 87.
128 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 87.
129 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 80.
130 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 88.
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food'.131 In the sense that her distinction has, thus, come under pressure, it is ultimately 
contingent upon the circumstances of man's life; hence, it is not an essential distinction 
between work and labour. And whilst Arendt considers the effect of work on man, in that 
she discusses work that is physically more or less demanding or work that is demeaning, she 
does not examine work as a constitutive aspect of the human; she does not think of work in 
metaphysical terms. As the title of her book suggests, she treats work and labour as conditions 
of the human -  and not in terms of the human essence.
In this sense, Arendt approaches the question of work and labour on very different 
grounds than Nietzsche, who recognizes it as a metaphysical question of the human essence. 
Her analysis shows that she is essentially still taken in by the dialectical illusions that 
Nietzsche had already exposed as a deadly impasse. Indeed, she argues that
... unlike working, whose end has come when the object is finished, ready to be 
added to the common world of things, laboring always moves in the same circle, 
which is prescribed by the biological process of the living organism and the end 
of its 'toil and trouble' comes only with the death of this organism.132
Arendt evidently perceives labour -  not work -  to be such that it can be accomplished only 
in the death of the one who undertakes it. Her interpretation runs, thus, counter to any that 
delves into the essence of work and labour. In Hegel's thinking, work has been exposed as the 
negation that constitutes man as human and as the activity that is never finished with the 
product but only in the worker's death. By contrast, labour describes, as Arendt rightly 
notes, the actions that immediately sustain man's life; it may be relentlessly repetitive but it 
does not harbour the same degree of negativity and it is ultimately accomplished not in
131 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 124.
132 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 98.
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man's death but in his life. Indeed, even Arendt's approach does not entirely shield her from 
the negative structure of work; she concedes that
[f]rom the viewpoint of nature, it is work rather than labor that is destructive, 
since the work process takes matter out of nature's hand without giving it back to 
her in the swift course of the natural metabolism of the living body.133
But even though she acknowledges the structure of negativity in work here, Arendt's 
standpoint ultimately always leads her to regard labour as the destructive and demeaning 
activity and work as the truly human expression and manifestation of man. This position 
certainly informs her reading of Genesis; hence, she argues that
[n]owhere in the Old Testament is death 'the wage of sin'. Nor did the curse by 
which man was expelled from paradise punish him with labor and birth; it only 
made labor harsh and birth full of sorrow.134
In Arendt's view, man's expulsion from paradise is not a radical break, but almost a natural 
progression. Even in paradise, to be sure, man would have had do something and would 
have had to make however minimal an effort to sustain his life. Arendt's basic error, 
however, is that she does not see the essential difference between this kind of labour and 
man's toil on earth. She believes that the curse only made man's labour a little harsher, but in 
fact, it marks the beginning of human work; it is the point at which man's activity becomes 
tainted by negativity. Labour, no doubt, also implies a certain negation of the world, but in 
so far as it serves to sustain man's life, it is in all its ends and purposes an affirmation of life. 
After the fall, however, the man who has so far lived at one with the world becomes in 
essence its negation. Now he no longer labours but works, for his activity is no longer 
directed at simply sustaining his life but at realizing himself in the negation of the world. 
There can be little doubt that this kind of work, which is directed against the forces of life, is
133 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 100.
134 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 107.
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'harsher7 than the labour man had undertaken previously. What Arendt fails to see, 
however, is that the difference is not merely one of degree -  but one of kind.
The story of Genesis illustrates, thus, how the distinction between work and labour is 
connected to the very beginning of man and reaches into the core of what constitutes the 
human. It is this distinction between work and labour that Nietzsche returns to at the end of 
Western metaphysics as the first question and the first instance of man. Although he does 
not presents an argument for the distinction and only his consistent usage of the terms Werk 
and Arbeit shows him to make it at all, it is implicit everywhere in his writing and 
particularly in his writing on women. To think the human in terms of labour at the end of the 
dialectical age is to think about woman, for man has in essence been reduced to work.135 And 
in the juxtaposition of man and woman, Nietzsche thinks the distinction between work and 
labour in its implications for the human essence. In Arendt's reasoning it seems that some of 
the activities we undertake are labour and others are work, but they do not affect anything 
other than what we do. In Nietzsche's thinking, on the other hand, work and labour 
determine what man is; work constitutes the human as man and labour constitutes the 
human as woman. The distinction is essential; man is either truly human only as man -  that 
is, only as he realizes himself in work, as he does in the dialectical age which has, 
consequently, always been suspicious of woman. Or man is truly human only as woman - 
that is, only as he r e a l i z e s  himself in labour. This is the concept of man that Nietzsche's 
thinking heralds, challenging, thus, the very notion of what it means to be human.
135 If Arendt argues that the West is becoming 'a society of laborers' (Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 
126) she is actually describing the same process of man being increasingly defined in the negative; the 
apparent contradiction stems from her usage of the terms.
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In Nietzsche's understanding, the distinction between work and labour rests on very 
different criteria from those that Arendt presumes; the question, it seems, is not so much 
what is being done -  What is being produced? Is it for use or for consumption? -  but how it is 
done. Where the emphasis is on the negation, that is, where an action is in essence dialectical 
and amounts to the negation of man by himself, Nietzsche speaks of work, Arbeit. And 
where the emphasis lies on the affirmation, where an action is in essence conducive to or 
indicative of life, Nietzsche speaks of Werk -  or, indeed, of giving birth and of Niederkunft. In 
the sense that he distinguishes, thus, between work and labour according to the tenor of the 
activity as negation or affirmation, his approach implies that what appears to be the same 
activity can either be work or labour, depending on the circumstances. In fact, if the 
difference between work and labour is the difference between an action carried out as 
negation, and one carried out as affirmation, it is only the smallest gap that separates work 
and labour -  so small that it is usually not even acknowledged, and yet so fundamental that 
it determines our whole understanding of man and of the world. Arendt, on the other hand, 
seeks the grounds for a distinction in the activities themselves; she looks at the mode of 
production, the product, its use and the circumstances of its consumption. She presumes, 
thus, that some human activities are by nature work and others labour; yet, she grants that 
the quality of an activity is not always straightforward or indeed inherent.136 In this sense, 
her own conclusions already expose the flaws in her approach and show her reasoning to fall 
prey to dialectical illusions. Ultimately, hers is the position of one beguiled by the dialectical 
notion of productivity, and by a twist of dialectical logic it reveals, thus, the price that the 
dialectical age pays for the illusion of productivity.
136 In pointing out that present-day society has 'almost succeeded in leveling all human activities to 
the common denominator of securing the necessities of life' (Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 126), she 
suggests that nearly all contemporary human activity is labour -  and undermines, thus, her attempt to 
ground the distinction between work and labour in the activity itself.
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The clearest illustration of the difference between Nietzsche's and Arendt's thinking on 
work and labour is perhaps their respective take on art. In Arendt's view, the artist is, 
'strictly speaking ... the only "worker" left in a laboring society',137 for she interprets art 
above all as freedom from the necessity that characterizes labour. According to Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, art is the truly metaphysical activity of man and as such necessary and 
essential to the human; in this sense, it is the epitome of labour even by Arendt's definition. 
In this instance, the discrepancy is indeed not simply one of the terminology; it stems from 
the fact that Arendt, in line with the Western tradition, still understands freedom and 
necessity as opposites. Accordingly, she notes that contemporary labour theories 'almost 
unanimously define labor as the opposite of play' and that,
[a]s a result, all serious activities, irrespective of their fruits, are called labor, and 
every activity which is not necessary either for the life of the individual or for the 
life process of society is subsumed under playfulness.138
Eventually, she predicts, 'not even the "work" of the artist is left; it is dissolved into play and 
has lost its worldly meaning'.139 Play, for Arendt, denotes what is not necessary to sustain 
man's life, as is labour, and does not even have a lasting effect on the world like work. 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, has recognized chance as a necessity of life;140 he has seen 
through the deception of dialectical reason and knows that the freedom promised in the 
dialectic is only ever an illusion. He realizes that play is not, as Arendt suggests, devoid of 
'worldly meaning', but defines in fact man's being in the world, for play is the embracing of 
every outcome and in this sense the affirmation of both chance and necessity. Hence, it is not 
a contradiction that Nietzsche sees in art labour and play, for in his understanding, labour
137 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 127.
138 Arendt, The Human Condition, p 127.
139 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 128.
140 Cf. Deleuze, 'The Dice-Throw' in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 25-27.
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and play are not opposites but share, in fact, the same structure. Labour and play, alea et 
parturio, are the pursuits which determine man as woman.
♦ ♦ ♦
In woman, Nietzsche recognizes a human existence which cannot be reduced to negation 
and which is, in this respect, essentially different from the slave. The ancients were aware of 
this distinction; they knew that
nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not 
niggardly,141
and realized, thus, that she whose essence is bringing forth is categorically different from the 
slave, who is lack, absence and negation -  and in short, niggardly. The dialectical age, 
however, overlooks this essential difference and on account of her social situation often 
compares woman's existence to that of the slave. De Beauvoir argues that
'[c]ertain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of 
master to slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman'.142
On the other hand, however, she acknowledges that
woman cannot in good faith be regarded simply as a worker; for her 
reproductive function is as important as her productive capacity, no less in the 
social economy than in the individual life.143
In the sense that she realizes that woman cannot be reduced to her work, de Beauvoir is 
clearly aware that woman is precisely not a slave; yet she falls prey to the dialectical imagery
141 Aristotle, 'Politics' in: Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume II, pp. 1986-2129 (p. 1987).
142 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 96.
143 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 89.
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of woman as slave. At the heart of the dialectical worldview is the illusion that work frees 
man from necessity; and correspondingly, the dialectical age entertains the image of woman 
as slave, shackled by the necessity of life which she is forced to perpetuate. The image of 
woman as a slave is, thus, deeply engrained in the tradition of Western thought. Even 
Nietzsche, it seems, does not steer clear of it as he remarks:
It is 'the slave' in the vain man's blood, a remnant of the craftiness of the slave - 
and how much 'slave' still remains [ist riickstandig] in woman, for example! - 
which seeks to seduce him to good opinions about himself; it is likewise the slave 
who immediately afterwards falls down before these opinions as if he himself 
had not called them forth. -  And to say it again: vanity is an atavism.144
But even though it seems that in keeping with the dialectical tradition, Nietzsche likens 
woman to the slave here, his remark in fact transcends rather than perpetuates this image. 
He is actually discussing man and only mentions woman as a point of comparison. And 
indeed, he discerns 'the slave' in the vain man's blood and in this sense at the very core of his 
being, whereas in woman, 'the slave' is residual, 'riickstandig' . In this sense, Nietzsche's 
remark actually shows that the vanity of the slave is much more of an atavism in woman 
than it is in man.
Woman is essentially different from the slave precisely because she is not simply the 
negation of the slave and of man in general; she differs from him, but she does not negate 
him. In labour, in bringing forth man, she is ultimately always his affirmation. The 
relationship of man and woman is, thus, indicative of the asymmetrical relationship between 
negation and affirmation; for negation, as Deleuze explains,
144 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 199 , and 'Jenseits von Gut und Bose' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Werke, V l/2 : Jenseits von Gut und Bose/Zur Genealogie der Moral, pp. 1-255  (p. 224).
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is opposed to affirmation but affirmation differs from negation. We cannot think of 
affirmation as 'being opposed' to negation: this would be to place the negative 
within it.145
The act of giving birth, of Niederkunft, is the utmost affirmation of man; ultimately, however, 
all human labour is an affirmation of man, in that it serves to sustain and perpetuate human 
life. The affirmation of man in labour is, thus, not peculiar to the biologically female. In 
metaphysical terms, Niederkunft simply describes the creation of the human as the epitome of 
labour, understood as all human activity that serves to sustain man's life. And 
correspondingly, woman denotes in metaphysical terms a human consciousness which has, 
quite independently of biological factors, been shaped by labour, as opposed to the human 
consciousness that arises in work. In the dialectic of master and slave, Hegel describes how 
man proves himself to be human by risking his life for the recognition by another,146 and in 
fighting with die other becomes either master or slave -  unless he dies or kills the other, in 
which case he remains as he is and 'cannot realize and reveal his humanity'.147 Consequently, 
man
in his nascent state, ... is never simply man. He is always, necessarily, and 
essentially, either Master or Slave;148
and in this sense, man is always determined by work -  whether he works or not. Ultimately, 
however, the master has not attained the recognition for which he staked his life, for he is 
recognized not by a fellow man but by a slave, and as he does not work, he cannot change 
the fact that his slave will eventually kill him. The slave, on the other hand, works to attain 
the recognition as human that he initially forewent, but he will never be recognized by his 
master, however much he changes the world in his work, which finally kills him. A human
145 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 188.
146 Cf. Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 7.
147 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 8.
148 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 8.
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existence is, thus, in either case one that can be fulfilled only in death. It is in this sense that 
man "is that which is in relation to his end';149 he is only in this own death and he is his own 
end. His human existence is bein^-towards a future project, and as being-foioards-the-end, as 
being-fowflrds-death,150 it is becoming-dead: it is dying. Ultimately, work determines man's 
existence such that it is either slowly accomplished murder or prolonged suicide.
Woman, on the other hand, is conspicuously absent from this account of the human 
consciousness. Indeed, Hegel takes woman to lead an ahistoric, universal life not dissimilar 
to an animal's, as feminist thinkers have criticized.151 He did not see that woman 
incorporates not only the animal existence of man, which is necessary for the propagation of 
the species, but that her existence, too, is an expression of a human self-consciousness, 
although she is, by way of her labour, neither master nor slave. In labour, woman puts her 
life at stake,152 but she does not do so for prestige alone, as the master does, who proves thus 
that he is 'n o t ... bound to life'.153 When woman risks her life in labour, she is bound to life, 
for she already values her life and that of the other, as human. She is aware that her 'life is as 
essential... as pure self-consciousness'154 to her. Unlike the master, who realizes his human 
existence in staking his life unnecessarily, as no animal would, she realizes her human essence 
in staking a life she values for the other. And thus, she too realizes herself over and above an 
animal existence, for an animal could not consciously put its life at stake for the other. In
149 Derrida, 'The Ends of Man' in: Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass (London: Prentice 
Hall, 1982), pp. 109-136 (p. 123).
150 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 236-237.
151 Patricia Jagentowicz Mills notes in 'Hegel's Antigone' that '[w]hile Hegel's system is meant to be a 
historical account of the development of humanity, woman is presented as outside history7. Patricia 
Jagentowicz Mills, 'Hegel's Antigone' in: Mills (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 59-88 (p. 81).
152 Medea would indeed rather 'stand /  Three times in the front of battle than bear one child'. 
Euripides, 'The Medea', translated by Rex Warner in: Alcestis/The Medea/The Heracleidae/ Hippolytus, 
edited by David Greene and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 55- 
108 (p. 67).
153 Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 12.
154 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 115.
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labour, however, woman does not only risk her biological existence; she also puts her human 
life at stake, for she risks propagating the species merely as all living beings do. It is the fact 
that she consciously puts her biological life at risk that distinguishes her as human; and it is in 
this realization that she grasps that she has a human existence which she is equally putting at 
stake. In labour, she recognizes, thus, her human life in all its precariousness. And in 
recognizing herself as human, she also recognizes the child, the other, as human, for "in the 
mother-to-be the antithesis of subject and object ceases to exist'.155 In labour, woman's 
consciousness is shaped such that she recognizes in the other her human essence and attains, 
thus, the recognition that man fights and works and kills and dies for -  in vain. The 
dialectical man is only in becoming, but his goal, his telos is always also his death. In this 
sense, he who is only future does not have a future. It is woman who, as Nietzsche was well 
aware, is the future -  and the only future -  of man. Her labour is the bringing forth and the 
beginning of man, but it is also the affirmation of man as he is and heralds, in this sense, the 
end of man understood as the negation of himself. And precisely in spelling his end, woman 
is also the future of man, for she does not effect the teleological end that the dialectical man 
brings on himself, but his avenir in the Derridean sense:156 She is the man-to-come.
♦ ♦ ♦
In the dialectical era, woman is the barely human other and yet, as such, she embodies the 
truth of man; it is she -  not man -  who reveals the nature of being to an age that would rather 
fabricate its own truths and therefore persistently shies away from her. In comparing truth to 
a woman, Nietzsche shows that behind the dialectical truth of man, he sees the tragic truth 
that woman incorporates. He muses:
155 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 512.
156 Cf. Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 65 and passim.
ISO
On Man and Woman: Hie (Determination of the Human in Worfand£a6our
Supposing truth to be a woman -  what? is the suspicion not well founded that all 
philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of 
women? that the gruesome earnestness, the clumsy importunity with which they 
have hitherto been in the habit of approaching truth have been inept and 
improper means for winning a wench? Certainly she has not let herself be won 
. . .157
Nietzsche illustrates, thus, not only that woman incorporates the truth of being but that this 
has, to date, escaped the philosophers. The philosophers of the West, who have hitherto all 
been dialecticians, have not as yet seen into the truth of being and indeed, Nietzsche 
suggests, they never will as long as they approach the truth as they do -  as long, that is, as 
they remain dialecticians. And precisely because it cannot grasp the truth of woman, the 
dialectical age suspects her to be secretive and flighty. Men, Nietzsche notes
have hitherto treated women like birds which have strayed down to them from 
the heights: as something more delicate, more fragile, more savage, stranger, 
sweeter, soulful -  but as something which has to be caged up so that it shall not 
fly away.158
Woman, as Nietzsche describes her here, is essentially alien to man, not least because she has 
come down to him, whereas the dialectical man can only ever aspire wpwards. Thus, she is the 
other that the dialectical man requires and therefore seeks to cage and to preserve; but 
precisely in keeping her, he robs her of her essence in all the movements of Aufhebung: he 
makes of her a bird which cannot fly. In Nietzsche's imagery, woman is actually the freer 
existence; and indeed, the dialectical man is never, for all his efforts, as successful at 
restraining woman as he is at restraining himself. Correspondingly, Nietzsche observes that
157 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 31.
158 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 166.
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[i]t is difficult to say something wrong about woman: with women, nothing is 
impossible...159
As opposed to the dialectical man, who cannot be anything but negation, woman is not 
essentially restricted in her potential. Nietzsche does not deny that she is much more than 
man tied to the necessity of life, but in contrast to the Western tradition, which has 
interpreted this as her 'enslavement' to nature and as restraint of her human freedom, he 
realizes that it is precisely in her standing vis-a-vis life that woman incorporates all the 
possibilities of man. Man is not free as long as he attempts to escape the necessity of life by 
changing the world in his work; he is not free until he can see beyond the 'enslavement' of 
woman and recognizes in the dialectical deceptions his own enslavement.
♦ ♦ ♦
In woman, Nietzsche discerns a human existence that is not enslaved by the nihilism 
inherent in dialectical work, but neither is hers simply an existence in affirmation where the 
existence of man is one of negation. Woman, too, negates the given and she does so 
essentially, for 'one can truly create only by negating the given real'.160 And yet, her negation 
of the world is different from man's in that it does not rest on the presumption that the 
negation of the negation equals positivity.161 This is the premise that Adorno identified as the 
basic error of the dialectic, for
[t]o negate a negation does not bring about its reversal; it proves, rather, that the 
negation was not negative enough.162
159 'Es ist schwer, iiber das Weib etwas Falsches zu sagen: bei den Weibern ist kein Ding 
unmoglich../. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds): Nietzsche: Werke, 
v il/l: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84, p. 162.
160 Koj£ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 223.
161 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
162 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, pp. 159-160.
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Dialectical reasoning always stipulates that its initial negation was not good enough as 
negation -  or that it was plainly wrong. Hence, the dialectical principle renders the initial 
negation -  that is, its very premise and foundation -  worthless in one sense or another and 
therefore steeps itself ever deeper into nihilism: for even though it records the negation of 
the negation as positive, it always exposes the first negation as meaningless by the same 
logic. Nietzsche's criticism of work is, indeed, not aimed at the negation per se; on the 
contrary: he harbours a deep suspicion of the yes-sayers.163 And in fact, he criticizes the 
dialectic not because of the negation it entails, but because it renders every negation 
meaningless, inconsequential and ultimately impossible -  which the dialectical age interprets 
as positive: as reasonable and peaceful. He saw the problems in the initial premise of the 
dialectic surface in the dilemmas of the dialectical man, but he also saw in woman a human 
existence that is by way of her labour determined in the non-negotiable negation of the 
given, which is implied in all creation, and the unreserved affirmation of this negation in the 
embracing of every possible outcome. Labour is, thus, essentially the affirmation of negation 
and pertains in this sense to the same structure as fighting, which also consists of the 
unreserved embracing of the negation and all its potential outcomes. Thus it is that 
Nietzsche, who thinks being as creation and as Niederkunft, can without contradiction 
advocate war and declare:
I advise not work, but fighting, I advise not peace but victory. May your work be
a fight, and your peace a victory.164
163 Cf. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 321-322.
164 Tch rathe nicht zur Arbeit, sondem zum Kampfe, ich rathe nicht zum Frieden sondem zum Siege. Eure 
Arbeit sei ein Kampf euer Friede ein Sieg'. Nietzsche, "Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari 
(eds), Nietzsche: Werke, V ll/1 :  Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84, p. 199.
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In suggesting that work could be a fight, Nietzsche grants that the traditional Western 
understanding of man as the worker who is only as negation could be succeeded by a 
definition of man in fighting and as such in the affirmation of negation. The fighting that 
Nietzsche recommends is, however, essentially different from dialectical warfare, which is 
geared towards a specific outcome and one goal and therefore does not entail the embracing 
of every outcome. Nor does warfare in the dialectical age ever amount to man putting his life 
at stake in the true, human sense; it operates, rather, on the calculated risk of the life of the 
other and in this sense on the purest contempt for the human. In this sense, it is precisely the 
sort of negation that renders man as the initial premise worthless. Nietzsche's thinking of the 
human shows, thus, that much more than actual fighting, it is the pointless, meaningless 
negation of man in the dialectic that kills him -  and kills him not just physically, but long 
before then kills him as human.
♦ ♦ ♦
Today, it is something of a commonplace that modern man is no longer truly human and 
lives in alienation from a world which negates him as man. Concerns about the dynamics of 
the dialectic -  expressed, mostly, as worries about the ever increasing rate of change - 
comprise the tenor of much of nineteenth and much more even of twentieth century 
thought.165 In Nietzsche's understanding, however, this estrangement of the modern man is 
indicative not only of the conditions of his life, but of his essence. In the alienation of the
165 Max Horkheimer notes, thus, that '[i]f the dream of machines doing men's work has now come 
true, it is also true that men are acting more and more like machines. Georges Duhamel writes: "Let us 
not forget that if the machine is making its way up to an ever greater likeness to man, the stresses of 
modem civilization tend to make man sink down to an ever greater likeness to the machine"'. Max 
Horkheimer, 'The Concept of Man' in: Critique of Instrumental Reason, translated by Matthew J. 
O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 1-33 (p. 26).
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modem man who is controlled by the machine, he sees the truth of man and indeed a way to 
the truth of man, as he notes:
The machine controls terribly that everything happens at the right time and 
correctly. The worker obeys this blind despot, who is more than his slave. The 
machine does not train the will to self-control. It awakens the desire to react 
against despotism -  in excess, nonsense, rapture. The machine causes 
saturnalia.166
The essence of the machine is, to all appearances, its rigorous and relentless order, which it 
also imposes on the worker who operates it. And yet, even the proudest achievement of the 
dialectical man cannot conceal the truth of being for long. Ultimately, Nietzsche points out, 
the machine serves not man's negation of the given by imposing order on it; rather, it leads 
him to abandon himself at the forces of life in excess, nonsense and rapture. And in leading 
him to saturnalia, the machine actually points him to the truth of being, which the dialectical 
age so vehemently denies. Even in the direst alienation of man, Nietzsche conceives, thus, a 
way for man to grasp the tragic truth of life and to lead a human life on earth, which the West 
is not actually taking for granted any more. Most poignantly, Heidegger concludes that what 
man inhabits today is, indeed, no longer an earth,167 illustrating with this incredible image 
that the dialectical man has removed himself from the earth which grounds his world to such 
an extent that he cannot even be said to inhabit this earth any more.168 Such, indeed, are the 
dilemmas of the dialectical man that ultimately he can only lead a life on earth that is no
166 /Die Maschine controlirt furchtbar, dafi alles zur rechten Zeit und recht geschieht. Der Arbeiter gehorcht 
dem blinden Despoten, er ist mehr als sein Sklave. Die Maschine e r z i e h t  n i c h t  den Willen zur 
Selbstbeherrschung. Sie weckt Reaktionsgeliiste gegen den Despotismus -  die Ausschweifung, den Unsinn, den 
Rausch. Die Maschine ruft Satumalien hervor'. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  
Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, IV/3: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Zweiter Band) /  Nachgelassene 
Fragmente, pp. 343-479 (p. 436).
167 'Das ist keine Erde mehr, auf der der Mensch heute lebt'. Heidegger, 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns 
retten', Der Spiegel, 73/1976 (31 May 1976), 193-219 (p. 206).
168 Cf. Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art7 in: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 139-212 (p. 174).
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longer human -  or a life that is no longer on earth. In thinking man as woman and being as 
Niederkunft, Nietzsche, however, conceives of a future for human life on earth.
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One day there will be associated with my name the recollection 
of something frightful -  of a crisis like no other before on earth, 
of the profoundest collision of conscience, of a decision evoked 
against everything that until then had been believed in, 
demanded, sanctified. I am not a man, I am dynamite. -
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
In the light of its impact on Western philosophy, dynamite seems only too fitting an image 
for Nietzsche's thinking and it is indeed an image that Nietzsche uses himself. The fact that 
the metaphor of the explosive has featured in many a commentary on his work, from one of 
the earliest reviews of his writing in the Bernese Bund newspaper in 1886,1 to Sarah Kofman's 
reading of it in the 1990s, is therefore hardly surprising. Nietzsche's thinking does in fact not 
just exceed the framework of traditional philosophy but, particularly in his later works, 
actually bursts out of it. Ecce Homo, 'the strangest autobiographical text ever written',2 is no 
doubt also the strangest philosophical text ever written, transgressing the conventions of 
philosophical writing to the extent that its very standing as a philosophical work could be 
drawn into question. If Ecce Homo is not dismissed -  and all the more easily dismissed, given 
that it has only ever been read in retrospect3 -  as a symptom of Nietzsche's impending 
collapse and the ramblings of a madman-to-be, it is read as the final explosion of Nietzsche's
1 Der Bund, 16/17  September 1886; cf. Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, III/3: Briefe von 
Nietzsche: Januar 1885-Dezember 1886 (1982), pp. 249-258.
2 Sarah Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', translated by Duncan Large in collaboration 
with the author, Diacritics 24/4  (winter 1994), 51-70 (p. 57).
3 Ecce Homo was published in 1908, after Nietzsche's collapse into madness and after his death.
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reason and, indeed, of meaning on the whole. However, even if Nietzsche's thinking spells 
the end of the Western tradition in philosophy, it does not describe it unambiguously as 
explosion; and in this light, it is certainly curious that this image is so prevalent in the 
scholarship on Nietzsche's work. Of the most prominent commentators, only Heidegger 
discerns in Nietzsche's thinking the manifestations of one, and only one, stringent 
philosophical thought and ultimately the implosion of the Western tradition in philosophy. 
And against the background of Heidegger's interpretation, it is all the more curious that the 
tradition of reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion, which followed in its wake, has not 
been questioned to date.
Nietzsche's Self-Consciousness on the Verge of Reason
Nietzsche's writing often gives the impression that he is concerned with himself more than 
with philosophy proper, and indeed to such an extent that the self-consciousness of his 
thinking could be used as charge against his standing as a philosopher. Chapter headings 
like 'Why I am so Wise', 'Why I am so Clever' and 'Why I write Such Good Books' not only 
flout the academic conventions but clearly lend themselves to accusations of narcissism and 
egomania. Nietzsche's self-consciousness in thinking is, however, not simply a stylistic 
feature or a foretaste of his impending madness. In fact, Heidegger cautions against 
trivializing 'Nietzsche's habit -  exercised since his youth -  of having an explicit and dogged 
self-reflection accompany his labors in thought',4 because he recognizes that this self­
reflection is essential to Nietzsche's thinking. 'If Nietzsche always and again mediates on 
himself', he argues,
4 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 9.
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it is nonetheless the very opposite of a vain self-mirroring. It is in fact Nietzsche's 
perpetually renewed readiness for the sacrifice that his task demanded of him; it 
is a necessity that Nietzsche had sensed ever since the days of his wakeful youth.5
Nietzsche's self-consciousness is, thus, not the 'vain self-mirroring' for which it is often 
mistaken; nor is it the self-mirroring of the dialectic, which 'tolerates nothing that is not like 
itself'6 and ultimately nothing that is not itself. The dialectic only ever refers to itself; yet it 
remains blind to its own essence and unaware of its inherent self-reflectivity, professing 
instead an interest in the other. Although it is essentially self-referential, Western thought 
has therefore never given the impression of being particularly introspective. Nietzsche, 
however, transcends the philosophical tradition not only in the sense that his thinking is 
overtly self-conscious where thought had hitherto been tacitly so; his self-consciousness is 
essentially different from that of the dialectic. Dialectical thought is self-referential because it 
appropriates and annihilates every other; it directs all its efforts outwards -  hence, the hollow 
at its centre -  and it is in this sense explosive. The self-consciousness of Nietzsche's 
philosophy, on the other hand, reflects the fact that in his thinking, thought concentrates 
upon itself for the first time in the history of the West. In this sense, Nietzsche's thinking 
describes the very opposite of an explosion, for what may look like the explosion of the 
philosophical conventions by a madman describes, in fact, the collapse and the implosion of 
the dialectical system of thought. Indeed, Nietzsche 'explodes' the philosophical tradition 
only in the less customary sense of the term: he makes a mockery of it.7
♦ ♦ ♦
5 Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 9.
6 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 142-143.
7 Among the meanings of the term 'explode', the Oxford English Dictionary cites 'To mock at, deride', 
'To reject with scorn' and 'To cause to be rejected; to bring into disrepute; to expose the hollowness of; 
to discredit7.. Murray /  Bradley et al (eds), Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, V: dvandva-follis, 
p. 573.
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In Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's thinking as the completion as well as the end of 
Western metaphysics, its essence as the moment between the explosive success of the 
dialectical age and its implosion is much more perspicuous than it is in Nietzsche's own 
writing. Nonetheless, Nietzsche is all too well aware of the implosive nature of his thinking 
and of the fate it therefore harbours for the whole of Western civilization. In his later works 
in particular, his writing shows that he not only thinks the implosion of philosophy, but that 
he is this implosion, in the sense that his faculties literally implode at the end of his creative 
life. And long before then, he reveals a particular sensitivity for the signs of implosion, which 
reaches into every aspect of his existence. Thus, it may seem odd that Nietzsche, the 
philosopher of life as opposed to the theoreticians of old, should feel wary of the explosive 
force of life in the springtime, to the extent that he remarks repeatedly that this season is not 
at all suited to his disposition and on one occasion even admits that it frightens him.8 It is not 
life as such, however, which perturbs Nietzsche, but the explosive nature of its manifestation 
in springtime, which runs counter to his essence as a thinker. He prefers the calm of autumn, 
when nature withdraws into itself, and the intensity of winter,9 for he perceives in these 
seasons of implosive character the kind of promise and anticipation that corresponds to the 
nature of his thinking. And even more poignantly, Nietzsche's sensitivity to the symptoms of 
implosion manifests itself in his constant fears for his health. All throughout his creative life, 
he worries about an imminent collapse and about his health giving in; in this sense, his fear 
for his health is essentially the fear of implosion. In his concerns for his health, Nietzsche
8 7Das Friihjahr macht mir Furcht; es ist mir an jedem Orte bisher mifirathen'. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck 
(3 March 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, m / 5 :  Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887- 
Januar 1889, p. 266. Similary, Nietzsche had written to Heinrich Koselitz:'.. .inzwischen gieng es nicht 
besser: und fast bilde ich mir ein, da.fi der Friihling, meine verhdngnisvolle Jahreszeit, mir iiberall gleich zusetzt'. 
Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz (20  May 1887) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, I I I /5: 
Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 78.
9 'Whom I love I love better in winter than in summer; I now mock my enemies better and more 
heartily7. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 193.
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anticipates, thus, the implications of this thinking, for ultimately they always reflect an issue 
in his thinking much more than a concern with his person. Indeed, as he contemplates the 
self-centredness of his health worries in a letter to Heinrich Koselitz, he also reflects on the 
essential paradox of his philosophical position. He writes:
The stupid egotism weighs on my conscience with which I wrote my last letter to 
you, without telling you of anything other than my incurata and incurabilia. 
Strange! Not in the worst times of my health did life appear to me as much of a 
difficulty as it does now. There are nights when I cannot stand myself any more in 
an absolutely humiliating manner.10
Accusing himself of egotism, Nietzsche acknowledges that his is still the self-centred 
viewpoint inherent in dialectical thought, even though he has extricated himself from the 
dialectical tradition to the extent that he actually recognizes its self-centredness. And in 
admitting that he cannot stand himself any longer, he grants that the cause for his suffering 
is not an extraneous one. Whatever causes his suffering is within himself and causes him 
suffering not least because it is within himself. Indeed, Nietzsche's pains originate in himself 
because he can no longer stand the system of thought that still informs his thinking. He 
cannot endure his own fundamental thought, for the thought that defines him as a thinker is 
the thought that brings about the end of thinking as it had been hitherto. Nietzsche's 
suffering as a thinker stems, thus, not simply from personal circumstances; for his historical 
position is such that the only truly philosophical thought he can think is the one that spells in 
the implosion of the Western tradition on the whole also his own demise. Accordingly, 
Nietzsche often experiences his illness as the kind of loneliness that amounts, in fact, to self­
absorption; thus he laments:
10 'Mir fallt der stupide Egoism aufs Gewissen mit dem ich meinen letzten Brief an Sie geschrieben habe, ohne 
Ihnen etwas Andres zu erzahlen als meine incurata und incurabilia. Sonderbar! Nicht in der schlechtesten Zeit 
meiner Gesundheit ist mir das Leben so sehr als S c h w i e r i g k e i t  erschienen wiejetzt. Es giebt Nachte, wo ich 
mich auf eine vollkommen demiithigende Weise nicht mehr aushalte’. Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz (15 
January 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 
1887-Januar 1889, p. 231.
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... everything about me is ill, and I do not want to see or speak to anybody. My 
old strict self-regime shall be attempted once again: for my experience is that if I 
myself [selber] alone [allein] do not help myself, I will not find help.11
The pleonastic use of the words 'selbeY and 'allein' really emphasizes Nietzsche's sense of 
loneliness in this instance. His feeling of abandonment is indeed such that he believes that 
there is nothing beyond himself that is of any use or relevance to him and that he can only 
fall back on himself. Nietzsche is by all accounts referring to his health here, but again, his 
fear for his health is indicative of his thinking. Being alone -  without another, without other 
- is the ultimate catastrophe of the dialectic; in feeling reduced to himself, Nietzsche 
anticipates the impending implosion of Western thinking. In this sense, his self- 
consciousness is integral to his thinking, which marks the point in history at which the 
Western system of thought comes to recognize in its self-referentiality also its imminent end. 
And because Nietzsche's habit of speaking of himself has its roots in the historical situation 
of his thought, some of his sharpest insights into the doomed dialectical age emerge in what 
seem to be accounts of his personal life. When he writes:
It remains to be said that it is looking bad with my eyes, incredibly [unheimlich] 
bad; in my whole life I have never experienced so strange and rapidly increasing 
an obscuration.. .12
he is no doubt reporting on his health, but again, his account of his suffering also reflects on 
his standing in the dialectical tradition of thought. Written in the spring of 1885, the letter
11 esist A l i es  krank an mir, und ich will und mag keinen M enschen sehn und sprechen. Es soli mein altes 
strenges Selbst-Regime noch einmal versucht werden: denn mein Erfahrungs-satz ist wenn ich mir selber nicht 
al l e in  helfe, werde ich keine Hiilfe finden'. Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug (21 February 1883) in: 
Colli /Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 
335.
12 'Es bleibt zu sagen iibrig, dafi mit meinen Augen es schlimm steht, unheim lich-schlim m ; mein games 
Leben habe ich niemals eine so seltsame und schnell zunehmende Verdunkelung erlebt...'. Nietzsche to 
Franziska Nietzsche (late April 1885) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m/3: Briefe von 
Nietzsche: Januar 1885-Dezenber 1886, pp. 42-43.
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dates from the period when Nietzsche was coining into his own as a thinker and coming to 
terms with his position in the history of philosophy. In this sense, he was doubtlessly 
concerned with the Rapidly increasing obscuration' of dialectical thought, which he saw 
veering towards its own implosion. He describes his situation at the time as uncannily bad 
and emphasizes, curiously, not the term 'bad', but the word 'uncanny', unheimlich. And in 
the sense that he seems perturbed by the uncanny character of his situation, he points to the 
dialectic as the cause of his suffering, for the uncanny is in essence a dialectical phenomenon. 
Freud defines it as 'that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old 
and long familiar';13 in this sense, it originates in the essentially dialectical return to the 
'father'.14 And it is no wonder that the dialectic has an air of the uncanny if, as Freud 
specifies,
an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between 
imagination and reality is effaced;15
for in its manufacture of synthetic -  and in this sense imaginary -  truths, the dialectic 
inevitably blurs this distinction. Ultimately, Freud concludes, the uncanny always describes 
the returning to life and to reality of things that had been laid to rest; and it is in this sense 
that it is essentially a dialectical phenomenon, for what is dialectics if not the dealing in the 
living dead casualties of the Aufhebung principle? Indeed, dialectics is not just dealing in the 
living dead; it is itself a spectre, an uncanny apparition: a method or, at best, a mode of 
thought which has come to life such that it now lays claim to thinking -  and to being -  itself. 
Nietzsche, however, recognizes the uncanny nature of dialectical thought and discerns in it 
the predicament of his philosophical position. If he sees in dialectical thinking the uncanny,
13 Freud, 'The Uncanny' in: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
XVII: (1917-19): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, translated by James Strachey (London: Hogarth 
Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), pp. 217-256 (p. 220).
14 Cf. Derrida, Dissemination, pp. 75-94, and Glas, pp. 75a-79a.
15 Freud, 'The Uncanny', pp. 217-256 (p. 244).
163
‘’Nietzsche Toddy: Explosions — Implosions
he sees it as something of the past that has returned to haunt him; in this sense, he has 
recognized the dialectic for w hat it is and has laid it to rest, transcending thus the boundaries 
of what the West has hitherto defined as thought. And nonetheless he is aware that the 
dialectic cannot be laid to rest; he is in fact working on Thus Spoke Zarathustra at the time, and 
in the prophet who climbs he explores Hegel's return.
Although Nietzsche's concern with his position vis-a-vis the dialectic emerges all 
throughout his writing, he is seldom as explicit as in Ecce Homo, where he explains:
I am by nature warlike. To attack is among my instincts. To be able to be an 
enemy, to be an enemy -  that perhaps presupposes a strong nature, it is in any 
event a condition of every strong nature. It needs resistances, consequently it 
seeks resistances.. .16
Nietzsche has no doubt seen through the illusion that the modus operandi of the dialectic is 
reconciliation, and recognizes it for what it is: a war. In this sense, he certainly transcends the 
dialectical tradition; and yet, as he professes that the warfare at the heart of the dialectic is 
'natural' to him and prides himself on the fact that he depends on 'resistances', that is to say, 
on the interaction with the other, he acknowledges how much his thinking is steeped in 
dialectics. In the preamble, on the other hand, he seems to paint a different picture of his 
relationship to the dialectic, as he introduces his work with the words: 'And so I tell myself 
my life'.17 Ultimately, however, he describes thus only the same paradoxical situation. 
Nietzsche's announcement of a work written by himself, about himself and for himself - a 
work, in other words, which does not stipulate the other, except for the fact that it was 
designed for publication -  highlights the extent of his self-absorption. And it is precisely this 
self-absorption which places Nietzsche's thinking still within the dialectical system - at a
16 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, pp. 16-17.
17 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 7.
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point, however, when this system is actually no longer possible. The self-referentiality that 
Nietzsche displays here is indeed not only the worst obstacle of the dialectic but also its 
ultimate consequence, for the dialectic strives forever to annul the other. If self-referentiality 
is, thus, the final result of the dialectic, its actual occurrence in a philosophical work is 
indicative of the imminent implosion of the dialectical system of thought. In this sense, the 
unconventional style of Ecce Homo is not a symptom of Nietzsche's egomania and looming 
madness, on the contrary; Ecce Homo is an 'insane' work of philosophy only because it 
remains faithful to reason right up to its logical conclusion. And accordingly, Nietzsche's 
own collapse into madness, which anticipates the collapse of dialectical reason at large, does 
not mark his departure from reason; it proves, rather, his fundamental entanglement in 
dialectical reasoning even at the point of its implosion.
Nietzsche is the first thinker of the West to transcend the dialectical tradition because 
he is the first who thinks the dialectic to its logical conclusion. And precisely in this sense he 
thinks the end of the dialectic ultimately still on dialectical terms. His predicament in the 
intricacies of dialectical thinking is, indeed, such that he admits that he prefers the dashes in 
his writing to the thoughts he actually communicates.18 It is in the silences marked by these 
dashes that his thinking transcends the dialectic; and yet, Nietzsche ultimately remains 
within the realm of dialectical thought for he cannot represent what goes beyond dialectical 
thought other than in absences and silences. And it is precisely because his thinking occurs 
in the realm of dialectics that Nietzsche experiences the implosion of this system of thought 
as his own collapse. He has, indeed, long been aware of the fate that would await him in the 
realization of his thought. In 1883, he already knows himself to be in great danger from his
18 'Ob ich gleich recht gut weifi, dafi mir meine Gedankenstriche lieber sind als meine mitgetheilten Gedanken'. 
Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke. Kritische 
Gesamtausga.be, Vll/3: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Herbst 1884-Herbst 1885, p. 189.
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'all too concentrated nature7, which directs everything towards his very core;19 in this sense, 
he already knows at the time that the 'concentration7 of his nature is such that he is 
threatening to implode.
A more detailed picture of Nietzsche's view of his situation in the history of 
philosophy emerges as he notes:
A sick animal retires to its lair [Hohle]; so does la bete philosophe. [...] I am alone 
now, absurdly alone; and in the course of my relentless and underground 
struggle against everything that human beings till now have revered and loved 
... I have imperceptibly become something like a lair [Hohle] myself -  something 
hidden away, which people do not find, even if they go out and look for it.20
In this instance, Nietzsche actually admits that his thinking makes him suffer to the extent 
that he feels like retreating into a lair or a cave like a sick animal21 The German word Hohle 
could also connote a hollow;22 and it may be that Nietzsche betrays, thus, his hiding-place in 
the hollow at the centre of the dialectical system. It is, indeed, at the very heart of the 
dialectical system that he finds the place that offers him at least the possibility of respite from 
the dialectic. This position, however, is also the most perilous, for it spells certain death 
when the cave falls in. The imagery of the cave might suggest -  particularly in the German, 
where the word Hohle is much more evocative of Plato's Hohlengleichnis than in the English 
translation -  that Nietzsche describes his position in the history of philosophy as a
19 'Aber die Gefahr ist g ro fl. Ich bin eine allzu concentrirte Natur, und was mich auch trifft, bewegt sich nach 
meinem Mittelpunkte'. Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck (14 August 1883) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 428.
20 Nietzsche to Reinhart von Seydlitz (12 February 1888) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, p. 283, and in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 
1887-Januar 1889, p. 248.
21 The German word Hohle could also be translated as 'cave'. Scholze-Stubenrecht / Sykes et al (eds),
The Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, p. 395.
22 Scholze-Stubenrecht /  Sykes et al (eds), The Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, p. 395.
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conclusion to Plato's Simile of the Cave,23 albeit a very different one to Plato's version. In the 
terms of Plato's simile, Nietzsche is the prisoner who has at long last realized that the 
prisoners in the cave cannot simply 'be released from their bonds'24 and wander out; he 
knows that they will only see the light at the moment of their death, as the cave falls in. Thus, 
if Nietzsche heads furthest into the cave at the very point when it is about to collapse, he is in 
fact driven to his death by the very same quest for light and understanding that has spurred 
on all philosophers for the last two thousand years. What distinguishes Nietzsche from the 
other captives is only the fact that he has realized the full extent of their predicament in the 
cave and therefore knows how much his thinking is intertwined with his fate. As he grants 
that he has become something of a cave himself, he acknowledges that in thinking the 
implosion of the Western system of thought, he presupposes the implosion of his own 
thinking -  and thus, his own collapse. It is in this sense that Nietzsche not only understands 
but incorporates the predicament of dialectical thought like no other thinker of the West. And 
nonetheless, he has to think the end of the dialectic at the very heart of the dialectical system, 
for it is only at the centre of the dialectic that thinking is safe from dialectical reasoning, 
which cannot leave anything be except for the hollow at its core. In essence, Nietzsche's 
thinking constitutes, thus, the anti-dialectical principle taking hold at the heart of the 
dialectic,25 under the guise of madness and safe in the knowledge that it will not be found - 
or found out -  for a very long time.
♦ ♦ ♦
23 Plato, The Republic, p. 255-264.
24 Plato, The Republic, p. 257.
25 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
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The dilemmas of his philosophical position distress Nietzsche practically all throughout his 
creative life, but his correspondence suggests that he finally makes his peace with his lot 
about a year before his collapse, although it is at this time that the instances of 'madness' in 
his writing really proliferate. At the beginning of 1888, he starts referring to himself as 
'Nichtsthue/26 and 'Nichtsnutz',27 as a layabout and wastrel, which certainly seems odd given 
that he is actually in the most productive phase of his life. The apparent contradiction could, 
however, indicate that Nietzsche is as creative as never before in his life precisely because as 
a self-professed layabout, he has now ceased to work in the dialectical sense. Similarly, it 
seems strange that Nietzsche, who has complained of ill health more or less obviously 
induced by his thinking for most of his life, should start to praise his good health28 at the very 
point when his writing suggests that he is indeed on the brink of madness. What may seem 
like yet more evidence of his delusional state reveals, however, that in the last few months of 
his creative life, Nietzsche has accepted that his thinking will only be completed by the 
giving-in of his sanity and of dialectical reason in general. And as he no longer perceives the 
impending implosion of the dialectical system as a threat, he no longer perceives his role in it 
as an aberration and an illness; in fact, in his new-found good health he now celebrates the 
fact that his imminent collapse is conducive to and even necessary for the realization of his 
thinking.
The continuing proliferation of 'madness' in Nietzsche's writing at a time when he 
seems to come to terms with his position in the history of philosophy is thus not a
26 Nietzsche to Georg Brandes (27 March 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, III/5: 
Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 279.
27 Nietzsche to Elisabeth Nietzsche (31 March 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, 
m/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 281.
28 ‘Zu aller Beruhigung will ich von mir selber soviel sagen, dajl mein Befinden ausgezeichnet ist, von einer 
Festigkeit und Geduld, wie ich in meinem ganzen friiheren Leben keine Stunde gehabt habe...’. Nietzsche to 
Elisabeth Nietzsche (draft; mid-November 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, 
III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 474.
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contradiction; it shows, rather, that he does not reconcile himself to the inevitable implosion 
of reason in a dialectical manner. In these final months, he embraces his paradoxical situation 
only to the extent that he embraces madness as the ultimate consequence of reason. And 
finally, he proclaims:
For 4 days I have lost the capacity to show a staid seriousness in my face -
I think in this state one is ready to be the 'world-redeemer'? .. .29
It would be easy, too easy perhaps, to read this claim to world-redemption as the 
culmination of Nietzsche's egomania and the decisive proof of his madness. But in 
suggesting that he is ready to redeem the world now that he can no longer even muster a 
reasonable expression, Nietzsche actually announces that he has finally transcended the 
dialectical life and is therefore ready to commit the last -  and the ultimate -  deed of the 
dialectical era. The dialectic seeks, for all its pretensions to the contrary, in its interactions 
with the other only returns; in this sense, it always aspires to redemption, which is in essence 
a dialectical act. It is no coincidence that the Christian god sent his son on earth as 'the 
Redeemer' -  to return, that is, the stake that god had put on man. And even if the Christian 
belief is that he redeemed mankind by purchasing their freedom, this is in fact the only stake 
that Christ redeems -  for w hat is freedom once it is and has to be purchased? When 
Nietzsche, however, announces himself as the 'world-redeemer', it is not to put himself on a 
par with Christ and especially not in his capacity as the founder of the 'Platonism for the 
people'30 that is Christianity -  on the contrary. Nietzsche redeems not the stake that god put 
on man but the stake that man put on god; thus, he redeems the world not in the way Christ 
had done, but precisely in the opposite sense. If Christ's redemption was the first dialectical
29 'Ich habe 4 Tage lang die Moglichkeit verloren, einen gesetzten Ernst in mein Gesicht zu bringen -  Ich denke, 
mit einem solchen Zustand ist man reif zum 'Welt-Erldser'? Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz (25 
November 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: 
Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 489.
30 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 32.
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deed, Nietzsche's redemption of the world will be the last. Man has been at god's whim ever 
since he was expelled from paradise, and he became only further indebted to god when god 
sacrificed his son to redeem him from this fate. In this sense, Christ's redemption actually 
made of man even more of a slave. And in order for man to truly free himself of his slavery, 
he will have to risk his life and redeem the stake he put on god to save him. The situation of 
the dialectical slave is such that his liberation cannot be achieved without him risking his life, 
for, Koj&ve explains,
... what made Man a Slave was his refusal to risk his life. Hence he will not cease 
to be a Slave, as long as he is not ready to risk his life in a Fight against the 
Master, as long as he does not accept the idea of his death. A liberation without a 
bloody Fight, therefore, is metaphysically impossible.31
In his relationship to the Christian god, man has indeed never risked his life; he always 
tacitly accepts his fate at the hand of god and actually counts on god to risk and to sacrifice 
his life/or him. It is this stake that Nietzsche seeks to redeem; and in order to free the slavish 
dialectical civilization from its debt to god he has to risk his life as no dialectician and no 
Christian has yet done. The first man had preferred life -  any life -  over death; therefore, he 
accepted his expulsion from paradise and became god's slave on earth. Indeed, god's slaves 
on earth preferred life, and any life, over death until god showed them in the death of Christ 
a truly human death. Christ sacrificed his biological but not his human life. He remained 
human even in his death, in that he died like no animal could -  he died knowingly, willingly 
and following his father's orders; he died for a cause. He did not simply value his life over 
death, but actually rated his father's reasons and his father's reasoning for his death over and 
above life. In a sense, Christ is putting his life at risk as a master would; and yet, in this very 
death, he remains in essence a slave: a slave to his father's command and to his father's 
cause. In order to redeem mankind from this slavery, Nietzsche also has to sacrifice his life,
31 Kojdve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 56.
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but if he were to sacrifice his biological life, as Christ had done, he would just bow to god's 
supreme mastery once again. Indeed, Nietzsche sacrifices not his biological but his human 
life: that is, his life as a rational and reasonable being. Thus, he pays god back in kind; he 
returns the 'understanding' and the 'knowledge' that god had placed in man and redeems in 
turn also the stake that man has put on god when he made him the guarantor of reason and 
the centre of meaning. And in freeing mankind from its enslavement by reason, Nietzsche 
commits the last -  and the ultimate -  rational, reasonable and dialectical deed. Just weeks 
before his collapse, he concludes the most autobiographical of his works and, it seems, his 
life as a philosopher with the curious epitaph:
-  Have I been understood? -  Dionysos against the Crucified.. .32
This cryptic line at the end of Ecce Homo certainly seems like a sign of Nietzsche's madness, 
and it is an announcement of madness, if, for lack of a better term, his sacrifice of reason is to 
be called thus. Not least in its anticipation of madness, however, this phrase is also the 
clearest and most explicit statement Nietzsche makes about his path, his task and his 
position in the history of thought. In his self-description as 'Dionysos against the Crucified', he 
implies that he can be properly understood only as the antidote to Christ, as the redeemer of 
the redeemer, who freed the world from the grasp of reason. And in this self-description, he 
who has already professed 'a  subtler sense for signs of ascent and decline than any man has 
ever had', because he knows himself to be both,33 testifies to his philosophical position at the 
turning point between ascent and decline, between auf- and nieder-, between the explosive 
success of the dialectical age and its tragic implosion.
32 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 104.
33 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 8.
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Infinite Explosions; On Exploring and Exploding Nietzsche
Nietzsche's predicament on the verges of reason is such that, in order to describe his 
philosophical position, he has to descend into madness; hence, he cannot give a rational 
account of his situation. His writing, however, clearly conveys the fact -  if not the nature -  of 
his dilemma. In this light it is nothing short of astonishing that Nietzsche, so obviously 
perturbed by the ambiguity of his thought, should have come to be read almost unanimously 
as a thinker -  and as the thinker -  of explosion. Most commentators discern in Nietzsche's 
thinking a sense of explosion, even if they do not affix the label explicitly; and in the works 
of Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski, Jacques Derrida and Sarah Kofman, the theme of 
explosion certainly pervades some of the most prominent readings of Nietzsche.
All of Bataille's writing betrays Nietzsche's influence on his thinking, but the true 
extent of Nietzsche's presence in his life and thought emerges in his work On Nietzsche. 
Bataille, who has been credited with disentangling Nietzsche's thinking from National 
Socialism and introducing it to a wider audience,34 believes himself to be closer to Nietzsche 
than to anybody else, to the extent that he claims that his 'company on earth is mostly 
Nietzsche'.35 And conversely, he reads Nietzsche in the conviction that he is more akin to 
Nietzsche than any other thinker at the time. 'Deliberately discarding Nietzsche's most well- 
known themes (the will to power and eternal return)',36 he aims not so much for an 
interpretation as an experience of Nietzsche's thought; in fact, he explains his approach thus:
Nietzsche did experience some kind of ecstasy and said as much ... I wanted to 
arrive at an understanding of the 'Nietzschean experience'. I imagine Nietzsche
34 Cf. Sylv&re Lotringer, 'Furiously Nietzschean' in: Bataille, On Nietzsche, translated by Bruce Boon 
(London: Athlone, 2000), pp. vii-xv (p. vii).
35 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 3.
36 Lotringer, 'Furiously Nietzschean' in: Bataille, On Nietzsche, pp. vii-xv (p. x).
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as having in mind these ... "mystical states' in passages in which he speaks of a 
divine.37
In the experience of 'ecstasy' or of a 'divine', Bataille perceives the possibility of transcending 
dialectical reason and returning to the 'general economy' of life.38 But whilst he clearly 
discerns in Nietzsche's thinking the propensity for bursting out of the constrictions of 
dialectical reason, Bataille does not read Nietzsche's thinking as the explosion of the 
dialectical system on the whole. In Nietzsche's transgressions of the boundaries of reason, 
Bataille sees, rather, temporary movements between the restricted human economy and the 
general economy of life. In this concern with transgression, excess and hence with economy, 
Bataille's reading of Nietzsche remains in essence grounded in dialectics and indeed, as 
Derrida argues, in a form of Hegelianism.39 And it is precisely because his reading leaves 
Nietzsche in the realm of the dialectic that Bataille sees in Nietzsche's thinking an explosive 
force, for ultimately he reads in it still the explosive principle of the dialectic -  epitomized 
and enforced, however, to its very limits and often beyond recognition. In Bataille's 
interpretation, Nietzsche's thinking is, thus, essentially explosive and unreservedly 
explosive, but nonetheless never explosive enough to break with the dialectical tradition.
In Klossowski's work on Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Nietzsche is depicted as much 
more methodical a thinker than he appears in Bataille's reading, but he is also more explicitly 
presented as a thinker of explosion. In the sense that Klossowski believes that Nietzsche's
collapse would never have occurred if the seduction exerted by Chaos -  that is, 
by incoherence -  had not still and always been present in Nietzsche,40
37 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 174.
38 Cf. Bataille, The Accursed Share, I: Consumption, pp. 19-41.
39 Cf. Derrida, 'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve' in: Writing and 
Difference, translated by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 317-350.
40 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, translated by Daniel W. Smith (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 220.
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he grants that the dissolution of Western philosophy had always been imminent in 
Nietzsche's thinking. And if, as Klossowski points out, this drive towards chaos is still 
present in Nietzsche's thinking at the time of his collapse, it would seem that his thinking is 
not completed until the final dissolution of Western thought. With the laughter in 
Nietzsche's thinking, Klossowski argues,
... all identities explode, including Nietzsche's. What also exploded was the
meaning that things can have or lose for other things.41
Similarly, Klossowski claims that in the 'Euphoria of Turin' which marked the last days 
before his collapse, Nietzsche adopted 'tivo perspectives that stemmed from the confrontation 
established in Ecce Homo: Dionysos versus the Crucified',*2 and that he 'chose the physiognomy 
of Christ to mask the loss of his own identity'.43 And in the sense that Klossowski reads in 
Nietzsche's thinking the shattering not only of Nietzsche's own identity but of the concept of 
identity at large, he presents Nietzsche as an unambiguously explosive thinker, who effaces 
the premises of Western philosophy.
Derrida's article 'Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche /  Heidegger): Two Questions' 
makes of the explosive character of Nietzsche's thinking much more central a theme than it is 
in Bataille's or in Klossowski's reading, where it actually remains implicit. Aiming to 
extricate Nietzsche's thinking from Heidegger's, Derrida asks whether 'it is correct to say, as 
Heidegger so positively claims, that this thinking is one' and 'that Nietzsche ... has only one
41 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 252.
42 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 234.
43 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 233.
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name'.44 And against Heidegger, who saw 'a  unity in Nietzschean thought even if it is not 
that of a system in the classical sense7 and argued that this 'unity is also its uniqueness, its 
singularity',45 Derrida suggests reading Nietzsche as 'one of the few great thinkers who 
multiplied his names and played with signatures, identities, and masks', and 'named himself 
more than once, with several nam es'46 Heidegger, Derrida argues, 'wants to save Nietzsche 
at any cost ... from ambiguity', but for Derrida it is precisely 'this rescue, which must be 
called into question in the name or names of Nietzsche'47 This, he argues, is
the Streitfall or the Auseinandersetzung between the Nietzsches and Martin 
Heidegger, between the Nietzsches and so-called ... Western metaphysics. Since 
Aristotle, and at least up to Bergson, 'it7 (metaphysics) has constantly repeated 
and assumed that to think and to say must mean to think and say something that 
would be a one, one matter. And that not thinking-saying some one matter or 
principle is not thinking-saying at all, but a loss of the logos. Here is perhaps what 
the Nietzsches have put in question: the legein of this logos, the gathering of this 
logic.48
If Nietzsche's thinking disperses the logos, as Derrida suggests, it sparks no doubt the 
explosion of Western philosophy. At the same time, however, Derrida's argument implies 
that in order for Nietzsche to be recognized -  and recognizable -  as the thinker of explosion, 
instead of being taken for yet another philosopher with only one thought, his thinking has 
yet to explode Heidegger's mould. And to this effect, he sets about defending Nietzsche 
against Heidegger's reading, arguing that the 'idea of the eternal recurrence ... is not a
44 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche /  Heidegger): Two Questions', translated by Diane 
Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, in: Daniel W. Conway (ed.), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments 
(London: Routledge, 1998), i: Incipit Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia: Art, Music, Representation, and 
Style, pp. 109-123 (p. 118).
45 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 110).
46 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 118).
47 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 118).
48 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (pp. 118-119).
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thought about totality', although Heidegger presents it as such,49 and that Nietzsche is 'not at 
all a thinker of beings, if ... an essential connection exists between beings as such and 
totality'.50 Having accused Heidegger of not entirely legitimately trying to rescue Nietzsche 
from himself, Derrida embarks thus on rescuing Nietzsche from Heidegger in a similarly 
ambiguous gesture. This attempt at freeing Nietzsche from Heidegger's mould, however, 
only reduces Nietzsche's thinking further; for ultimately Derrida implies, thus, that even as 
the thinker of explosion, Nietzsche requires his -  Derrida's -  assistance just to rid himself of 
Heidegger's grasp. In this sense, Derrida's reading depicts Nietzsche as an essentially 
explosive thinker, who has, however, thus far been contained by the Western tradition in 
philosophy. The 'explosive' aspect of Nietzsche's thinking is, in Derrida's eyes, that 
Nietzsche is not a thinker of totality and 'by no means trusts any thought of totality',51 but it 
is, he adds, 'also worth noting that it is life-death which deprives the value of totality of any 
privileged status'.52 And precisely in this sense, Derrida's argument reveals that it is the 
dialectic itself that threatens the totality it aspires to -  for is not life-death the mode of 
dialectical existence and the only form of life that the dialectic tolerates? The dispersion of 
totality that Derrida discerns in Nietzsche's thinking is indeed still a dialectical phenomenon; 
it is the dialectic eroding its own premises and falling back upon itself: in short, it is the 
implosion of the dialectic. And thus it seems that Nietzsche cannot escape his fate even with 
Derrida's assistance. For all Derrida's efforts at defending the 'explosive' quality of 
Nietzsche's thinking and at actually helping Nietzsche explode, even Derrida's own
49 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 120).
50 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 121).
51 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (p. 120).
52 Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures' in: Conway (ed), Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, I: Incipit 
Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia, pp. 109-123 (pp. 121-122).
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interpretation of Nietzsche evokes a sense that Nietzsche's thinking describes the implosion of 
the dialectical system.
Of the renowned commentators on Nietzsche, it is Sarah Kofman who most explicitly 
labels the impact of Nietzsche's thinking as explosion -  and indeed, as a series of 
explosions.53 In the sense that she states explicitly what her predecessors had implied, her 
work actually transcends the critique of Nietzsche's thought and highlights the fact that 
Nietzsche scholarship has hitherto been dominated by one particular interpretation. The 
picture that Kofman draws of Nietzsche himself is, in fact, not even that of a thinker as 
insanely explosive as he is for Bataille or as essentially explosive as he is for Derrida. She 
ascribes the explosive nature of Nietzsche's writing to the myriad of themes and topics that 
she sees in it; and indeed, whilst most readers discover many facets to Nietzsche's thought, 
few discern as many as she does. In the sense that her reading diversifies the significance of 
Nietzsche's thinking, it seems that she, too, challenges the status of totality in Western 
philosophy after Nietzsche and infers that traditional concepts of identity and meaning have 
been shattered. Although she speaks of Nietzsche's books as his 'children'54 and in this sense 
points to the nature of his writing as bringing forth, she ultimately reads his thinking as the 
anticipation of the explosion in which it finally culminates. Nietzsche, she suggests, explodes 
in many different ways; most significantly, however, his explosion is a question of sanity or 
madness. In Ecce Homo, she argues, he is
... recounting to himself that he is not mad and that at the very moment he is 
planning to blow up the entire earth he is not himself in the process of exploding 
-  of shattering into a thousand figures with no link or unity.55
53 The two volumes of Kofman's work on Nietzsche are entitled Explosion I and Explosion II.
54 The second volume of Kofman's work on Nietzsche is entitled Explosion II: Les enfants de Nietzsche 
(Paris: Galilee, 1993).
55 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 59.
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She concludes, however, that whilst
... in a certain defensive gesture, Nietzsche still attempts to save himself from 
what the serious and reasonable man calls a 'mad' dispersal, by emphasizing 
what properly belongs to him and by still dividing up the 'central' from the 
'eccentric', on the other hand he takes no care at all to avoid exploding all the 
time.56
In this light, it seems that Kofman presumes as the modus operandi of Nietzsche's thinking the 
essentially dialectical principle of the controlled explosion, in which the centre and the unity 
of the centre is always restored. And no wonder that Nietzsche takes no care to avoid 
exploding all the time, if the premise of his explosions is that his identity is always restored. It 
is, indeed, not only in this respect that Kofman's reading grounds Nietzsche in the tradition 
of dialectical thought. She observes that '[b]efore reaching his height', Nietzsche
... had to take numerous byroads and multiple masks: for example, that of a 
philologist,57
and emphasizes, thus, that it was on the dialectical path via the other that Nietzsche came 
into his own as a thinker. On the other hand, however, she also recognizes Nietzsche's 
distrust of the other and his attempts at protecting himself from it, as she argues that 
Nietzsche's
first rule ... during periods of creation and intense work is to disallow [him] self 
all manner of reading. This is a protective measure similar to the one pregnant 
[enceintes] women take in order to prevent all harmful contact to the child they 
carry in their womb, a truly protective enclosure [enceinte].58
56 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 61.
57 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 57.
58 'La premiere regie a suivre est, durant les periodes de creation et de travail intense, de s'interdire toute lecture.
C'est la une mesure de protection analogue a celle que prennent les femmes enceintes pour eviter tout contact
nocif a I'enfant qu'elles portent dans leur ventre, veritable enceinte protectrice'. Kofman, Explosion I: De 
V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche (Paris: Galilee, 1992), p. 302.
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In the sense that Kofman compares Nietzsche's situation to the state of pregnancy, she 
certainly seems to be aware of the nature of Nietzsche's thought -  and yet she immediately 
evokes another image: for, playing on the homonym 'enceinte', she speaks also of an 
enclosure, a protective wall.59 At this point, the emphasis in her imagery shifts significantly; 
for the metaphor of a safe enclosure conjures up connotations of dialectical safe-keeping 
much more than of bringing forth. And ultimately, Kofman's interpretation implies that by 
denying himself all reading and thus guarding himself against the other, Nietzsche ensures 
only that he will eventually explode all the more powerfully.60 In this sense, too, she reads in 
Nietzsche's drinking moments of guarding, protecting and preserving which pertain to the 
essence of dialectical Aufhebung. Ultimately, it is the fact that she reads Nietzsche in economic 
terms that gives her interpretation of his work a decidedly dialectical tenor. She actually 
suggests that Nietzsche himself describes his thinking in economic terms, as she argues that 
in Nietzsche's thinking genius is, not least in relation to himself,
... given an economic definition; it is characterized by the explosion of an 
enormous quantity of retained forces. The genius is not a particularly brilliant 
spirit, he is dynamite.61
If genius was an economic phenomenon, as Kofman suggests, it would be found in the self­
destructive nihilism of dialectics; indeed, the barter principle at the heart of the dialectic 
would be its epitome. This is an inherently absurd definition and it certainly is not one that 
Nietzsche actually subscribes to. Whenever he speaks of distinction, he speaks -  often very 
controversially -  of type, of breed and of race; he is, in short, concerned with distinctions not 
of degree, but of kind. And by the very fact that he makes categorical and not economical
59 Georges Pilard et al (eds), Harrap's Shorter Dictionary (Chambers Harrap: Edinburgh, 2000), p. 338.
60 Cf. Kofman, Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 365.
61 '... le genie regoit chez Nietzsche une definition economique; il est caracterise par Vexplosion d'une enorme 
quantite deforces retenue. Le genie n'est pas un esprit particulierement genial, il est de la dynamite'. Kofman, 
Explosion 1: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 297.
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distinctions, his thinking differs from dialectical thought, which does not tolerate the other as 
such and in this sense does not allow for distinctions of kind. In this respect, Nietzsche's 
thinking certainly transcends the dialectical tradition, even if Kofman's interpretation of it 
does not give this impression. Her reading evokes, no doubt, a sense that Nietzsche's 
thinking approaches the limits of thinking itself, but she does not imply that Nietzsche 
transcends what has hitherto been defined as thinking -  at least not until his final explosion. 
She acknowledges that thinking in the West has reached the stage where it can only refer to 
itself as she points out that in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche 'addresses only himself' and 'recounts 
"himself" to "himself"';62 but in her eyes, Nietzsche's thinking does not transcend this 
ultimate impasse of the dialectic. In fact, she describes Nietzsche's thinking even at its most 
poignantly decisive as a 'recounting' and in this sense still in dialectical terms. Accordingly, 
she sees in Ecce Homo
... first of all a work of mourning -  and in this sense a thanatography -  in which 
Nietzsche buries himself several times over so as to be able to be reborn to 
himself and reappropriate himself: ... he attempts to divide up what in him 
properly belongs to 'him ' and what were just borrowed masks, hiding places, 
more or less demeaning figureheads, occasionally aberrant detours, in order to 
achieve his unity and his center and to transform himself into a destiny.63
Since Kofman reveals in the introduction to Explosion I that she reads Nietzsche's 
autobiography as 'a  work of mourning', it seems almost as if the premise of her analysis is 
that Nietzsche's thinking, insofar as it is mourning, is -  and remains -  in essence dialectical. 
To be sure, she also recognizes anti-dialectical moments in his thought as she describes him 
being bom and reborn in his thinking, but she does not dwell on the image of birth, 
Niederkunft, returning instead to the essentially dialectical terminology of 'reappropriation'. 
In Kofman's eyes, Nietzsche's thinking may indeed have anti-dialectical moments, but it
62 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 56.
63 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 58.
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always returns to the dialectical order -  at least until his final explosion. And ultimately, she 
questions the extent of his madness even then; for she
... cannot avoid thinking that Nietzsche's 'madness' is also, like Hamlet's, the last
mask he wears so as not to die of the 'truth': 'for we are all afraid of the truth' . 64
Unlike the dialecticians, however, Nietzsche is not afraid of the truth; hence, he is the first 
thinker who sees the dialectic for what it is and recognizes that dialectical truths are always 
manufactured and therefore fictional. This is the truth of which he dies: he dies of the 
realization that thinking -  dialectical thinking -  can never grasp and certainly not produce 
the truth. Strictly speaking, however, Nietzsche dies only as human being, for he loses not 
his life but his senses -  collapsing, thus, into the essentially dialectical state of the living- 
dead. In this sense, his fate simply describes the implosion of dialectical reason. As Nietzsche 
clearly reveals this to be madness, however, he actually transcends the limits of dialectical 
thought, which is blind to its own essence, and from within the crumbling system of 
dialectics illustrates that dialectical reason, taken to its conclusion, is madness. In this light, 
Kofman's reading certainly trivializes Nietzsche's thinking and indeed highlights that 
reading his thinking as explosion always trivializes it; for this approach implies that he does 
not transcend the dialectic in his thinking itself but escapes the order of the dialectic only in 
his death. Thus it is that the prevailing interpretation of Nietzsche's thought makes of his 
death the dispersion rather than the bringing-forth, the Niederkunft, of meaning. In the light 
of these implications, it is all the more remarkable that the tradition of portraying Nietzsche 
as the thinker of explosion has not been seriously questioned to date. In fact, it is 
questionable even on its own terms, for if Nietzsche's thinking were such that it could only 
be read as explosion and if it would therefore allow for only one interpretation, there would
64 'On ne peut done eviter de penser que la folie' de Nietzsche serait, elle aussi, comme celle d'Hamlet, le dernier 
masque qu'il revet pour ne pas mourir de la "verite": "car nous avons tous peur de la verity"'. Kofman, 
Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 330.
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be nothing Explosive' about it at all. Hence, reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion 
clearly cannot do it justice; in fact, this approach explodes him first and foremost in the less 
common sense of the term: it derides his life and thought.
Implosion and Return: The Peculiar Topography of Nietzsche's Influence
The tradition of reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion, which prevails in Nietzsche 
scholarship today, certainly says less about Nietzsche's thinking than it does about the 
situation of his commentators in the dialectical age. It may seem strange that this tradition 
could have established itself at all, given that some of the earliest reactions to Nietzsche 
depict his thinking not solely as explosion, but ultimately the fact that it flourished precisely 
by containing any other approach only testifies to its dialectical nature. Even today, it is in 
contradistinction to some of the earliest readings that the essentially reductive quality of 
reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion emerges at its most perspicuous. Deleuze, for one, 
draws a more complex and ambiguous picture of Nietzsche's thinking, although he, too, 
discerns in it a certain dispersion of meaning. 'Nietzsche's philosophy', he argues,
cannot be understood without taking its essential pluralism into account. [...]
The Gods are dead but they have died from laughing, on hearing one God claim 
to be the only one... And the death of this God, who claimed to be the only one, 
is itself plural; the death of God is an event with a multiple sense. [...] There is no 
event, no phenomenon, word or thought which does not have a multiple sense. A 
thing is sometimes this, sometimes that, sometimes something more complicated 
-  depending on the forces (the gods) which take possession of it.65
In this description of the dispersal of meaning in Nietzsche's thought, Deleuze does actually 
come close to evoking the image of an 'explosion' of reason. He certainly reads Nietzsche
65 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 4.
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against Hegel and against the dialectic, and indeed more so than many of those who 
explicitly portray Nietzsche's thought as the explosion of the dialectical system. Although he 
maintains that 'Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge',66 
Deleuze, however, does not present Nietzsche's thinking as the explosion of the dialectical 
system, but as its antidote. He concludes that
Nietzsche's 'yes' is opposed to the dialectical 'no'; affirmation to dialectical 
negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical 
labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical responsibilities,67
and emphasizes, thus, that Nietzsche's thinking is profoundly anti-dialectical -  without, 
however, implying that it therefore seeks to annihilate the dialectical system. Indeed, if 
Nietzsche's thinking were aimed at annihilating the dialectic, it would not be dissimilar to the 
dialectic, which forever strives to annihilate the other. In this sense, Nietzsche's position vis- 
a-vis the dialectic is essentially asymmetric; he is the thinker of the anti-dialectical principle 
precisely because his thought does not oppose the dialectic, but differs from it in the same way 
that '[njegation is opposed to affirmation but affirmation differs from negation'.68 As 
Nietzsche's thinking maintains, thus, a perspective other than that of the dialectic, it can 
indeed give new meaning to the world. To this effect, it exposes the truth of the dialectic, 
which the dialectical age had never been able or even willing to see and revaluates the 
dialectical system of thought accordingly. What had been taken for the key to absolute 
knowledge and 'immaculate perception', as Nietzsche satirizes, is revealed as a dogmatic 
and totalitarian doctrine, more jealous even than the Christian god of all other deities. And 
yet, Nietzsche does not annihilate it, for in his thought of eternal return the dialectic will no 
doubt return along with everything else. In Zarathustra, he actually describes Hegel's
66 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 8.
67 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 9.
68 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 188.
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reincarnation and illustrates, thus, the nature of the asymmetrical relationship between his 
thinking and Hegel's dialectics. In fact, in thinking Hegel's reincarnation as Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche shows that he has not obliterated Hegel, but that he gave him an altogether new 
meaning. On the whole, Deleuze's reading emphasizes, indeed, not so much what 
Nietzsche's thinking destroys as the meanings it creates; thus, he presents it in a very 
different light to those who read it as the explosion of the Western tradition. And 
consequently, he grants it far broader an impact on the history of thought than it could have 
if it was simply the explosion of this tradition. Indeed, Deleuze reveals how Nietzsche's 
thinking creates a new hum an relationship with god and how he who always laid claim to 
the 'revaluation of all values' arrives at an entirely new definition of the human.
♦ ♦ ♦
It is Heidegger's reading, however, which to date provides the most perspicuous account of 
Nietzsche's situation on the verge of the dialectical age. Dialectics has characterized 
philosophy since Socrates and Plato, and even though it professes an interest in the other and 
in every other and claims that all its energy is directed outwards, it ultimately never amounts 
to anything but acquisition. For all its interest in the other, it never considers the other as 
such; and all its expenditure is only a bargaining for a greater return. In truth, the dialectic 
proceeds as the concentration upon itself and towards its own implosion. Heidegger, who 
reads in Nietzsche's work the culmination and the end of Western thought,69 locates his 
thinking at the point at which the dialectical age has exhausted itself and in the return to its 
commencement70 entails also the possibility of 'another beginning'.71 Although he does not
69 Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p. 8.
70 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 198-206.
71 Heidegger, Nietzsche, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, p . 8.
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use the term per se, his interpretation of Nietzsche's position as the last one that is possible in 
the history of Western metaphysics72 certainly evokes a sense that this system of thought is 
proceeding towards its implosion. And Heidegger does not only read the implosion of 
Western philosophy in and perhaps even into Nietzsche's thinking; he actually approaches 
Nietzsche's thinking such that it implodes and reduces to just one fundamental thought. The 
fact that he actively effects the implosion of Nietzsche's body of thought has, indeed, been 
criticized, particularly by those who read Nietzsche's thinking as explosion. Derrida and 
Kofman both suspect in Heidegger's reduction of Nietzsche's thinking an attempt to protect 
Nietzsche73 -  with all the dialectical connotations that this 'safekeeping' entails. Heidegger, 
however, readily explains that he seeks not the protection of but die confrontation with 
Nietzsche, as this is 'the supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker'74 And 
as he overtly seeks confrontation, he already differentiates his approach from a dialectical 
one, which would lay claim to reconciliation. Indeed, in the sense that Heidegger describes 
what his confrontation with Nietzsche brings forth, the tenor of his reading is one of 
Niederkunft much more than one of Aufhebung. In the very act of reducing Nietzsche to the 
last metaphysician, he accentuates the meaning, the implications and the consequences of 
Nietzsche's thought -  and did not Nietzsche himself suggest that in order to grasp his 
thinking, one would have to create something from it?75
The fact that Heidegger's interpretation reduces Nietzsche's thinking has been the 
main criticism levelled against it; indeed, it seems that other differences notwithstanding, the 
various critiques of his work hinge practically unanimously on this point. It certainly
72 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 205.
73 Cf. Derrida, 'Interpreting Signatures', p. 118, and Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo',
p. 66.
74 Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 4.
75 Cf. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, p. 9.
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provides the grounds for both Derrida's and Kofman's criticism -  as well as of Bataille's, 
although Bataille seems to reproach Heidegger not for trying to protect Nietzsche as Derrida 
and Kofman do but, on the contrary, for sacrificing the truth of his thinking in the name of an 
analytic dissection. And yet, despite their obvious differences, they all agree on the charge 
that Heidegger reduces Nietzsche's thinking almost beyond recognition. Kofman asks, thus:
If [Heidegger] dreams of effacing from the 'thought' of 'Nietzsche' all traces of 
desire, laughter, 'eccentricity', buffoonery, carnivalesque multiplicity, is it not 
because all this can have no place in a logos which is supposed to be a gathering 
together and a unifying -  because all this is too explosive and dazzling? Is it not 
because Nietzsche, if one understands him other than as an 'essential thinker', 
precisely blows up -  along with the subject and Being, which are reduced by him 
to mere names or metaphysical fictions .. .?76
The argument that Heidegger deprives Nietzsche's thinking of all its unconventionality is no 
doubt a valid criticism, but Heidegger never actually denies that his reading is reductive; he 
introduces it as a lecture course on only one book, The Will to Power,77 and acknowledges that 
he is interested only in Nietzsche's 'conventional' metaphysical thought. And conversely, 
reading Nietzsche's thinking as explosion, as Kofman herself does, is also a reduction of it, 
and ultimately more categorical a reduction, for however reductive Heidegger may be in his 
approach to Nietzsche, the implications that his reading evokes are enormous. Somewhat 
paradoxically, it seems indeed that read as one fundamental thought, Nietzsche's thinking 
generates a multitude of meanings, whereas read as explosion in one way or another, it 
always remains just that: the explosion of all meaning. In this light, the prevalent view that a 
reductive approach to reading Nietzsche does not do his thinking justice certainly seems 
problematic. And more specifically, Kofman's criticism of Heidegger is actually questionable 
even on her own terms; for if, as she points out, 'being faithful to Nietzsche does not mean
76 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 68.
77 Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 3.
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doing as he does, writing as he does7,78 there is no reason why the fact that Heidegger reads 
Nietzsche against the grain would impair his loyalty to Nietzsche's thinking. Those who 
read Nietzsche's thinking as explosion, on the other hand, always seem to imply that their 
interpretation is faithful to Nietzsche precisely because they are doing as he does; and thus, 
they are in fact implying that Nietzsche himself saw his thinking as explosion. There are 
indeed instances in his writing which seem to lend themselves to this view, but ultimately 
the image of explosion is always ambiguous in Nietzsche's work. On one occasion, he 
describes this much-loathed brother-in-law as an explosive,79 which, given that he always 
emphasizes their essential differences, seems to indicate that he does not think of himself in 
these terms. Yet, elsewhere he does not object to his thinking being compared to explosives; 
indeed, he proudly quotes from an article in the Bund newspaper, which concludes that his 
thinking constitutes 'dynamite'. The wording of the statement that 'here lies dynamite',80 
however, highlights that the image points to a concentration -  and not to a dispersion -  of 
forces in Nietzsche's thinking. And similarly, when Nietzsche declares in Ecce Homo: 'I am 
dynamite',81 he draws attention to an immense concentration in his thinking and illustrates 
that although it has the potential to explode, his thinking is actually aimed to counteract the 
essentially dialectical goal of explosion. Nietzsche's own understanding of the momentum of 
his thinking emerges most clearly, perhaps, as he explains:
By the way, the whole Zarathastra is an explosion of forces, which have
accumulated for decades: in such explosions, the instigator can easily be blown
78 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, translated by Duncan Large (London: Athlone, 1993), p. 2.
79 7m Ubrigen thut es mir wohl, noch einmal mit meinen Angehdrigen zusammen zu sein: der ‘ Sprengstoff, in 
Gestalt des Dr. Forster, wird uns ja in Kurzem recht hiibsch iiber die ganze Erde hin auseinander treiben'. 
Nietzsche to Heinrich Koselitz (22 September 1885) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, 
m/3: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1885-Dezember 1886, p. 93.
80 ‘Hi e r  l i e g t  D y n a m i t ! '  Nietzsche to Malwida vonMeysenbug (24September 1886) in: Colli/  
Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m/3: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1885-Dezember 1886, p. 258 (my 
italics).
81 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 96.
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up himself [in die Luft gehen]. [...] You have an extremely dangerous friend; and the 
worst about him is the extent to which he can restrain himself.82
It is not himself but Zarathustra that Nietzsche describes here as an explosion of forces, 
although he grants that as Zarathustra's creator, he may well be blown up in this explosion, 
too. In this sense, Nietzsche acknowledges that he is not striving to explode but that he is 
actually trying to avoid being blown up alongside the prophet he created. And in the other 
sense o f ' in die Luft gehen', he is also trying to avoid going up into the air in the manner of all 
dialectics; he is trying to avoid vanishing into thin air as Hegel did, when he wanted to 
become god, and as Zarathustra, the prophet who forever climbs, is already threatening to 
do, too. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche portrays not a faithful son, but an antidote to himself; and 
conversely, he thus depicts himself as the antidote to all dialectics: as one who descends, 
where the dialecticians climb, and who implodes, where they explode. He admits to his 
friend Overbeck that he is dangerous -  not because he is explosive but, on the contrary, 
because of the extent to which he can hold back and concentrate his forces. In Nietzsche's own 
view, the dangerous aspect of his thinking is, thus, not its 'explosive' character, but the fact 
that it anticipates the end and the reversal of the explosive progress of the dialectic. In a 
similarly ambiguous image, Nietzsche describes his thinking as philosophizing 'with the 
hammer', by which he means that he aims
to tap all things with the hammer to hear whether or not they yield that familiar 
hollow sound, to ask whether there is still solidity and weight in things or 
whether every possible center of gravity has vanished from them. That is what 
Nietzsche's thought wants to achieve: it wants to give things weight and 
importance again.83
82 ‘Ubrigens ist der g a n z e  Zarathustra eine Explosion von Krdften, die Jahrzehende lange sich aufgehduft 
haben: bei solchen Explosionen kann der Urheber leicht selber mit in die Luft gehen. [...] Du hast einen 
duf l ers t  g e f d h r l i c h e n  Freund; und das Schlimmste an ihm ist, wie sehr er zuriickhalten kann'. Nietzsche 
to Franz Overbeck (6 February 1884) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briejwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von 
Nietzsche: Januar 1880- Dezember 1884, p. 475.
83 Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 66.
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In this sense, Nietzsche clearly does not aim for the explosion of the Western tradition; on the 
contrary: his thinking actually counteracts the dispersion of meaning inherent in the dialectic 
and aims to give things meaning again. It effects, thus, a new concentration of meaning in 
some things and the implosion of others. The fact that it constitutes the very opposite of an 
explosion, however, does not make it benign. The danger of Nietzsche's thinking - the 
danger of which he warned his friend -  is that it gives a new importance to everything and 
that everything will have meaning again.
♦ ♦ ♦
In the light of Nietzsche's own insight into the nature of his thinking, it is certainly curious 
that the tradition of reading his thought as explosion remains virtually unquestioned to date. 
If anything, this approach was consolidated in what could, without undue exaggeration, be 
called a series of explosions in Nietzsche scholarship: in 1960s France and later in the 
Anglophone countries of the West. By contrast, it is remarkable how quiet it has been around 
Nietzsche in the German speaking world, even if the French tradition in Nietzsche 
scholarship has long maintained that Germany is essentially resistant to Nietzsche. Of 
Nietzsche's standing in his homeland, Bataille writes:
I know of no better example of the wall of incomprehension existing between one 
person and his or her country: for fifteen years a whole nation remaining deaf to 
that voice -  isn't this a serious matter? As witnesses to that destruction, we ought 
to look in admiration at the fact that while Germany took the path leading to the 
worst developments, one of the best and most passionate Germans turned away 
from his country with feelings of horror and uncontrollable disgust.84
84 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. xxiii.
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In Kofman's reading, Nietzsche's alienation from Germany actually becomes a central theme. 
By and large, she discerns in Nietzsche a Frenchman in spirit,85 who is indifferent to the 
Germans' ignorance of him. In fact, she argues that
... no German was capable of recognizing him; they all buried his name in an 
absurd silence. But he did not suffer from this, for whatever has the character of 
necessity does not harm him: 'Amor fati: such is the basis of my nature'.86
To be sure, Nietzsche himself makes no secret of his contempt for Germany and the Germans 
as he declares:
The 'German spirit' is my bad air: I find it hard to breathe in the proximity of this 
uncleanliness in psychologicis become instinct which every word, every gesture of 
a German betrays.87
In the last days before his collapse, his aversion to all things German only increases and he 
does, indeed, seem to embrace the idea of himself as a Frenchman, remarking proudly that 
he has been said to write in French.88 At the time, it may well seem that he regards himself as 
a Frenchman in spirit. On the other hand, however, even Kofman herself grants that 
Nietzsche's dislike of all things German could also be the sign of an essential bond. In the 
specific case of his mother and sister, she certainly suggests that his 'attack is all the fiercer as 
it is the reverse of a profound attachment'.89 And indeed, a contempt that roots in profound 
attachment seems to be a defining feature not only of Nietzsche's relationship to his family, 
but of his position vis-a-vis Germany and the Germans on the whole. His aversion to all
85 Cf. Kofman, Explosion I: O f Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo', p. 308.
86 'D'ailleurs aucun Allemand n'a su le reconnoitre: tous ont enseveli son nom dans un absurde silence. Mais il 
n'en soujfrirait pas, car ce qui a le caractere de la necessite ne le blesse pas: "Amor fati: tel est le fond de ma 
nature"'. Kofman, Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 259.
87 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 92.
88 'Ich wiinsche, in Frankreich gelesen zu werden; mehr noch, ich ha.be es notig. [...] Es ist mir nichtsfremd, was 
sich in der geistigen Welt Frankreichs begiebt: man sagt mir, ich schreibe im Grunde franzosisch, obschon ich 
vielleicht mit der deutschen Sprache besonders in meinem Zarathustra, etzoas in Deutschland selbst 
Unerreichtes erreicht habe'. Nietzsche to Jean Bourdeau (draft; around 17 December 1888) in: Colli /  
Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III /5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p p . 532-533.
89'... I'attaque est d'autant plus forte qu'elle est I'envers d'un profond attachement'. Kofman, Explosion I: De 
V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 259.
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things German stems from the fact that he knows the German spirit like nobody else, for he 
has seen German philosophy -  not least, Hegelian dialectics -  for what it is. The silence that 
still surrounds Nietzsche in Germany, on the other hand, suggests that the Germans have 
not yet realized that Nietzsche speaks from their very heart. In fact, Germany was, and 
perhaps still is, so unaware of its spirit, moulded like no other by the dialectical abstraction 
of Aufhebung, that when Nietzsche described it to the Germans, they thought that he spoke a 
different language or that he must be mad. And today, even if Heidegger is not the only 
German who ever really recognized Nietzsche, the lack of German commentaries on a par 
with his still stands in stark contrast to the explosion of Nietzsche scholarship elsewhere. It is 
by this very fact, however, that Germany also remains true to Nietzsche, who already knew 
that his thinking would first manifest itself 'on the periphery and will thence drift back to the 
"fatherland"'.90 In this sense, Nietzsche anticipates the current proliferation of his thinking in 
the West and predicts that it will be superseded by a new concentration of Nietzsche 
scholarship in the German speaking world. It seems, indeed, that only the return to 
Nietzsche's originals could finally diminish the much-disputed and yet undisputed authority 
of Heidegger's reading, which is in fact consolidated in every attempt at saving Nietzsche 
from Heidegger's influence. The tradition of reading Nietzsche against Heidegger as the 
explosion of the Western tradition has, thus, only aggravated the 'power of Heidegger's 
reading', such that today, 'reading Nietzsche ... is inseparable from reading Heidegger'.91 
The authority of Heidegger's interpretation will therefore yield only when Nietzsche's work 
is no longer read as Heidegger's critics read it, but when we return to Nietzsche's beginnings
90 'Principiell weisen alle meine Erfahrungen daraufhin, daft meine Wirksamkeit p e r i p h e r i s c h  beginnt und 
erst von da aus auf das 'Vaterland' zuriickstrdmen wird'. Nietzsche to Ernst Wilhelm Fritzsch (shortly after 
14 April 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887- 
Januar 1889, p. 296.
91 Howard Caygill, 'Affirmation and Eternal Return in the Free Spirit Trilogy' in: Keith Ansell-Pearson 
(ed.), Nietzsche and Modem German Thought (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 216-239 (p. 238).
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and read Nietzsche as Heidegger himself reads him: in German and in the philosophical 
tradition of the West.
Nietzsche Today: Reading the Madness at the Heart of Reason
Nietzsche's predictions for the future, outlandish though they seem, show the extent to 
which he is aware not only of the nature of his thought but of the course by which it will 
change die history of the West. He knows that his own time is not ready for his thinking and 
he resigns himself to waiting,92 but he also knows that the poor reception of his work during 
his lifetime is not only due to his contemporaries' ignorance but to the fact that his thinking 
itself is such that it will 'come to life' only after his death. Indeed, he realizes very early on 
that his thinking will manifest itself only belatedly; thus, he explains:
A very slow and long course will be the fate of my thought -  indeed I believe ... 
in my life only after death and in my death during life. And thus it is proper and 
natural! - 93
If Nietzsche speaks of his life after death, it is certainly not in the Christian sense, for he 
knows that what the Christians call the 'eternal life' is only the existence of the living dead in 
search of the god they have already murdered. Nietzsche has, indeed, seen through the 
dialectical illusion; he knows that the dialectic only aims to negate life and actually stipulates 
another, a 'true' realm of life beyond this world. In this sense, the dialectical age refers to life 
as death and believes in a true life only after death. Nietzsche, however, uses the terms
92 'Man hat keine Zeit fur mich? Gut, so werde ich warten. Was liegt an einer Zeit, die "keine Zeit hat"!' 
Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in Colli /  Montinari (eds.), Nietzsche: Werke, vil/1: Nachgelassene 
Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84, p. 539.
93 'Eine sehr  langsame und lange Bohn wird das Loos meiner Gedanken sein -  ja ich glaube, um mich etwas 
blasphemisch auszudriicken, an m e i n  Leben erst nach dem Tode und an meinen Tod w a h r e n d  des Lebens. 
Und so ist es billig und naturlich! - '  Nietzsche to Ida Overbeck (19 January 1882) in: Colli /  Montinari 
(eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 156.
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differently; he infers that his life on earth will start only after his death. He died during his 
lifetime because he took the dialectical negation to its logical conclusion; and his life on earth 
begins only after his death for it is only then that his thinking, which originates in the 
transcendental heights of the dialectical system, will manifest itself in the world. In this 
sense, Nietzsche's posthumous life is the very reversal of the Christian notion of a life after 
death; and as such, it marks the end of the dialectical age. The coming-to-earth, the 
Niederkunft, of Nietzsche's thinking describes in essence the implosion of the dialectical 
system. And in the sense that Nietzsche will be 'reborn' in the collapse of the dialectic, his 
thinking also spells the beginning of a new age. Indeed, on several occasions, Nietzsche 
announces that his thought will 'break the history of the world into two halves'; thus, as he 
writes:
I am preparing an event, which will in all probability break history into two 
halves, to the extent that we will have a new calendar: with 1888 as the year One. 
...we will have wars unlike any today, but not between nations, not between 
classes: Everything is blown apart, -  I am the most terrible dynamite that there 
is.94
Once again, Nietzsche compares himself to dynamite, but again it seems that he employs the 
metaphor to illustrate not so much a moment of explosion as one of concentration. He is 
certainly not threatening to blow up everything -  on the contrary: he notes that 'everything is 
blown up' and therefore suggests, in fact, that the explosion has already happened. In the 
image of the explosion, Nietzsche comments thus not on the future impact of his thought but 
on the devastation wreaked by the dialectical age. Indeed, Nietzsche's thinking is not aiming
94 'Ich bereite ein Ereignifi vor, welches hochst wahrscheinlich die Geschichte in zwei Hdlften spaltet, bis zu dem 
Punkte, dafl wir eine neue Zeitrechnung haben werden: von 1888 als Jahr Eins an. ... wir werden Kriege haben, 
wie es keine giebt, aber n i c h t  zwischen Nationen, n i c h t  zwischen Stdnden: Alles ist auseinander gesprengt, -  
ich bin das furchtbarste Dynamit, das es giebt'. Nietzsche to Georg Brandes (early December 1888) in: 
Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 500; 
cf. also Nietzsche to Constantin Georg Naumann (early October 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 447.
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for destruction at all; even if it stipulates the collapse of the philosophical tradition of the 
West, it ultimately strives to create the possibility of a new age of human civilization on 
earth. It is in the sense that Nietzsche's thought concludes the explosive age of dialectics and 
introduces an era which will define being as Niederkunft that it separates the history of the 
world into two epochs. On the whole, Nietzsche's predictions of the future seem vague at 
best and mostly even downright fantastic, but ultimately they are always incredibly precise. 
The fact that he describes Thus Spoke Zarathustra as
-  the most profound and decisive event -  of the soul, with respect! -  between two
millennia, die second and the third - 95
would, thus, indicate that ours will be the age to witness the realization of Nietzsche's 
thinking for the first time. And indeed, the recent proliferation of Nietzsche scholarship 
would suggest that we are not only thoroughly prepared for the impact of Nietzsche's 
thinking but that we are, in fact, eagerly anticipating it. Ultimately, however, our age is still 
grounded in dialectical reason, and in dialectics, 'the familiar, just because it is familiar is not 
cognitively understood'.96 In fact, its dialectical roots blind our age not only to what it 
regards as familiar, but also to its own essence; thus, it does not know that it is blind to the 
familiar, because it does not know itself.97 And in this sense, it certainly seems that although 
and precisely because our age preoccupies itself with Nietzsche in the way and to the extent 
that it does, it is not at all ready for the real impact of his thought.
9 5 das tiefste und entscheidendste Ereignifi - d e r  See le,  mit Erlaubnifi! -  zwischen zwei Jahrtausenden, dem 
zweiten und dem dritten Nietzsche to Carl Spitteler (10 February 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), 
Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 247.
96 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 18; cf. 'Das Bekannte iiberhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht 
erkannt'. Hegel, Werke, III: Phdnomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 35.
97 Cf. Heidegger's argument that 'Being itself necessarily remains unthought in metaphysics'. 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism, p. 211.
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The fact that Nietzsche's influence seems to be ubiquitous in contemporary thought 
reflects, indeed, only negatively on the readiness of the age for his thinking, for scholarship 
is essentially incapable of representing the true impact of his thought, given that the 
realization of his thought implies precisely the end of scholarship as it has been hitherto. The 
scholarship of our age ultimately still operates in dialectical terms; it still aspires to an 
abstraction from life and maintains thus precisely the otherworldly realm that will be 
abolished in Nietzsche's thinking. Although we engage with Nietzsche's thinking like never 
before, our scholarship is effectively still opposed to it; in fact, it is precisely because we 
embrace Nietzsche's thought in theory that our age still opposes it in practice. And indeed, 
the thinker who rejects the valuation of theory over and above life is today still read 
theoretically. There is no doubt a certain paradox in writing about Nietzsche, of which 
Heidegger, for one, was well aware. In the sense that his study of Nietzsche takes the form of 
lectures, it is actually in the less theoretical form of the word; and in general,
Heidegger sees writing as a danger which threatens thought just as much as does
madness.98
In Nietzsche's case, madness is not so much a threat to thinking as an illustration of it; in fact, 
he shows that madness is the logical and the only possible outcome of thinking as the West 
defines it. Writing, however -  Nietzsche's own writing, as well as writing on Nietzsche - 
does actually threaten his thought in that it presupposes the very abstraction that his 
thinking seeks to resist. It facilitates the theoretical appropriation of Nietzsche's thought with 
all the dialectical connotations that this entails and therefore allows for the dialectical age to 
annihilate it precisely in its appropriation. If Heidegger aims to speak about Nietzsche rather 
than write about him and even in the printed version retains the form of the lectures, 
apologizing in advance that 'the written and printed text lacks the advantages of oral
98 Kofman, 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', p. 68.
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p resen ta tio n 'h e  proves how receptive he is to the nature of Nietzsche's thinking. Indeed, 
Nietzsche believes that writing is, and should be, the imitation of speech.100 Even if he does 
not attest to a priority of speech over writing in the sense that Derrida criticizes in Of 
Grammatology,101 he rates writing as an imitation -  an abstract, theoretical representation -  of 
life. And accordingly, he regards reading only as recreation102 and respite from life. In this 
sense, Nietzsche clearly overturns the Western belief that reading and writing pertain to a 
truly human life and that they are therefore worthy over and above life itself; for he actually 
treats them as far less pressing than what appear to us to be the simple considerations of life. 
No doubt Kofman speaks for many readers of Nietzsche when she asks -  albeit rhetorically -  
whether Nietzsche, who claims to be destined to great things, does not risk the seriousness of 
his task by concerning himself only with what appear to be trivialities -  questions of food, 
location, climate and leisure.103 This concern with mundane matters features not only in Ecce 
Homo, where Kofman detects it, but prevails in the whole of Nietzsche's writing; and it is 
integral to his thought. Indeed, Nietzsche often illustrates how his concern with seemingly 
mundane affairs is essential to his thinking, but his imagery is such that these explanations 
have been read as signs of impending madness. The 'madness' of his statements, however, 
stems from the fact that he is trying to put into words that the old system of meaning -  and 
hence of 'putting into words' -  has collapsed and will be replaced with one that originates in 
this thinking. If he declares that the 'world is transfigured [verklart], for god is on earth',104 he 
states only that there is no longer a transcendental guarantor of meaning. And in saying that
99 Heidegger, Nietzsche, volumes I and II, p. xl.
100 Nietzsche to Lou Salom<§ (8/24 August 1882) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m /1 :  
Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 244.
101 Cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (corrected edition; 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 27-73.
102 Kofman, Explosion I: De l"Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 366; cf. also pp. 301-320.
103 Kofman, Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 377.
104 'Die Welt ist verklart, denn Gott ist aufder Erde'. Nietzsche to Meta von Salis (3 January 1889) in: Colli 
/  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Briefwechsel, m/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 572.
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the world is standing on its head, that the old god has abdicated and that he himself will 
now reign over the world,105 he announces that it is his thinking which will give new 
meaning to the world -  and only the world, for the transcendental realm has been abolished. 
And once there is no longer a transcendental world -  a god, a heaven, a realm of ideas - 
there is no longer anything more important than the mundanities of this life. Thought cannot 
lay claim to a universal validity over and above life any more, which is not to say that there 
cannot be thinking and even abstract thinking, but that thinking will no longer be opposed to 
life, devoid of life and indifferent to life. In the sense that thinking as Nietzsche defines it 
refers to life and not only to itself, as dialectical thought does, it will be radically different 
from what our age knows as scholarly and philosophical thought. Today, thinking pertains 
to life only if it is literally about the trivialities of life. Nietzsche's concern with the seemingly 
mundane questions of life is, thus, not an adjunct to his thinking -  on the contrary: it 
constitutes its revolutionary quality. In thinking about food, climate and location, he 
anticipates the redefinition of thinking that is inherent in his thought. In this sense, his 
remarks about seemingly trivial questions of life by no means challenge his philosophical 
project, as Kofman's rhetoric might suggest. Nor is Nietzsche simply advocating a 
philosophy of the future which will incorporate the mundane questions of life.106 His 
thinking changes thinking itself such that it will relate to life as only thoughts about 
trivialities relate to life today. And in this sense, Nietzsche's remarks about the trivialities of 
life actually constitute some of his most radical philosophizing and pave the way for the 
realization of his thought.
♦ ♦ ♦
105 'Die ndchsten Jahre steht die Welt auf dem Kopf: nach dem der alte Gott abgedankt ist, werde ich  von nun 
an die Welt regieren'. Nietzsche to Carl Fuchs (11 December 1888) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: 
Briefwechsel, m/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887-Januar 1889, p. 522.
106 Cf. Kofman, Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche, p. 291.
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As the impact of Nietzsche's thinking is such that it spells the end of dialectical scholarship, 
thought as it is defined today is essentially incapable of rendering its implications. The true 
magnitude of Nietzsche's thinking will manifest itself not in the abstraction of thought, but 
in life itself. We will first recognize Nietzsche's thinking as the world we thought we had 
mastered starts 'standing on its head' and under the growing influence of the anti-dialectical 
principle becomes 'unreasonable' again. And as the anti-dialectical principle takes hold at 
the very heart of the dialectic,107 it is precisely in those areas of life that have been most 
firmly in the grip of dialectical abstraction that we will first realize the impact of Nietzsche's 
thinking -  and can, indeed, already see it today. The dialectical principle originates in the 
exchange, the dialogue and generally the human interaction of the ancient polis, particularly 
in the market, the parliament and the academy; and it is precisely these institutions, which 
incorporate the dialectical principle in its purest form, that have today been most 
significantly transformed by the emergence of the anti-dialectical principle. The market, once 
believed to regulate itself for the benefit of all,108 has now become as capricious as life itself 
and governs us as chance and as necessity alike, and such that these are, as Nietzsche 
predicts, no longer opposites. The parliament, conceived in the belief that dialogue is the 
means to the truth, serves today only the consolidation of one principal worldview. And the 
academy, dedicated in its inception to the principle of Bildung and hence to shaping and 
literally building the world -  and man himself -  according to ideas,109 is today so far 
removed from the notion that thinking should, and will, result in a change in the world that
107 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
108 Cf. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R. H. 
Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).
109 Cf. 'Work is Bildung, in the double meaning of the word: on the one hand, it forms, transforms, the 
World, humanizes it by making it more adapted to Man; on the other, it transforms, forms, educates 
man, it humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with the idea that he has of himself, an 
idea that -  in the beginning -  is only an abstract idea, an ideal'. Koj&ve, Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel, p. 52.
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it conveys how to adjust to the world as it is. This demise of the Bildung principle does not 
mean that we can no longer change the world; it illustrates, however, that a fundamental 
change of the world today will not originate in the abstract realm of thought but in life itself. 
In this sense, it indicates in its own right that if the impact of Nietzsche's thinking is such 
that it changes the world fundamentally, it will not manifest itself in scholarship and in the 
institution dedicated to Bildung. Even Heidegger, who studies Nietzsche in the strictest sense 
of the term and thus seeks to grasp his thought in the abstract, is already aware that only the 
manifestation of Nietzsche's thinking in the world would show its full implications. 'What 
else', he asks,
is the essence of the modern power-driven machine than one offshoot of the 
eternal recurrence of the same? But the essence of such machines is neither 
something machine-like nor anything mechanical. Just as little can Nietzsche's 
thought of eternal recurrence of the same be interpreted in a mechanical sense.110
In this sense, Heidegger grants that Nietzsche's thinking already manifests itself in the world 
today and manifests itself, indeed, in the most calculated, most rational and most lifeless 
environment that the dialectical age has created. It is not the 'mechanical' quality of the 
machine, however, which demonstrates the eternal return of the same -  on the contrary: it is 
the fact that the machine, the highest achievement of the dialectical negation of the world, is 
today no longer simply 'machine-like', for despite its mechanical regularity, it is as 
unreasonable as life itself in its dominance of the human. It is actually not the malfunctioning 
of a machine that testifies to the anti-dialectical principle at the heart of its perfectly 
dialectical operation. The uncanny and unexpected thing about technology is the very fact
110 Heidegger, 'Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?' in: Nietzsche: II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, pp. 
209-233 (p. 233).
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that it works.111 And precisely because it works, it could establish as capricious a rule over us 
as life itself once had. The same quality that makes technology the epitome of the dialectical 
age is also what generates its anti-dialectical function, and it is in this sense that it 
incorporates the realization of Nietzsche's thinking in the world.
♦ ♦ ♦
The fact that our scholarship is essentially incapable of rendering the implications of 
Nietzsche's thinking in their entirety prompts the question of what reading Nietzsche could 
achieve today. Indeed, if Nietzsche's thought is already realizing itself in the world, it may 
seem that this is no longer the time to read him after all. The 'right' time to read Nietzsche 
has always been something of a conundrum, not least for Nietzsche himself. He often 
expresses his fear of being misunderstood by those who read him too early, but he grants 
that even the years will not prevent the misinterpretation of his works. 'Who knows', he 
muses,
how many generations will have to pass in order to bring forth a few people who 
understand the whole depth of what I have done! And even then I am frightened 
at the thought of the unauthorized and totally unsuitable people who will refer to 
my authority.112
Today, we are indeed no less prone to misinterpreting Nietzsche's work than previous 
readers; it is only now, however, that it is possible to see the 'whole depth' of what Nietzsche
111 'Esjunktioniert alles. Das ist gerade das Unheimliche, dafi es funktioniert und dafi das Funktionieren immer 
weiter treibt zu einem weiteren Funktionieren'. Heidegger, 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', Der 
Spiegel, 23/1976 (31 May 1976), 193-219 (p. 206).
112 'Wer zveifi wie viele Generationen erst voriiber gehen miissen/  urn einige Menschen heruorzubringen, die es 
in seiner ganzen Tiefe nachfuhlen, w a s  ich gethan habe! Und dann selbst noch macht mir der Gedanke 
Schrecken, was fur Unberechtigte und ganzlich Ungeeignete sich einmal auf meine Autoritdt berufen werden'. 
Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug (early May 1884) in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: 
Briefwechsel, Ill/l: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884, p. 499.
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has done, for we can see the implications of his thinking not only in the abstraction of 
thought but in the reality of the world. Reading Nietzsche today -  reading Nietzsche as he 
can be read today -  entails, thus, the possibility of reading Nietzsche such that 'reading' is 
not the purely abstract encounter that it has been in the dialectical age but such that it 
heralds a way of reading and of thought in general which does not stipulate the negation of 
life. It is not that the realization of Nietzsche's thought spells the end of all abstract thinking, 
but it abolishes the primacy of the abstraction over life that the dialectic presupposes. After 
Nietzsche, thinking originates in this life and remains in this life; it can be abstract, but never 
transcendental and it reaches for the sky, but not the heavens. Indeed, although 'many new 
gods are still possible', Nietzsche points out that
Zarathustra himself ... is only an old atheist. Be sure to understand him rightly!
Zarathusta may say he would but Zarathustra will not.. .113
Zarathustra, the reincarnation of the philosopher who became god, is an atheist; he might say 
that he will become god just like Hegel had, but he will not. Nietzsche knows that there 
would be many new ideas seeking to take the vacant chair of the old god, but he also knows 
that there could be a mode of thought which allows for a degree of abstraction without 
negating this world. His prophet Zarathustra, the climber, aims no doubt for an elevated 
perspective overlooking the world, but he always remains in the world: he strives for the 
perspective of a mountaineer or even of an eagle -  but never for that of god. And in this 
sense, Nietzsche's thinking shows not only how 'pure' dialectical reason inevitably leads to 
madness, but also heralds the promise of a new mode of thought. Indeed, if thinking, as 
Heidegger argues, can begin 'only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for
113 'Nochmals gesagt: wie viele neue Goiter sind noch moglich! -  Zarathustra selbst freilich ist blofi ein alter 
Atheist. Man verstehe ihn rechtl Zarathustra sagt zwar, er w i i r d e  aber Zarathustra w i r d  nicht...'. 
Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente' in: Colli /  Montinari (eds), Nietzsche: Werke, Vlll/3: 
Nachgelassene Fragmente: Anfang 1888-Anfang Januar 1889, p. 324.
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centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought',114 the realization of Nietzsche's 
thought will allow for thinking proper for the first time in the modem world. In this sense, 
Nietzsche's thinking actually shows a way out of the madness of dialectics. It creates a world 
where the gods live on the hills or in the mountains, like in ancient Greece; where thinking 
makes sense of the world without negating it and where the sages climb but never reach a 
truer world than this one and never find a god who gives meaning to the world only by first 
taking it out of the world. Today, as we are beginning to realize Nietzsche's thinking in a 
world that is standing on its head, even reading Nietzsche could, indeed, transcend the 
abstract realm of ideas and become the bringing-forth of a new mode of thought. Nietzsche 
himself certainly seems convinced that our age would be ready for his thought. In September 
1886, he warns Malwida von Meysenbug against reading the latest one of his books, Beyond 
Good and Evil, suggesting that she 'assume that people will be allowed to read it in about the 
year 2000'.115 And if he deems us, but not his friend, ready for his thinking, is it not because 
now that we are beginning to see the demise of the dialectical age in our everyday lives, we 
are already -  consciously or unconsciously -  not only thinking but living the prelude to a 
philosophy of the future?116
114 Heidegger, 'The Word of Nietzsche: "God is Dead'", translated by William Lovitt, in: Conway (ed.), 
Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, II:'The World as Will to Power -  and Nothing Else?': Metaphysics and 
Epistemology, pp. 91-135 (p. 129).
115 Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug (24 September 1886) in: Middleton (ed.), Selected Letters of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 256.
116 'Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future' is the subtitle of Beyond Good and Evil.
202
Bibliography
(Dictionaries are listed separately at the end.)
Adorno, Theodor W.: Aesthetic Theory, translated by C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1984)
— Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 2003)
Allison, David B. (ed.): The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation (Cambridge, 
Massachussets: MIT Press, 1985)
Althaus, Horst: Hegel: An Intellectual Biography, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2000)
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (ed.): Nietzsche and Modem German Thought (London: Routledge, 1991)
Arendt, Hannah: The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989)
Bames, Jonathan (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume II (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984)
Bataille, Georges: The Accursed Share, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Zone), I: 
Consumption (1991); Volumes II and III (1993), II: The History of Eroticism, and III: Sovereignty 
— Eroticism, translated by Mary Dalwood (London: Marion Boyars, 1987)
— Inner Experience, translated by Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1988)
— My Mother/Mme Edwarda /  The Dead Man, translated by Austryn Wainhouse (London: 
Marion Boyars, 1995)
A  Telling Silence: Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
 On Nietzsche, translated by Bruce Boone (London: Athlone, 2000)
Beauvoir, Simone de: The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 1997)
Benjamin, Walter: Gesammelte Schriften, rv/1 (Werkausgabe Band 10): Kleine Prosa /  Baudelaire- 
Ubertragungen, edited by Tillman Rexroth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980)
Blanchot, Maurice: The Step Not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1992)
 The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1995)
Bullock, Marcus /  Jennings, Michael W. (eds): Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 1:1913-1926 
(Cambridge, Massachussets: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996)
Burgard, Peter J. (ed.): Nietzsche and the Feminine (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1994)
Colli, Giorgio /  Montinari, Mazzino (eds): Nietzsche: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: 
de Gruy ter)
— m/1: Die Geburt der Tragodie/  Unzeitgemdfie Betrachtungen 7-777, 1872-1874 (1972)
 IV/3: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Zweiter Band)/Nachgelassene Fragmente:
Friihling 1878-November 1879 (1967)
— V /l: Morgenrdthe/Nachgelassene Fragmente: Anfang 1880-Fnihjahr 1881 (1971)
— V/2: ldyllen aus Messina/ Die frohliche Wissenschaft/ Nachgelassene Fragmente:
Friihjahr 1881 bis Sommer 1882 (1973)
— Vl/1: Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-1885) (1968)
— Vl/2: Jenseits von Gut und Bose/Zur Genealogie der Moral (1886-1887) (1968)
— VI/3: Der Fall Wagner/  Gotzen-Dammerung/ Nachgelassene Schriften (August 1888- 
Anfang Januar 1889): Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysos-Dithyramben / Nietzsche contra 
Wagner (1969)
 VII/1: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Juli 1882-Winter 1883/84 (1977)
 Vll/2: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Friihjahr bis Herbst 1884 (1974)
204
A  (TeCRng Silence: ^Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
— VIl/3: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Herbst 1884-Herbst 1885 (1974)
— V III/3: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Anfang 1888-Anfang Januar 1889 (1972)
— Nietzsche: Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter)
— m/1: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1880-Dezember 1884 (1981)
— Ill/3: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1885-Dezember 1886 (1982)
 III/5: Briefe von Nietzsche: Januar 1887- Januar 1889 (1984)
Conway, Daniel W. (ed.): Nietzsche: Critical Assessments (London: Routledge, 1998)
— I: Incipit Zarathustra /  Incipit Tragoedia: Art, Music, Representation, and Style 
— II: 'The World as Will to Power -  and Nothing Else?': Metaphysics and Epistemology
Deleuze, Gilles: Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 
1983)
Derrida, Jacques: Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996)
— Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone, 1993)
— The Ear of the Other: Otiobiography, Transference, Translation, edited by Christie McDonald, 
translated by Peggy Kamuf from the French edition by Claude Levesque and Christie 
McDonald (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988)
— The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
— Glas, translated by John P. Leavey jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1990)
— OfGrammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (corrected edition; Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)
— Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass (London: Prentice Hall, 1982)
— 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives', translated 
by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14/2 (1984), 20-31 
— Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, 
translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994)
 Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles /  tperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, translated by Barbara Harlow
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979)
205
A  TeCCing Silence: Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
— L'Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978)
— The Work of Mourning, edited by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001)
Docherty, Thomas (ed.): Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993)
Dudley, Will: Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Euripides: Alcestis /  The Medea/The Heracleidae /  Hipplytus, edited by David Grene and 
Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955)
Farrell Krell, David /  Wood, David (eds): Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary 
Nietzsche Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1988)
Freud, Sigmund: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
XVII: (1917-19): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, translated by James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: Werke, III: Dramatische Dichtungen, Erster Band (Hamburg: 
Christian Wegner, 1957)
— Faust: Parts I  &  I I ,  translated by Albert G. Latham (London: Dent & Sons, 1908)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977)
— Philosophy of Right, translated by S. W. Dyde (London: Bell, 1896)
— Werke, III: Phanomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970)
Heidegger, Martin: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993) 
— Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1962)
— Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988)
206
A  'IeCRng Silence: Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
— Nietzsche: Volumes I  and I I , translated by David Farrell Krell, I: The Will to Power as Art; II: 
The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991)
— Nietzsche: Volumes I I I  and I V ,  edited by David Farrell Krell, III: The Will to Power as 
Knowledge and as Metaphysics, translated by Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell and Frank 
A. Capuzzi; IV: Nihilism, translated by Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991) 
— 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', Der Spiegel, 23/1976 (31 May 1976), 193-219
Heinamaa, Sara: Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)
Hesiod: The Works and Days /  Theogony /  The Shield ofHerakles, translated by Richmond 
Lattimore (n. p.: University of Michigan Press, 1959)
The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, translated out of the original 
tongues: and with the former translations diligently compared and revised by his Majesty's 
special command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, n. d.)
Horkheimer, Max: Critique of Instrumental Reason, translated by Matthew J. O'Connell and 
others (New York: Continuum, 1994)
Horkheimer, Max /  Adorno, Theodor W.: Dialectic of Enlightenment, edited by Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, translated by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)
Irigaray, Luce: Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991)
Jagentowicz Mills, Patricia (ed.): Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996)
Jaspers, Karl: Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, 
translated by Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997)
207
A  ‘Telling Silence: INietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
Jones, Ernest: Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, II: Years of Maturity: 1901-1919 (London: Hogarth, 
1955)
Jowett, B. (ed.): The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett, volume IV (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1964)
Jurist, Elliot L.: Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency (Cambridge, 
Massachussets: MIT Press, 2000)
Kamuf, Peggy (ed.): A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991)
Klossowski, Pierre: Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, translated by Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997)
Kofman, Sarah: Explosion I: De V'Ecce Homo' de Nietzsche (Paris: Galilee, 1992)
 Explosion II:  Les enfants de Nietzsche (Paris: Galilee, 1993)
— 'Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo', translated by Duncan Large in collaboration with 
the author, Diacritics 24/4 (Winter 1994), 51-70
— Nietzsche and Metaphor, translated by Duncan Large (London: Athlone, 1993)
Kojeve, Alexandre: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
assembled by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols jr. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980)
Lowith, Karl: Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionare Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten 
Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1969)
Lyotard, Jean-Frangois: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984)
Marx, Karl: Early Writings, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: 
Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1992)
208
J? Teflmg Silence: Sfietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
Marx, Karl /  Engels, Frederick: The German Ideology, edited by C. J. Arthur (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1970)
— Selected Works in Two Volumes, volume I (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1950)
Melville, Herman: The Standard Edition of the Works, X: The Piazza Tales (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1963)
Middleton, Christopher (ed.): Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Christopher 
Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969)
Murray, Peter: "Nietzsche's New Wiederkunft', Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 17 (1999), 70-72
Nehamas, Alexander: Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard 
University Press, 1985)
Nietzsche, Friedrich: Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translated by 
R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990)
 The Birth of Tragedy, translated by Shaun Whiteside (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993)
 Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (London:
Penguin, 2004)
— The Gay Science, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974)
— Human, All Too Human, translated by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984)
 On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994)
— The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, translated by Greg Whitlock (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001)
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A  Book for Everyone and No One, translated by R. J. Hollingdale
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969)
 Twilight of the Idols /  The Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1990)
209
A  Ceding Silence: Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the (Dialectic
 The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York:
Vintage, 1968)
Oksala, Johanna: 'What is feminist phenomenology? -  Thinking Birth Philosophically', 
Radical Philosophy, 126 (July/ August 2004), 16-22
Oliver, Kelly /  Pearsall, Marilyn (eds): Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998)
Orage, A. R.: Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age (London: Foulis, 1914)
Ormiston, Gayle /  Schrift, Alan D. (eds): Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche 
to Nancy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990)
Patton, Paul (ed.): Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory (London: Routledge, 1993)
Plato: Phaedrus, translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
 The Republic, translated by Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987)
Schatz, Holger: Arbeit als Herrschaft: Die Krise des Leistungsprinzips und seine neoliberale 
Rekonstruktion (Munster: Unrast, 2004)
Smith, Adam: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R. H. 
Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976)
Weber, Max: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons 
(London: Unwin University Books, 1974)
210
A  Telling Silence: Nietzsche on the (Downfall of the Dialectic
Dictionaries
Atkinson, David J. /  Field, David H. et al (eds): New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral 
Theology (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995)
Grimm, Jakob /  Grimm, Wilhelm: Deutsches Worterbuch (Leipzig: Hirzel)
 1. Band: A -  Biermolke (1854)
— III. Band: E-Forsche (1862)
 IV. Band, I. Abteilung, III. Teil: Getreide -  Gewdhniglich (1911)
 IV. Band, I. Abteilung, rv. Teil: Gewdhnlich-Gleve (1949)
 VI. Band: L-M (1885)
 XI. Band, I. Abteilung, I. Band: T-Treftig (1935)
 XI. Band, III. Abteilung: Un-Uzvogel (1936)
 XIV. Band, I. Abteilung, II. Teil: Wenig -  Wiking (1960)
Murray, James A. H. /  Bradley, Henry et al (eds): The Oxford English Dictionary, second 
edition prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989)
 v: Dvandva-Follis
 XVIII: Thro-Unelucidated
Pearsall, Judy (ed.): The New Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998)
Pilard, Georges et al (eds): Harrap's Shorter Dictionary (Chambers Harrap: Edinburgh, 2000)
Scholze-Stubenrecht, W. /  Sykes, J. B. et al (eds): The Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, revised 
edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997)
Wildhagen, Karl /  Heraucourt, Will: English-German, German-English Dictionary in Two 
Volumes (Wiesbaden: Brandstetter; London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), II: German-English
211
